




Fully updated second edition
Greg McLaughlin
First published 2002
Fully updated second edition first published 2016 by Pluto Press
345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA 
www.plutobooks.com
Copyright © Greg McLaughlin 2002, 2016
The right of Greg McLaughlin to be identified as the author of this work has 
been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act 1988.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978 0 7453 3319 9 Hardback
ISBN 978 0 7453 3318 2 Paperback
ISBN 978 1 7837 1758 3 PDF eBook
ISBN 978 1 7837 1760 6 Kindle eBook
ISBN 978 1 7837 1759 0 EPUB eBook
 
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully 
managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing 
processes are expected to conform to the environmental standards of the 
country of origin. 
Typeset by Stanford DTP Services, Northampton, England
Simultaneously printed in the European Union and United States of America





 1 Introduction 1
PART I:  THE WAR CORRESPONDENT IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE
 2  The War Correspondent: Risk, Motivation and Tradition 9
 3  Journalism, Objectivity and War 33
 4  From Luckless Tribe to Wireless Tribe: The Impact of Media 
Technologies on War Reporting 63
PART II: THE WAR CORRESPONDENT AND THE MILITARY
 5  Getting to Know Each Other: From Crimea to Vietnam 93
 6  Learning and Forgetting: From the Falklands to the Gulf 118
 7  Goodbye Vietnam Syndrome: The Embed System in  
Afghanistan and Iraq 141
PART III:  THE WAR CORRESPONDENT AND IDEOLOGICAL 
FRAMEWORKS
 8  Reporting the Cold War and the New World Order 161
 9  Reporting the ‘War on Terror’ and the Return of the Evil  
Empire 190
10  Conclusions: ‘Telling Truth To Power’ – the Ultimate Role of  




Appendix 1  International Press Institute: Recommendations  
to News Organisations for Improving Journalists’  
Safety 221
Appendix 2  The ‘Surviving Hostile Regions’ Course for War  
Correspondents 222
Appendix 3  British Ministry of Defence (MoD) Green Book 
Guidelines for the British Media Reporting the  
Gulf War, 1991 224
Appendix 4  US Military Ground Rules for Media Reporting  
of the Gulf War, 1991 225
Appendix 5  US Department of Defense (DoD) Public Affairs 
Guidance (2003) for Embedded Reporters 226
Appendix 6  British Ministry of Defence (MoD) Green Book,  
2013: Working Arrangements with the Media for  
Use Through the Full Spectrum of Conflict 229
Appendix 7 British Newspaper Descriptions of President Putin 
During the Crimea Crisis, 21 February–20 March  
2014 231
Appendix 8 British Newspaper Descriptions of President Putin’s 
Policies and Actions During the Crimea Crisis,  






Warm thanks and appreciation to the people who helped me see this 
book through to completion and into production: 
At Pluto Press, commissioning editor, David Castle, for his priceless 
patience and wise counsel; managing editor, Robert Webb, for his expert 
supervision of the book’s production; copy editor Nuala Ernest for her 
guidance and advice; and Melanie Patrick and her colleagues, Emily 
Orford, Kieran O’Connor and Chris Browne, for their superb cover 
design and promotional work. 
At the University of Ulster, my good friends and colleagues Martin 
McLoone, for his constructive comments on early drafts, and Stephen 
Baker for his valuable review of the final manuscript; Head of School, 
Colm Murphy, for giving me time and space when most needed; and 
Carol, Sally and Lisa for their amazing admin support and for keeping 
me grounded. 
Thanks once again to the journalists who provided such great 
interview material for the first edition: Christiane Amanpour, Martin 
Bell, Victoria Brittain, Robert Fisk, Nik Gowing, Lindsey Hilsum, Mark 
Laity, Jacques Leslie, Jake Lynch, Mike Nicholson, Maggie O’Kane, John 
Pilger, John Simpson, Alex Thomson and Mark Urban; and to NATO 
press secretary, Jamie Shea. Their insights and arguments have stood the 
test of time so many years later. Special thanks also to Mary Dejevsky 
and Alex Thomson for giving me such rich interview material for this 
new edition. 
On the home front, the love and faith of my mum, brothers and sisters 
was as crucial as always. But I don’t think I would have made it to the end 
without Sue and her endless love, belief and support.
Míle buíochas do gach duine.
x
Abbreviations
ABC American Broadcasting Company
AP Associated Press
APTN  Associated Press Television News
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation 
BEF British Expeditionary Force
CBS Columbia Broadcasting System
CINCLANT Commander-in-Chief of the US Atlantic Fleet
CNN Cable News Network
CPJ Committee to Protect Journalists
DoD Department of Defense (US)
FEC Far Eastern Command
IDF Israel Defence Forces
IED Improvised Explosive Device
INSS Institute for National Security Studies
IPI International Press Institute
ITN Independent Television News
MoD Ministry of Defence (UK)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NBC National Broadcasting Company
PAG Public Affairs Guidance 
PTSD post-traumatic stress disorder
RTLM Radio-Television Libre des Milles Collines 
SAS Special Air Service 





William Howard Russell is widely regarded as one of the first war cor-
respondents to write for a commercial daily newspaper. He became 
famous for his dispatches from the Crimean War, 1854–56, for The 
Times and he seemed to appreciate that he was blazing a trail for a new 
breed of journalist, calling himself the ‘miserable parent of a luckless 
tribe’. Charles Page, an American contemporary of Russell, also seemed 
to see the miserable and luckless side of the job. In an article entitled An 
Invalid’s Whims...The Miseries of Correspondents, he compared himself 
and his colleagues to invalids, ‘proverbially querulous and unreasonable. 
They may fret and scold, abuse their toast and their friends, scatter their 
maledictions and their furniture’ (1898, p.  143). The war correspon-
dent, he warned, ‘will inevitably write things that will offend somebody. 
Somebody will say harsh things of you, and perhaps seek you out to 
destroy you. Never mind. Such is a part of the misery of correspondents’ 
(ibid., p. 146). During the Anglo Zulu war of 1879, a ‘Special Correspon-
dent’ for the Natal Witness (19 June) complained that ‘[To] enthusiastic 
persons, the position of War Correspondent may be a very pretty one...
but a little practical experience of such work will rub off a great deal of 
its gloss’ (Laband and Knight, 1996, p. v). 
More recent and contemporary accounts suggest these impressions 
have changed little since the nineteenth century. In Dispatches, Michael 
Herr recalls some of the things political commentators and newspaper 
columnists called him and his colleagues during the course of the Vietnam 
War. They were called ‘thrill freaks, death-wishers, wound-seekers, 
war-lovers, hero-worshippers, closet queens, dope addicts, low-grade 
alcoholics, ghouls, communists [and] seditionists [...]’ (1978, p.  183). 
With the growth of media journalism in the 1990s, the media reporting 
the media, war reporting has become a story itself. Coverage of war is 
bound to feature articles and TV programmes looking at various issues 
that reporters face in the war zone. As the first bombs fell on Afghanistan 
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in October, 2001, the Independent carried a special feature item on 13 
October, highlighting the conditions experienced by journalists who 
were not even in the country a week but were already missing their home 
comforts: ‘Reporters live on bread, onions and water from gutter’; ‘Foreign 
correspondents are down to one lavatory per 45 people’. The capture by 
the Taliban of the Sunday Express reporter Yvonne Ridley seemed to 
put these discomforts into perspective, if we were to believe ‘a world 
exclusive’ in the Daily Express, published just after her eventual release 
on 8 October 2001. The front-page splash highlighted Ridley’s ‘Taliban 
Hell’, in which she lay captive in a ‘filthy, rat-infested prison cell’, ‘went 
on hunger strike’ and ‘fought with vicious guards’. She even ‘risked death 
to keep secret diary for Express readers’ (9 October 2001). According 
to Ridley, the true story was rather less dramatic. She told the media 
that the prison conditions were bearable and that the Taliban treated 
her well.1 In coincidence with Ridley’s release, the British Broadcasting 
Corporation’s (BBC’s) chief news correspondent, Kate Adie, was being 
pilloried by the British popular press for allegedly revealing embargoed 
information about Prime Minister Tony Blair’s itinerary in the Middle 
East, where he was undertaking a tour to drum up Arab support for 
the war in Afghanistan. In fact, she inadvertently confirmed a leading 
question from her news anchor about Blair’s next stop. Amid furious 
complaints from 10 Downing Street, the BBC failed to protect her from 
the flak even in the wake of a full front page headline from The Sun: ‘Sack 
Kate Adie!’(10 October 2001). Adie threatened libel action against The 
Sun and suggested that the original breach of security, such that it was, 
lay with 10 Downing Street for the way in which they briefed the media. 
Some critics suspected sinister government spin because it seemed all 
too convenient that the row helped deflect public attention away from 
difficult domestic stories.2
There are other impressions and depictions of the war reporter in 
the wider culture. The movies usually depict journalists as hard-boiled, 
cynical or dissolute scoundrels; but in films such as Salvador (dir. 
Oliver Stone, 1983) or The Killing Fields (dir. Roland Joffé, 1984), the 
war correspondent is depicted as a hero, risking life and limb to report 
the story and ‘telling truth to power’ (McNair, 2010; pp.  57–133).3 In 
Evelyn Waugh’s newspaper satire, Scoop (1938), anti-hero William Boot 
of the Beast, goes off to report a war in the fictional African country 
of Ishmaelia, with no experience and for no other reason than he has 
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been sent there by his editor, Lord Copper. In a situation that many 
experienced war correspondents today would recognise as an example 
of ‘parachute journalism’, Boot recalls his big moment with blasé 
wonderment and naivety:
Two months ago, when Lord Copper summoned me from my desk 
in the Beast office, to handle the biggest news story of the century, 
I had never been to Ishmaelia, I knew little of foreign politics. I was 
being pitted against the most brilliant brains, the experience, and the 
learning of the civilized world. I had nothing except my youth, my will 
to succeed, and what – for want of a better word – I must call my flair.
The aim of this book is to provide a more complete, objective 
impression of the war correspondent than those available in personal 
memoirs and interviews or in fictional representations. Since journalism 
is often taken as ‘the first draft of history’, its claims to ‘make sense’ of 
reality with objectivity and authority would be of obvious interest to 
the critical media scholar. If the relationship between war reporter and 
military, from the Crimean War to the latest conflicts of the twenty-first 
century, is so crucial to the shaping of that same draft of history, and 
thus public understanding of war, then the scholar will want to inquire 
into the nature of that relationship in its historical, professional and 
political contexts. And, if ideology and ideological frameworks are 
so fundamental to how citizens perceive and make sense of war in a 
supposedly chaotic world, then those that construct and reproduce those 
frameworks, including journalists, are of obvious interest and concern 
to the sociologist and the cultural studies critic. There are two impulses, 
then, that drive this book: the need to inquire into and analyse one of 
the most interesting but controversial genres of mainstream journalism 
from a sociological and historical perspective; and to de-mythologise 
war correspondents, to get past the legends, the myths and cultural rep-
resentations and get to the reality of who they are, what they do and why 
they do it.
This is the second edition of a book first published in 2002, and has 
been significantly updated and restructured to consider the various 
issues and debates that have surrounded the reporting of the major 
conflicts that have happened since then, such as those in Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Syria. It ends with an entirely new chapter that looks at the 
the war correspondent
4
implications for western journalism of two recent reporting paradigms: 
the ‘war on terror’ frame that defined our understanding of conflict in 
the first decade of the new century and a newly-emerging Cold War 
frame that heralds the return of the Evil Empire: Vladimir Putin’s Russia. 
To that end, it is divided into three thematic sections.
Part I examines the various issues and debates that surround the role 
of war correspondents. It acknowledges the very real risks and dangers 
that come with the job and, in that context, explores the motivations and 
journalistic traditions that compel them to accept those risks (Chapter 2). 
It examines the ethical problems that come with the practice of objectivity 
in the war zone (Chapter 3), and the challenges and opportunities that 
each new media technology has brought to the job (Chapter 4). Part II 
of the book shifts the focus of inquiry from the work of the war reporter 
as individual and examines the vexed relationship between journalist 
and the military, perhaps one of the key factors that have shaped and 
defined war reporting since the Crimean War and William Howard 
Russell. It puts the relationship into historical perspective, moving from 
the Crimean War to the Korean War (Chapter 5); from the Vietnam War 
to the Gulf War in 1991 (Chapter 6); and into the twenty-first century 
with the ‘war on terror’ conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq (Chapter 7). 
It suggests that this controversial and problematical relationship has 
been one of evolution, leaving behind the traces of past practices and 
confrontations but also mutating and refining itself with each conflict. 
For the military, it has been about learning the lessons of the last war, 
fine tuning systems of control, censorship and propaganda in which war 
reporters and the media in general have a predetermined role: to sell war 
to domestic publics. Alas for the majority of war correspondents, it has 
been about forgetting the lessons except, perhaps, between the covers 
of their memoirs where they might express regret for how easily they 
conformed to the system for the sake of getting the story. 
Telling the story, of course, is vital for the journalist on any beat, 
whether that be war, defence or diplomacy, and Part III examines the 
importance of historical and ideological frameworks for shaping and 
sometimes limiting the content and scope of the story as effectively as 
military censorship in the war zone. Of particular interest in this respect 
is the Cold War framework or paradigm (Chapter 8), with its meta-
narrative of a bipolar world order of ideological oppositions, as well as 
the implications for journalism of its crisis after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
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in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union just two years later. Looking 
at the much less coherent framework that apparently replaced it, that of 
a ‘new world order’, the book closes with two more recent and competing 
frameworks for making sense of international conflict: the ‘war on terror’ 
that followed the attacks on America in 2001 (9/11); and the ‘new Cold 
War’ story that seems to be coming into play in the western media as a 
means of reporting the return of a familiar old enemy: Russia (Chapter 
9). It is unlikely that we will see again anything like the global, imperial 
and ideological conflict of superpowers that ended in 1991. But even 
an analysis of the Cold War hysteria and rhetoric that has characterised 
the western media image of Vladimir Putin, and the reporting of his 
approach to the crisis in neighbouring Ukraine, suggests that the power 
of such frameworks, to shape and perhaps distort our understanding of 
complex wars and civil conflicts, is still considerable.

Part I





The War Correspondent:  
Risk, Motivation and Tradition
Most war reporters are brave, selfless types – more interested in the 
news story at hand than their own physical discomfort and fear. 
Not me. 
Chris Ayres, War Reporting for Cowards, 2005
The job of the war correspondent is defined by the risks and dangers 
involved with getting the story: death, injury, kidnap, harassment and 
imprisonment, among others. This chapter considers the real extent 
of these risks, the kinds of training courses available to journalists 
reporting in hostile environments and the variable level of risk that a 
war reporter might face, depending on the size and resources of his or 
her news organisation. In that context, it explores the motivations by 
which war correspondents rationalise risk and danger: from the candid 
(the thrill and excitement of reporting war) to the pragmatic (getting the 
story) or the idealistic (reporting the truth or the human cost of war). 
It suggests that whatever the motivations might be and however writers 
and commentators might define them, today’s war correspondents have 
little sense of commonality, of being part of Russell’s ‘luckless tribe’ or 
some ‘fellowship of danger’ (Lambert, 1987, p. 13) other than just being 
journalists. 
risk
According to journalist organisations such as the International Press 
Institute (IPI) in Vienna and the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) 
in New York,1 up to 1,400 journalists and media workers have lost their 
lives in the period 1997–2014, the majority of them reporting wars or 
conflicts of some description. The IPI was founded in Vienna in 19502 
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and began monitoring death rates among journalists worldwide in 1992. 
Its definition of ‘journalist’ has always been a broad one and includes 
media workers such as producers, freelancers and local contacts. The 
CPJ was founded in New York in 1981 and began compiling data on 
journalists and risk in 1992. In its early life, it defined journalists as 
‘people who cover news or comment on public affairs through any media 
– including in print, in photographs, on radio, on television, and online’; 
and it still campaigns today on behalf of ‘staff journalists, freelancers, 
stringers, bloggers, and citizen journalists’ around the world.3 However, 
in 2003, it broadened its definition along the lines of the IPI to include 
media support workers. The historical differences in methodology has 
resulted in various statistical discrepancies between these organisations, 
but a summary of their key data provides a vivid picture of the level and 
nature of the risks that war reporters and other journalists and media 
workers face on a daily basis.
The IPI’s Death Watch Survey reports that 1,461 journalists have been 
killed in hostile situations around the world between 1997 and 2014, 824 
of these since 2006 – an average of over 90 per year. The CPJ takes a 
longer sample period and reports that 1,102 journalists have been killed 
between 1992 and 2014, 657 of these murdered with impunity, an issue 
on which both organisations campaign strongly. 
Most deadly countries
The IPI and CPJ websites also feature breakdowns of these statistics 
by country. The IPI’s ten most deadly countries for journalists to work 
between 1997 and 2013 were: 
 1. Iraq (203)
 2. The Philippines (122)
 3. Colombia (85)
 4. Mexico (81)
 5. Pakistan (76)
 6. Russia (64)
 7. Syria (56)
 8. Somalia (53)
 9. India (49)
10. Brazil (39)
the war correspondent: risk, motivation and tradition
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The CPJ includes figures for 20 countries but for sake of comparison 
with the IPI, its ten most deadly countries for journalists to work in the 
same period were:
 1. Iraq (104)
 2. The Philippines (75)
 3. Syria (63)
 4. Algeria (60)
 5. Russia (56)
 6. Pakistan (54)
 7. Somalia (52)
 8. Colombia (45)
 9. India (32)
10. Mexico (30)
The interested reader may explore this data in detail on the IPI and CPJ 
websites, but it is worth considering here some of the most dangerous 
assignments and the different kinds of hazards they present to interna-
tional and local correspondents alike. 
Iraq’s number one billing in both surveys is hardly surprising 
considering that since 1991 the country has suffered two major wars and 
following the US-led invasion in 2003, an insurgency against western 
occupation as well as sectarian warfare between the country’s Sunni and 
Shi’a populations. Included in the high death toll among journalists are 
those killed in so-called ‘friendly fire’ or ‘blue on blue’ incidents, where 
military forces accidentally fire upon and kill or injure allied military 
forces or civilians. Independent Television News’ (ITN’s) Terry Lloyd 
was killed in such an incident on 22 March 2003 when reporting the 
early stages of the invasion as an independent, or what the military 
call ‘unilateral’, correspondent; in other words, working outside of the 
military’s ‘embed’ system of media accreditation (for an analysis of 
the embed system, see Chapter 7). The circumstances of Lloyd’s death 
and that of his cameraman, Fred Nérac, and Lebanese ‘fixer’, Hussein 
Osman, are still disputed. Were they simply unlucky to run into crossfire 
between the American and Iraqis, as official versions claim? Or was 
he deliberately targetted as an example to all foreign journalists of the 
dangers of working outside of military restrictions? In a film to mark the 
tenth anniversary of his death, his daughter, Chelsey, and ITN colleague, 
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Mark Austin, question the official version and also ask why, after a 
coroner’s ruling in 2006 of ‘unlawful killing’, no one has been prosecuted 
or held accountable for his death.4 
Similar questions have been asked about the deaths on 8 April 2003 of 
news cameramen Taras Protsyuk (Reuters) and José Couso (Telecinco), 
killed when American forces fired at the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad; 
or that of the Al Jazeera reporter Tariq Ayyoub, killed earlier that day 
when an American missile struck the network’s Baghdad office. The 
BBC’s veteran foreign correspondent, John Simpson, himself a victim 
of American friendly fire in the north of Iraq just before the US ground 
invasion, suggests that the targeting of journalists has become a new 
feature of American military operations around the world. What is 
disturbing for Simpson and many other journalists is the impunity 
enjoyed by those who do the targetting, whether deliberately or by 
accident.5 Chris Paterson makes a strong case for seeing these incidents 
as part of US military strategy since the attacks on America in 2001, 
9/11, designed above all to ensure a compliant media response to US 
military operations (2014, pp. 9–12, 21–22). 
In cases like these, the US military insists that it does not target 
journalists and that it operates according to official rules of engagement 
but that accidents sometimes happen.6 Such ‘accidents’ might include 
the killing by an Apache helicopter gunner on 12 July 2007 of Reuters 
photographer Namoor Noor-Eldeen, his driver Saeed Chmagh and ten 
civilians who tried to rescue their bodies; two children were wounded 
in the incident. The cockpit video (with crew audio) from the helicopter 
gunship was later leaked to WikiLeaks, but to date no one has been 
brought to account for what happened. In a strong address to an anti-war 
conference in 2010, US Ranger Ethan McCord explained the difference 
between the official rules of military engagement in Iraq and what 
soldiers were told off record to do when they came under fire: 
If you feel threatened by anybody, you are able to engage [fire upon] 
that person. Many soldiers felt threatened just by the fact that you 
were looking at them so they fired their weapons at anyone who was 
looking at them. We were told that if we were to fire our weapons at 
people, and we were to be investigated, officers would take care of you. 
We were given orders for 360-degree rotational fire whenever we were 
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hit by an IED [Improvised Explosive Device]. We were told by our 
commander to kill every motherfucker in the street.7
The most recent addition to these most deadly country lists has been 
Syria. From the beginning of the civil war there in 2011 up until the end 
of 2014, various sources have put the death toll at between 150,000 and 
200,000, the majority being combatants.8 Over 600 Syrian civilians lost 
their lives in the same period and the pictures of hundreds of thousands 
of refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Jordan and 
Lebanon have dominated news from the region. In what seems to be 
a brutal and unpredictable conflict without clear lines of opposition or 
rules of engagement, the figure of up to 63 journalists killed so far seems 
mercifully low but when expressed as an annual death rate, it represents 
an average of 25–30 per year over two years compared to 15–20 per year 
over ten years in Iraq. The Syrian Journalists Association includes in its 
statistics what it calls ‘media activists and citizen reporters’ and reported 
a death toll in December 2012 of just over 100, a much higher figure 
than that of either the IPI or CPJ.9 The most high-profile casualty among 
western journalists in Syria has been Marie Colvin of the Sunday Times, 
killed on 21 February 2012 with French photojournalist Remi Ochlik, 
when the house where she was staying in the besieged city of Homs 
was hit by incoming artillery fire from the Syrian army. Three other 
journalists, including her colleague, photojournalist Paul Conroy, were 
wounded in the attack.10 Conroy recounts the moment he found his dead 
colleagues in the aftermath of the shelling:
There, in what had once been the entranceway to the house, lay the 
bodies of my two friends. Mercifully, I could not see Marie’s face. Her 
head and legs were covered in fallen rubble and I recognize her only 
by her blue jumper and belt. Of Remi, I saw only his back through the 
thick layers of dust and fallen masonry. [...] The wonderful, smiling 
Remi – together we had dodged bullets and bombs as we pushed our 
way through the cities and deserts of Libya. [...] Marie who had given 
a face and voice to millions of people whose lives had been torn apart 
by war; Marie the Martha Gellhorn of our generation who now lay 
motionless in the ruins of Babr Amr. I gently lay my hand on her chest 
and checked she was dead. Farewell Chechen queen. (2013, p. 222).
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The majority of journalists killed in the conflict have been from Syria 
and other countries in the Middle East. Ghaith Abd al-Jawad and Amr 
Badir al-Deen Junaid, news cameramen for the pro-opposition Qaboun 
Media Centre were killed by mortar shell on 10 March 2013. Syrian cor-
respondent Yara Abbas was killed by sniper fire near the border with 
Lebanon on 26 May 2013. Hamza al-Hajj Hassan, cameraman Mohamed 
Muntich and technician Halim Alouh, were killed on 14 April 2014 
while on assignment for Lebanon’s Al-Manar TV; they died when the 
car they were in was sprayed with machine gunfire from ‘unknown 
assailants’. The IPI has also estimated that, as of September 2013, at least 
34 journalists from Syria and abroad have been kidnapped or reported 
missing since the conflict began.11
Both the IPI and CPJ identify the Philippines as the second most 
dangerous country for journalists. This 40-year conflict between the 
mainly Christian government and Islamic insurgents is barely reported 
in the international media, yet it has claimed up to 150,000 deaths and 
displaced over 2 million people.12 The CPJ reports that 76 journalists were 
killed there between 1997 and 2013; out of those, 74 were murdered, 66 
with impunity. The worst single incident was the death on 15 July 2012 of 
32 mainly Filipino journalists and 26 other civilians in what has become 
known as the Maguindanao Massacre, which was not directly related to 
the wider military conflict but to a regional party political power struggle. 
In a special feature article to mark the second anniversary of the massacre, 
the IPI reported that to date no one had been brought to justice for the 
killings.13 Elsewhere around the world, the drugs wars in Colombia and, 
in recent times, Mexico, as well as corruption and racketeering in Russia 
have made these countries particularly dangerous for investigative 
journalists. The murder of Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya at her 
home in Moscow on 7 October 2006 has been variously blamed on the 
Russian mafia, the pro-Russian Chechen President, Ramzan Kadyrov, 
and on an unnamed, senior Russian politician. The Chechen connection 
seemed to the prosecution at least to be the most likely lead because of 
Politkovskaya’s critical reporting of Russia’s conduct in the two Chechen 
wars, between 1994–96 and 1999–2009, even though her investigations 
probed other aspects of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian 
regime (see for example, Politkovskaya 2001, 2004 and, posthumously, 
2008 and 2011). In 2014, after a retrial, two men identified as Chechen 
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criminals were convicted of her murder. However, crime reporter Elena 
Shmaraeva has examined the transcripts of the trial and concludes that 
the real assassins may still be at large.14 At least 55 other journalists have 
been killed in Russia between 1992 and 2013, 32 of those with impunity.15
Another very real risk for war correspondents is psychological trauma, 
which can often have long term effects in their professional and personal 
lives. In the documentary film, Reporters at War (dir. Brian Woods, 
2003),16 former ITN cameraman, Jon Steele, tells how he developed 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on return from assignment in 
Bosnia, where he filmed a fatally injured girl as she was being rushed 
to hospital:
There was this little girl in a pool of blood, lying on her back. And I 
didn’t go rush up to her. I didn’t try to help. I ran to the truck and got 
my camera. And I started filming the situation. Some men picked her 
up and put her in the back of a car and they were actually blocking 
my shot. And I grabbed one of the men on the back of the shoulder, 
yanked him back and I went in with the camera. I was looking at her 
through the eyepiece. I don’t know if she was conscious...but she just 
sort of looked into the lens and then her eyes just sort of lost focus and 
then the car took off [to the hospital].
On cleaning his camera some time later, he realised the implications of 
what he had done: 
I was looking into the glass of the lens...and the more I looked at the 
lens, the more something hit me. I was seeing myself in the lens and 
I was looking at my eyes in the lens and then I realised that that girl 
had seen herself in the lens as she was dying and bleeding. And it just 
hit me that the last thing she saw in her life was her own self, dying. I 
did that to her.
Wracked with guilt that he had put the needs of the job before those of the 
girl, he went off to film civilians under fire on Sarajevo’s main boulevard, 
dubbed Sniper Alley, without wearing protective body armour. ‘At that 
moment, I really wanted to die’, he says. ‘I wanted to take a bullet [...] for 
what I had just done and that’s when I lost it completely. And everything 
was a bit of a blur for the next few days until I wound up having a nervous 
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breakdown in Heathrow Airport.’ On reflection, Steele thinks that the 
nature of the job of news cameraman, the imperative to keep looking, 
leaves him or her particularly vulnerable to psychological trauma:
A correspondent, a reporter, a scribbler, a soundman, even a stills 
cameraman, can turn away. The nature of television is that you have 
to let the action happen within the frame, which means you have to 
concentrate, which means you have to count, which means you have 
to stare. And you keep looking for pictures, looking for pictures, which 
means you have to look at this stuff. You have to look at the blood, you 
have to look at the carnage...you have to look at the faces screaming at 
you in pain. And you take that in. You are the camera. It goes through 
the lens, into the eyepiece, into your eyes, into your brain, into your 
heart and into your soul. And it never leaves. It stays there forever.17
Other war reporters with similar experiences resist the possibilities of 
psychological trauma. Anthony Lloyd of The Times has written two 
powerful memoirs of his first major assignment in Bosnia (Lloyd, 
2007) and then Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Iraq (Lloyd, 2013). In the 
latter volume, Another Bloody Love Letter, he admits openly to his 
heroin addiction but dismisses any assumption of cause and effect, that 
somehow his addiction marks a traumatic response to his experience 
of war:
War had not produced my drug addiction, nor was I totally convinced 
by the platitudes of those suggesting it was an addiction in itself. I 
felt fairly grounded in my relationship with war. It was certainly an 
environment full of compulsion and attraction, and one that fired my 
imagination, but my inability to find tranquility in peace was more 
the question at stake. It would have been too simple to regard heroin 
as some sort of self-medication to the horrors I had seen. Instead I felt 
victim to nothing but self-execution. (2013, p. 63)18 
As disturbing as these case studies in risk might be, it is important to 
offer some perspective here. First, while the dangers are obvious, it is 
difficult to establish whether war reporting today is proportionately 
more dangerous than it was before the 1990s when organisations such 
as the IPI and CPJ began gathering data. It is also important to note in 
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the context of this book that the IPI and CPJ count journalists killed on 
various beats, for example crime, political or financial corruption and 
human rights, not just war and conflict. In any case, are the death tolls 
today higher because journalists have become targets more than ever 
before? Or is it simply because there are more journalists working in 
war zones, with their work and the risks they face daily as much a part of 
the media story as the conflict they report? And has that in turn raised 
the public profile of the job, making heroes and celebrities out of war 
reporters in a way not seen since Winston Churchill and other journalists 
during the Second Boer War (1899–1902)?19 It is probably impossible to 
offer definitive answers to these questions, but the very perception of 
risk in war journalism has had consequences in recent times. In civil 
conflicts of the 1990s, such as those in Somalia, Rwanda, East Timor 
and Sierra Leone, most western journalists either left eventually or were 
called home by their employers when the risks were perceived to be too 
high. There are also financial considerations. The prohibitive costs of 
safety training and equipment as well as insurance cover are unaffordable 
for all but the larger international news organisations and agencies. 
Training and support
Writing in 2001 for the IPI, News Editor-in-Chief of ITN, Richard Tait, 
acknowledged that war reporting had become ‘unacceptably dangerous’, 
but wanted to avoid sending ‘a message to the teams on the frontline that 
we are no longer committed to enterprising, courageous and original 
journalism.’ In response to these concerns, ITN joined with BBC, CNN, 
Reuters and APTN to set up a safety group and draw up guidelines on 
‘assignment, training, protective equipment, post-traumatic counseling 
and insurance’ (ibid.; see Appendix 1). Such interventions led to 
the development of special training courses for journalists working 
in dangerous or hostile regions. A company in Britain, AKE, offers a 
‘Surviving Hostile Regions’ course of between one and five days in 
length.20 It also offers a range of insurance products covering ‘Personal 
Accident and MedEvac’ (premiums from £750 plus VAT per person), 
‘Kidnap and Ransom’ (premium unspecified) and ‘General Liability and 
Professional Indemnity’ (premium unspecified).21 Instructed by former 
Special Air Service (SAS) personnel, participants in the AKE course are 
trained in the awareness, anticipation, and avoidance of danger; as well 
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as coping in the extreme conditions of ‘weather, disease and war’ (for the 
full syllabus, see Appendix 2). 
AKE offers on its website an example of how its training course has 
helped journalists in difficult situations:
During the height of the conflict in 1996 a team of four journalists 
crossed the border into rebel-held Goma (Democratic Republic of 
Congo). While interviewing civilians in the town a grenade exploded 
behind them, sending them running for cover. One journalist rounded 
a corner into oncoming rifle fire and was hit in the leg. His partner, 
remembering his AKE training, managed to administer first aid, 
constructed a tourniquet to stem the bleeding whilst in an exposed 
position and still under fire, and took control of the situation.
After getting all safely across the border he summoned further 
assistance from an aid group before organising evacuation to Kigali. 
Here more medical aid was given to the wounded before both were 
airlifted home and to hospital in Europe. The surgeons at home 
ascribed the positive outcome to the actions of both journalists; both 
of them are sure that without AKE’s preparation the outcome would 
have been very different. (Emphasis added)22 
It is difficult to separate hype from heroics in this sales pitch, but most 
war correspondents accept the risks; some celebrate them, and others 
rationalise them in philosophical terms. ‘I think I shall take chances all 
my life’, wrote the French reporter Victor Franco, ‘it’s part of my trade’ 
(1963, p. 2). ITN’s reporter, Mike Nicholson, now retired, talks of ‘that 
fatalism in the people who do the job that I do...the certainty that you’re 
never going to get clobbered. It’s never crossed my mind that I’d ever get 
hurt or killed or wounded in any way...I really do believe in a kind of 
immortality...otherwise I’d never want to do it again.’23 Channel 4’s inter-
national editor, Lindsey Hilsum, is particularly scathing of the risk angle:
We’re all supposed to be in danger all the time and we’re all supposed 
to be traumatised and in need of psychotherapy because of all the 
dangerous things that we do. I mean, it’s bollocks! We choose to 
do this and it is sometimes dangerous but so are lots of other jobs. 
Nobody forces me to do this.24
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For most war correspondents, then, the impulse is to play down the 
dangers and get on with the job. American reporter Siobhan Darrow 
admits to an ‘addiction to danger’, an impulse among war reporters to 
‘push themselves to the limit of risk and endurance.’ Echoing Lindsey 
Hilsum’s disdain for the journalism safety culture, she reveals that ‘lots 
of hardened journalists would never be caught dead in a flak-jacket, the 
wartime equivalent of a seat belt’ (2000, p. 73). So what sort of journalist 
wants to become part of the ‘luckless tribe’? What motivates them to take 
and accept these obvious risks?
motivation
At a very basic level, the job may satisfy the ‘terrible show-off ’ in a 
journalist.25 Some reporters talk about war reporting as ‘something in 
our background, in our childhood, in our upbringing, which makes us 
feel slightly deficient somewhere, and makes us want to do something 
where we get noticed’, and that require one ‘to be tenacious, tenacious, 
tenacious to the point of being insufferable, being obsequious, being an 
absolute bastard’ in order to get the story ahead of the competition.26 
For many reporters, most of them men, modern warfare provides the 
ultimate media spectacle and may even fulfill their dearest Boy’s Own 
fantasies. A BBC defence correspondent remembers always being ‘a 
complete fanatic about aircraft, military aircraft in particular.’27 Richard 
Dowden of The Independent confesses to fascination as well as fear and 
revulsion: ‘Half of me never wants to do anything like that ever again, 
and another part of me says, “Where’s the next one? That was great!”’28 
Tony Clifton, editor of Newsweek, compares the Gulf War with sex: it 
was ‘a hell of a lot of foreplay and one final orgasm that lasted eight and a 
half seconds.’ And on a more psychedelic plane, Robert Fox of the Daily 
Telegraph, ‘a kid of the sixties...brought up on Camus and the existen-
tialists’, admits to ‘a mad, depersonalised’ sense of excitement; it was ‘the 
lunatic on the edge...the moment when things come together.’29 
On one of his first assignments, reporting the civil war in El Salvador 
in the 1980s, the BBC’s Jeremy Bowen was caught up in a crossfire and 
clearly remembers the mix of fear and exhilaration he felt afterwards:
It was hard to believe the bullets were real, even though...civilians, 
government soldiers and guerilla fighters were dying. Then, when it 
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was over and I got through it and I wasn’t dead, it was fantastically 
exciting. That was the first big burst of the war drug, pulling me 
towards addiction. It was also frightening, but to start with anyway, 
you forget the fear and remember the excitement. I liked it. It was an 
action movie and I was in it. (2006, p. 45) 
This idea of the danger and excitement of war as an addiction comes 
up time and again when war reporters talk about their experiences. 
‘War is like hard drug abuse or a fickle lover’, writes Anthony Lloyd, 
‘an apparently contradictory bolt of compulsion, agony and ecstasy 
that draws you back in the face of better judgment time and time again’ 
(1999, p. 310). Alex Thomson of Channel 4 News talks of ‘an enormous 
drive and an enormous excitement and an enormous addiction’ to the 
job. It was the excitement and glamour that first caught his attention 
when watching the news as a child: 
I watched people do it on TV and I thought, ‘Jesus! That looks quite 
fun!’ I mean really if I’m honest with you that is part of the motivation. 
I think that anyone who doesn’t say that being a war correspondent 
is a glamorous way of making a living is bull-shitting you because 
it is and I’m no different from the person out there. You travel to 
interesting, different places. You are there at moments of history... . 
[It] is a fantastic opportunity, purely selfishly, leaving the job aside, to 
be at, to be present where things are happening.30 
Mike Nicholson reported up to 16 wars in his career as a correspondent 
for Independent Television News (ITN). He says that it is ‘not that you 
like going to war, though I do; it’s the promise of excitement and...the 
knowledge and the certainty of getting all the big stories.’ For him, the 
excitement and glamour are the driving motivations:
Obviously, travel is the main attraction. [...] I used to sit there [as a cub 
reporter] and see these guys going off to Africa or Australia, going off 
to all these wars and felt very jealous about it as every young blood 
did and probably still does. [...] I wanted to do all the exciting things 
I was watching other people do and eventually, and by luck really, it’s 
usually luck, I was given the chance to [report] the Nigerian civil war. 
And once it’s in the blood it’s very hard to get rid of... . If a company 
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spends a lot of money sending you to foreign places a long way away 
you can be guaranteed it’s going to get pretty prominent place in the 
running order. So it’s also that. You’re going to get high profile. There’s 
that glamour attached to being a foreign correspondent, a roving cor-
respondent, or a fireman war correspondent.31 
The abiding attraction for him, however, is a fascination with war:
I like going to war and you have to be very honest about it...which 
makes you sound rather inhuman; in fact you do sound inhuman...
And you have to be honest... I did get quite a thrill from being under 
fire, being with soldiers, watching the fighting. It’s a very exciting, 
exhilarating existence and I’d be dishonest if I didn’t admit it.32 
This is not to argue that all foreign or war correspondents are thrill 
seekers, ‘parachutists’ or ‘ambulance chasers’ after the quick scoop and 
then off to the next one. Talk to other war reporters at length and they 
reveal the conflicts and dilemmas that constantly haunt their efforts to 
‘get the story’ more than their colleagues on political or diplomatic beats. 
Scratch the surface values of excitement, glamour, and even danger, 
and one reveals deeper motivations and even misgivings. Michael Herr 
writes that the glamour of being a war reporter in Vietnam may have 
been ‘empty and lunatic but there were times when it was all you had, 
a benign infection that ravaged all but your worst fears and deepest 
depressions’ (1978, p. 152). As well as ‘curiosity and the desire to tell a 
story’, Christiane Amanpour of CNN talks of being ‘further motivated 
by a deep conviction that the stories I cover are important and absolutely 
need to be told...stories such as the genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda.’33 
The BBC’s World Affairs editor, John Simpson, concedes the importance 
of a ‘serious moral purpose’ in one’s work as a journalist but insists that 
he does not see himself ‘as being on any kind of crusade to change the 
world.’ The ultimate litmus test for him is telling the story and getting 
behind the news to look at ‘what is really going on...the sort of underside 
of the whole thing, the submerged realities.’ He does not so much go for 
the breaking news as for ‘the sort of grander, broader stories and also 
to be the sweeper-up who tells you what’s happened in places that you 
might think have dropped out of public attention.’34
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Former war reporter, Maggie O’Kane, saw more to her job than 
dodging 1000 lb bombs on the Grozny road and living to tell the tale. ‘I 
think in the beginning’, she says, ‘it was an exciting way to make a living 
and a very adventurous way to make a living [but] I suppose as I got more 
into it I began to believe and still believe that you can make a difference.’35 
The desire to ‘make a difference’, however, is sometimes tempered by a 
certain battle weariness, especially among more experienced correspon-
dents. Anthony Lawrence (1972) reflects with some disillusionment on 
what the job of ‘foreign correspondent’ really added up to in the end: 
The rewards are elusive and related to memories. You had a chance 
to travel to strange places and sometimes have a seat booked in the 
spectator stands of great events...Then you remember fragments of 
talk in the small hours...long, deceitful news conferences, the baking 
concrete of innumerable airports, enormous bedrooms in old hotels; 
the jungle. (p. 9) 
Reflecting on his reporting of the atom bomb tests on Bikini Atoll in 
1947, James Cameron writes of how: ‘One had tried; one had travelled 
22,000 miles, one had stewed and steamed, one had fought for the words 
against the clock. But one was only a reporter, not a historian; one had 
suffered from the occupational delusion of importance. At home nobody 
gave a damn’ (1967, p. 67). Mike Nicholson looks back on his long career 
and measures the ideals of his job against its potential to change things:
I actually believe that we are one of the four cornerstones of 
democracy. It stands to reason. If we weren’t here making public some 
of the misdemeanours of government...and all the other rottennesses 
in society, who would know about it? [...] One begins one’s career as a 
young man really in a kind of cavalier fashion but underlying all that 
is a belief that your pen, your camera, your writing can help change 
the way the world is. By making it public, by showing suffering, by 
showing war, by showing corruption, by showing misdemeanour...
you’re going to help change it. But when the time comes to hang up 
your boots as I’m just about doing you realise that you’ve done very 
little to change the world. All you’ve really done is to advertise its ills. 
It’s a very sad epitaph.36
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A few correspondents profess utter confidence in their own convictions. 
Mark Urban, Diplomatic Editor for BBC Newsnight, professes to be 
guided in his work by ‘Truth, the belief in the power of truth’, even if that 
means perhaps complicating a delicate political process like the peace 
process in Northern Ireland or the Middle East.37 John Pilger has long 
been a dissenting voice when the flags run full mast at wartime. There 
is no greater motivation for him than to pursue the truth and he applies 
two principles when reporting wars: ‘to report them from the ground 
up, from the point of view of both civilian and combatants because most 
wars now are against civilians directly or indirectly’, and to reveal the 
hidden agendas of war: 
It’s a wider principle of do you report from the side of the powerful 
or do you report from the side of people? I think it’s a choice many 
have to face...But I think it’s essential to be with those who are either 
fighting the war, struggling for their lives in the war, or are victims 
of the war. I think the other motivation is to attempt to explain the 
war, to deconstruct it, to find out what the real agendas of the war 
are...The hidden agendas, which are really the truth of the wars, have 
only emerged later. That is true of all those wars. [We] found out 
that the Gulf War was not a war at all, it was a slaughter, and that 
the reporters were only playing theatrical bit parts in the slaughter, 
standing on top of hotel buildings, admiring the technology, or being 
captive members of press conferences, military people showed them 
video games of people being blown up on bridges...I mention all that 
because [revealing] that agenda...is the most important aspect of 
war reporting.38
Many of the journalists I spoke to talked about history or, as Martin 
Bell puts it, getting ‘a front row seat in the making of history. There’s 
nothing quite like the buzz of being there when important events are 
taking place.’39 Robert Fisk of The Independent sees it as ‘a job where we 
are uniquely witnesses to history’, although for him history is something 
that should also inform the craft of reporting: ‘One of the things I always 
say to some of my younger colleagues when they’re going off on a story is 
take a history book. Don’t just go there and report it as if it’s a crime story. 
Take a history book!’ When he arrived in Beirut in the 1970s to report 
the Middle East conflict he did so armed with a good working knowledge 
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of the history of the area and the significance of the conflict. That has 
helped him to explain the reactions, responses and reflexes of the various 
protagonists both in his daily reporting and in his authored writing on 
conflict in the Middle East (Fisk, 2001 and 2006). For example, when 
reporting the Israel-Palestine conflict he is able to see it in a variety of 
historical contexts:
I was very conscious from the very start it was not just a story about 
Arabs and Israelis and conflict over one piece of real estate in particular, 
Palestine/Israel. It was also about the Jewish Holocaust in the Second 
World War. It was about the results of the Armenian genocide by the 
Turks, it was about the carving up of the Middle East by the victorious 
Allied powers at the end of the First World War in which my father 
fought, therefore had a direct connection to Sarajevo. Therefore I was 
aware when I went to Beirut, for example, that most of the countries 
which were invented or whose borders were created in the two years 
after the First world war, ended up with serious internal conflicts: 
Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland and the Free 
State. All these borders we drew at the same time had been covered in 
blood. So when I started in Beirut, even though it was the height of 
the civil war, which was of course dramatic and so on...I knew at the 
start I was covering something with enormous historical perspective 
to it. It wasn’t for me something to dip into for a few years and then go 
on somewhere else.40 
A perspective such as this brings us closer to a sense of foreign and 
conflict reporting as part of something more idealistic and serious. Fisk 
talks of journalism as ‘a vocation’ and describes himself as ‘a foreign cor-
respondent, not a war reporter.’ He eschews generalism and careerism in 
journalism for a lifetime of specialism. ‘There’s a problem’, he says: 
When a journalist starts to rise and he starts writing the truth, he’s told 
that he can’t see the wood for the trees. When he’s there long enough to 
understand it, he’s gone native. Well, I think both of those are rubbish. 
If you read up properly and start carefully you can be very good from 
the beginning and you can keep going. And as long as you don’t ally 
yourself with one side or another – and my story’s far too risky for 
any sane person to do that – I think you should stay there. I mean 
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it’s an investment for the paper. I have contacts I would never have if 
I started anywhere else. I understand the region, the culture and so 
on...I think in general it’s time that correspondents thought more in 
terms of career in a particular location and becoming a specialist.41 
 
Victoria Brittain’s fascination with the Vietnam War was not just its 
currency as ‘the big foreign policy issue’ of the times but also ‘the broader 
issues [such as] the balance of power between third world countries 
[...] and the big powerful western countries.’ This became the abiding 
specialism underpinning the rest of her reporting career. She based 
herself in Algiers in the 1970s, ‘which at the time...was very much the 
centre of the third world movement – more economic equality and so 
on. Intellectually, it was a very important influence on the rest of the 
third world.’ She was able to stop and look with some breadth and depth 
at ‘the whole question of what South Africa was doing to the continent...
and more interested in the other countries affected by that.’ Brittain 
returned every year to look and see what was happening in the various 
countries across the continent. She was astonished that African countries 
were at one and the same time under-reported and misreported by the 
western news media, but she found them ‘so fascinating I just wanted 
to know more and I wanted to write more so I kind of got stuck into 
that’. She agrees with Robert Fisk that the idea of the specialist corre-
spondent has been compromised by media economics, or at least by the 
pretext that media organisations can no longer afford to commit area 
specialists to the Middle East or Africa. But she also points to ‘a kind of 
a cultural shift’, a generation gap in terms of aspirations and ambitions. 
Young journalists these days ‘don’t want to take the risk of going off and 
trying to hack it in some obscure place.’ Instead, ‘they are so aware that 
big careers in media now are either made in television or [writing] flashy 
columns about themselves because that’s thought to be a very successful 
thing to do. I think for my generation what could possibly be duller?’42
The idea of the specialist correspondent sits uncomfortably with many 
news media who see the commercial realities of journalism impinging 
more and more on their ability to provide and maintain credible foreign 
news coverage. Alex Thomson thinks that in this respect newspapers 
have an advantage over television news:
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Some newspapers for instance may send their...specialist[s] to those 
conflicts – he or she will speak the language and be very well versed in 
the politics and the history and traditions of the place. But of course no 
television company except possibly the BBC can afford that. So I think 
in terms of the heavy broadsheet newspaper, there is a pool of resources 
there for in-depth coverage and they undoubtedly have more time. 
They’re like me, they’ve got the luxury of only one deadline a day.43
The importance of a good relationship between editor and war correspon-
dent recalls the excellent friendship between William Howard Russell 
and John Delane, his editor at The Times. Throughout the Crimean War, 
Delane supported Russell and protected him from political and military 
pressures to have him recalled. It was a solid relationship of mutual 
trust in a powerful institution. In her time as foreign desk editor for the 
Guardian, Victoria Brittain would assume a ‘facilitator’ role – standing 
by her correspondents, fighting their corner in the newsroom and taking 
the chill off the ‘cold calculations’ that editors make about budgets and 
resources. In an interview for the first edition of this book, she said:
I love the correspondents. The best part of my day is talking to the cor-
respondents and trying to work out with them what stories they want 
to do, how best we can place them in the paper, whether we should 
be concentrating more on this, more on that and so on...But of course 
above me is a whole layer of editors who are only interested as you say 
in budgets and what it’s going to cost and do we really need a man in 
Harare, those sort of preoccupations...It’s a very lonely business being 
a foreign correspondent and unless you’re incredibly self-sufficient 
you need a friendly, understanding presence back at base to help you 
do those things and I hope that’s what I do for a lot of people. It’s 
certainly what I try to do.44
Robert Fisk talks of his relationship with his editor at The Independent 
and how important it is to have his friendship and trust: 
Mine is my friend. I go to see him, I talk to him on the phone, I write 
to him...The editor must trust you. Don’t fight your editor...We also 
have a lot of readers unprompted who write to the editor saying they 
want to read Bob Fisk. That helps too. It’s very important.
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He thinks that is why readers matter, too, but the commercial pressures 
which The Independent has faced throughout its short existence, 
including takeovers and revamps, provides a salutary lesson that the 
best newspapers with the best specialist correspondents and columnists 
cannot take reader loyalty for granted:
When Murdoch deliberately [lowered] the price of The Times using 
money from elsewhere in his conglomerate, his attempt was to put 
us out of business. We were selling at 50p so he went down to 30 or 
20. And we believed that our readers were loyal. Great readers of The 
Independent! And in one week we lost 20 per cent of them. Our loyal 
readers decided they wanted to pay 20p and not 50p. Big problem. And 
you can say we got this right and we got that right, and we tell the truth 
and we don’t go along with the NATO briefings. They left and we still 
haven’t got most of them back because they want a cheaper paper.45 
And, as Nik Gowing points out, sending the best roving correspondent 
on a temporary assignment somewhere on the other side of the world 
‘happens less and less in some ways because more information is coming 
in more quickly from more parts of the world than ever before from 
people who are based in the region, and therefore you’ve got to work 
out where the value-added is [in] sending a correspondent and that’s a 
cold calculation that only editors can take.’46 Commercial realities such 
as these rather put into perspective the glamour and excitement of war 
reporting, and perhaps herald a news future in which instead of sending 
their best writers and reporters to Libya, Gaza or Syria, news organisa-
tions will choose to graze on various inflows of information, from the 
news agencies, satellite feeds and social media. Is it possible, then, that we 
are seeing the end of a tradition of war reporting, a sense and sensibility 
among some correspondents today that they are part of a line going back 
to William Howard Russell, Archibald Forbes or Richard Harding Davis? 
tradition
The American journalist Walter Cronkite writes that ‘nothing in the field 
of journalism is more glamorous than being a war correspondent’ and 
recalls ‘the model of the newspaper reporter dashing from one scene 
of action to the next, press badge tucked into his hatband, notebook in 
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hand. His mandatory costume reeks of wartime experience – the trench 
coat with its vestigial epaulets’ (Stenbuck, 1995, p. viii). This is a rather 
outdated model of the war correspondent at a time when some of the 
highest paid, highest profile war correspondents have been women such 
as Christiane Amanpour (CNN), Kate Adie (BBC) or Maggie O’Kane 
(Guardian). So when the war reporter John Burrowes (1984) dedicates 
his memoirs ‘To reporters everywhere – and the women who have to 
suffer them’, he rather misses the point. There is no doubting that the 
glamour and excitement of the job have attracted many to the ranks of 
the ‘luckless tribe’, regardless of gender or risk perception. Yet, among 
some older, more experienced war correspondents, there is a palpable 
sense also of being part of a tribe with a tradition and a history going back 
more than 160 years to their ‘miserable parent’, William Howard Russell. 
Alan Hankinson refers to,
the sharpness of [Russell’s] observation, an appraising intelligence 
which enabled him to find the truth in a welter of conflicting evidence, 
his broad historical sense of the struggle and the political implications 
of the events he had witnessed, the courage with which he set down 
his impressions and judgements. (1982, p. 269) 
Unlike many of his journalist colleagues of the day, Russell was ‘serious, 
not superficial...an observer of events, not a participant’. Opinionated 
but not prejudiced,
[his] judgements sprang from two strong and complimentary 
qualities: a realistic view, based on his reading of history and his 
maturing experience, of the way men and armies and nations behave 
in moments of stress; and high standards of what constituted decent, 
civilised, humane conduct. (Ibid.) 
This was the tradition many think Russell set down – ‘the uncompro-
mising quest for the truth, and the belief that society can only hope to 
be just and healthy if it is blessed with an independent and critical and 
courageous press’ (ibid., p. 270). 
John Simpson is the ultimate public-service news journalist and John 
Pilger the radical independent, yet both place themselves in the tradition 
of Russell and they do so with considerable admiration. Pilger boasts as 
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a ‘prize possession’ a copy of the first edition of Russell’s War Diaries. 
Russell was, for Pilger and many others, the war correspondent, the one 
who ‘stuck to his principles of reporting the blunders and the disasters, 
everything he saw and everything he knew to be true, without fear or 
favour.’47 Simpson looks at Russell’s reporting in the Crimea as,
the ultimate that you can do to cut through the [...] mystification 
that any government then or now tends to try to build up around its 
activities and tell what’s really going on. He cut through all the ‘gallantry 
of war’ aspect of it, the idea that because the British government was 
doing something it must be [getting] done in a sensible and rational 
and good way, and he showed people what the reality was. I don’t 
think there’s anything better than that.48
In a study of the ‘warcos’, the war correspondents who reported on the 
Second World War, Collier mentions that even then reporters clung to an 
abiding image of the war correspondent as ‘intrepid individualist, long 
on courage and short on introspection’, an image very much inspired by 
correspondents like Russell and Richard Harding Davis: ‘Such shining 
examples, along with hazy adolescent memories of Tennyson’s Charge of 
the Light Brigade and Kipling’s Barrack Room Ballads, had forged the war 
correspondent of 1939’ (Collier, 1989, p. 20).
But there are other sources of inspiration. For former BBC journalist 
Mark Laity, it is British public service broadcast journalism – ‘the style, 
the careful authoritative style, unsensational, concerned, ...just getting 
it right and eschewing bells and whistles.’ Significantly for him, its 
origins lie in the reporting of the Second World War; all the BBC’s war 
reporters inspired him in his work as the corporation’s defence corre-
spondent in the 1990s.49 Martin Bell looks first to George Orwell whose 
journalism was characterised ‘by plain speaking, by eye-witness and not 
being blinded by preconceptions’ but he also speaks of his admiration 
for James Cameron.50 Lindsey Hilsum believes that most reporters like 
her ‘would want to be in the same tradition as Cameron and Martha 
Gellhorn...because those are journalists who are honourable, those are 
journalists who wrote incredibly well and were able to convey things’ not 
normally conveyed by journalists in the warzones of today.51 Cameron’s 
name occurred almost as often as Russell in my interviews for this book. 
John Pilger refers back to Cameron’s attempts to report the Vietnam War 
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from the North, funding the assignment from his own pocket only to 
meet with opposition not from the frontline censors but from editors 
and producers within the BBC who refused to use his material. In the 
way he went about getting that footage and struggling to have it aired, 
Cameron demonstrated, ‘All the initiative and curiosity and passion and 
all those things that make up a good maverick reporter.’ It is this determi-
nation that inspires Pilger and reminds him when he watches journalists 
accept the propaganda line from Downing Street or the White House 
that ‘it needn’t be like this.’52
Other journalists are rather more reticent when talking about a 
specific tradition of war reporting and hesitate to single out particular 
journalists who have inspired them. They prefer to talk in terms of simply 
reporting and explaining the story and hoping, like John Simpson and 
Victoria Brittain, that as a result people will know more about the war in 
Afghanistan or Syria. Brittain stresses a ‘tradition in which the reporter 
is of absolutely no importance [where] you certainly wouldn’t use the 
word “I” or anything like that; you’re kind of a transmission vehicle.’ 
Nowadays, she thinks, ‘there’s a kind of a thing about reporters as stars 
and I’m not that, I’m not that tradition.’53 Maggie O’Kane confesses some 
ambivalence about the idea of working within a tradition, ‘because in a 
way I think a lot of the journalism...was very inhumane. A lot of the war 
correspondents were very much part of a particular class and a particular 
sex and were introduced to the war through positions within the army 
and military rank. So the accessibility to the story and the way that they 
did it was something I certainly didn’t aspire to emulate because it didn’t 
sound very exciting really.’54
There is a possible generation gap here that might even mark the end 
of tradition in war reporting in the face of new political and commercial 
realities in journalism. Alex Thomson talks not of some abstract notion 
of tradition, but of:
a deep-seated belief [that] any government that is talking to you is 
likely to be lying to you and that the establishment, the received view, 
is likely to be a bigger lie. And I think that is true in terms of war as 
in terms of many other things. Politics, I know, is all we’ve got but I 
certainly know that...politicians are not to be trusted, least of all when 
they’re getting involved in the business of killing people.55
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Mike Nicholson wishes he could look to the work of Richard Dimbleby 
and James Cameron and say he was part of that tradition but he cannot 
because, unlike newspaper reporting, television, the medium in which 
he has always reported, has developed beyond tradition in terms of 
technology and professional practice:
We have to do things that newspaper reporters aren’t often called 
upon to do. They don’t need to be at the frontline. Because we stand 
alongside a camera, we always have to be where it’s happening, or at 
least we have to try to be where it’s happening, whereas newspaper 
reporters can actually sit in a bar, can’t they, and pick up gossip. 
They can go to the AP line, they can talk to us; there’s so much the 
newspaperman can do that we can’t do. We simply have to be there 
with our lens.56 
Nik Gowing agrees with much of this and argues that the newspaper 
reporting style of James Cameron is impossible for the broadcast 
journalist today because the technology and the immediacy makes the 
reporter instantly accountable: 
What you say is heard by people, seen by people, and in a transparent 
environment they know very quickly if you’re not telling the truth, if 
you’re being too florid in your language, you know, embellishing it 
because it sounds good.57
concluding remarks
War correspondents talk readily and easily about the motives and 
impulses that drive them to take so many obvious risks to report from 
the world’s warzones; and what fascinates and excites them about what 
they see as a job or even a vocation. Few, if any, think about it as a 
‘career’. There seems to be less certainty about the notion of following 
in tradition, especially among younger journalists, and certainly among 
young broadcast journalists who see war reporting as no different than 
other journalism beats. It is simply about ‘reporting the facts’ and ‘telling 
the story’ as best and as honestly as they can. All this is very interesting 
and provides a good insight into the psyche of the war reporter. Yet 
in some ways, it is much too easy. Common to most memoirs by or 
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interviews with contemporary war reporters is a self-conscious sense of 
glamour, offset by world-weary cynicism or self-deprecating humour. 
So it is important to handle their reflections with care and put them 
into some sort of critical perspective. In his polemical and sometimes 
savage critique of war reporting, Mick Hume attacks the self-regard-
ing news articles and television documentaries that focus on the trials 
and tribulations of the war reporter-as-martyr (1997, pp.  18–19). He 
has a point. The BBC, for example, has broadcast special 45-minute 
programmes looking back at the work of reporters in the first Gulf 
War (Tales from the Gulf, BBC2, 1991) and the Bosnian civil war (Tales 
from Sarajevo, BBC2, 1993). And shortly after the Iraq War in 2003, 
both the BBC and Channel 4 aired programmes on the conflict from 
the perspective of a few of the hundreds of international journalists who 
covered the conflict.58 It is much less common to read or watch insider 
stories about lobby correspondents at Westminster, and I have been 
unable to find a written memoir or television documentary anywhere 
that lays bare the challenges of the farming correspondent. Yet, for Hume, 
there is more to this than just good copy or good television. There is 
an ideological message in these kinds of news features and programmes 
that taps into our human curiosity about anything dramatic, dangerous 
and heroic. It acts as a catharsis, reassuring us in our helplessness that 
some will take risks on our behalf to bring the story home in a way that 
is comfortable, that does not disturb our moral universe. It is, in short, 
what Hume calls ‘a twisted sort of therapy’ – for the reporter and, by 
extension, for us (1997, pp. 17–21). 
Hume’s critique of the culture and psyche of today’s war reporter 
comes as part of a focused attack on the idea of ‘committed journalism’ in 
the war zone or, as the BBC journalist Martin Bell put it while reporting 
the Bosnian civil war in the 1990s, ‘the journalism of attachment’. This 
is the idea that in the face of atrocity or even genocide, the practice of 
journalistic objectivity and impartiality can get in the way of making an 
ethical, moral judgement on what is right or wrong, good or evil, in the 
conduct of war. The following chapter puts the debate into historical 
perspective and considers the various implications and difficulties of the 
journalism of attachment in the war zone. 
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Journalism, Objectivity and War
Strange as it may seem, a war correspondent is often good at what he 
does because of a certain detachment. I mean, a journalist is not an 
academic. He is a dilettante by definition. 
Andrei Babitsky, Russian war correspondent1 
The existence or possibility of objectivity and impartiality in journalism 
has long been debated, but it seems to have most pressing relevance 
in the reporting of war and conflict. Amid the propaganda and the 
censorship, war reporters have had to don their metaphorical helmet and 
flak jacket and protest their integrity as loudly as possible. So when the 
BBC reporter Martin Bell raised his head above the parapet during the 
Bosnian civil war (1992–95) and proclaimed that he could no longer be 
impartial in the face of the daily atrocities of that conflict, he ignited a 
heated and acrimonious public debate. His advocacy of what he called a 
‘journalism of attachment’ placed emphasis on the moral duty to tell the 
truth, however inconvenient, over and above the professional obligation 
to be impartial (see Bell, 1998). The proposition attracted criticism from 
all quarters, not least from some of his colleagues in Bosnia; but the most 
sustained and withering critique came from Mick Hume, editor of the 
Living Marxism magazine. For him, the journalism of attachment was 
both a ‘twisted sort of therapy’ for reporters like Bell and ‘a menace to 
good journalism’ (Hume, 1997). 
This chapter will consider the debate in more detail later and offer 
some explanation of why it emerged as it did. It will conclude with a 
discussion of the flip side of the debate: the assumption of impartiality 
in the reporting of grossly asymmetrical conflicts such as that between 
Israel and the Palestinians. It is important first, though, to look at some 
historical precedents and understand that what Martin Bell advocated in 
Bosnia was nothing new. 
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the committed war correspondent:  
historical precedents
There are many instances in history of war correspondents crossing 
the line between journalism and combat by taking part in the fighting 
they were there to report or setting themselves up as military or political 
advisors. During the Mexican War (1846–48), the newspaper reporter 
and owner George Wilkins Kendall rode with the Texan Rangers as 
both journalist and combatant. This dual role and the intelligence he 
drew from it gave him a decisive edge over his competitors (Lande, 
1996, p.  51) but from a military point of view it set an unhealthy 
precedent for military–press relations in wartime. Lieutenant General 
Lord Chelmsford, commander of British forces in the Anglo–Zulu War 
(1879), complained bitterly about correspondents who were ‘always 
ready without sufficient data for their guidance to express their opinions 
on every conceivable military subject ex cathedra’ (Laband and Knight, 
1996, p.  v). During the Sioux Uprising in America (the Ghost Dance 
War, 1890), the Chicago Inter Ocean declared that ‘the war correspondent 
ever was the most war-like personage [and] there is the stuff that makes 
a good brigadier in most good war correspondents’ (Kolbenschlag, 1990, 
p. 41). As if to prove the point, the Nebraska State Journal declared its 
reporter, William Kelley, to be the ‘champion Indian fighter among war 
correspondents’ after he picked up a rifle from a dead union soldier and 
killed two Sioux warriors (ibid., p. 69). In the Spanish–American War 
(1898), journalists spied for the US army and navy, took part in combat 
operations, assumed quasi-officer roles and even hoisted the first flags 
to claim Cuba as part of America (Brown, 1967, p. vii). Richard Harding 
Davis was one of the most famous reporters of the war and saw no 
conflict of interest between reporting the war as a professional journalist 
and fighting it as a patriotic citizen. Much in the style of George Kendall, 
he rode with Theodore Roosevelt’s Rough Riders and paid tribute to 
other American journalists for their part in the war, most notably for 
their ‘reconnoitring, scouting, and fighting’ (Lande, 1996, p. 165).
The trend for this kind of adventurism in war reporting continued 
well into the twentieth century. With the retreat of the German army in 
Europe in the Second World War, armed journalists accepted surrenders 
in what Richard Johnston called ‘a manhunt with notebooks and cameras’ 
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(Collier, 1989, pp. 193). Evelyn Irons of the London Evening Standard, for 
example, arrived in a small Bavarian village with three other reporters 
– all armed with revolvers – and apparently forced its surrender; while 
Ernest Hemingway packed a brace of pistols in breach both of army rules 
and of the Geneva Conventions (ibid.). Journalists had the honorary 
rank of captain and they could dress accordingly, but unless they actually 
enlisted they were still civilian and were not permitted to carry a weapon. 
Peter Arnett (1996) recalls his pistol-packing days reporting the Vietnam 
War when, 
...it was tempting to play soldier. In the early years I carried a large 
revolver that I lovingly polished while relishing the approval of the 
GIs I was covering. I never did fire that pistol...and eventually threw 
it away while running for dear life...during a Vietcong rocket attack.
And in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, journalists 
such as Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) reporter Kurt Lohbeck 
were roundly criticised from within their profession for associating 
themselves too closely with the Mujahideen rebels (Williams Walsh, 
1990). In fact, it was suspected that Lohbeck was helping the rebels with 
their public relations and building contacts with western media outlets 
and arms dealers. Lohbeck had a rather murky career as a political 
lobbyist and journalist, but CBS were happy to hire him without vetting 
him because he came cheap – keeping a staff reporter in the region would 
cost the network anything up to US$200,000 per year – and because he 
boasted knowledge of the region and contacts with the Mujahideen 
(ibid., p. 28). He insisted that he was a reporter, not ‘a player’, but found 
it difficult to shake the allegations that he was ‘a partisan in a holy war’ 
(ibid., p. 36). 
But it is the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) that puts into sharpest 
perspective the debate Martin Bell provoked in Bosnia. This was a 
conflict of stark ideological and political positions that presaged not 
only imminent world war but also the Cold War that followed. The 
correspondents who went to report it from Europe and North America 
were marked out by their partisanship in favour of one side or the 
other. Reporting on the Republican side were Claude Cockburn, Arthur 
Koestler, Ernest Hemingway, Herbert Matthews and Martha Gellhorn, 
‘at her happiest striding out alone on a journalist’s cause’ such as Spain 
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(Shakespeare, 1998, p. 225). Kim Philby reported for The Times on the 
Nationalist side but was also working as a Soviet spy (Knightley, 2004, 
p. 210). One of the most celebrated American journalists of the Spanish 
Civil War was Herbert Matthews. He recalled later what was behind this 
trend for committed journalism at the front in Spain:
All of us who lived the Spanish Civil War felt deeply emotional about 
it...I always felt the falseness and hypocrisy of those who claimed 
to be unbiased, and the foolish, if not the rank stupidity of editors 
and readers who demand objectivity or impartiality of correspon-
dents writing about the war... [In] condemning bias one rejects 
the only factors which really matter – honesty, understanding and 
thoroughness. A reader has the right to ask for all the facts; he has 
no right to ask that a journalist or historian agree with him. (Ibid., 
pp. 210–11; see also Matthews, 1971)
However, Philip Knightley argues that some correspondents in Spain 
forgot about the importance of facts altogether and became nothing more 
than propaganda mouthpieces for one side or the other. It is alleged, for 
example, that Arthur Koestler, of the London News Chronicle, and Claude 
Cockburn of The Week and the Daily Worker, mixed propaganda with 
fact and were not averse to inventing stories to further the Republican 
cause, which they championed with great passion as Communists 
first and reporters second. Knightley objects not so much to their 
partisanship as to the assumption that newspaper readers had no right 
to the truth if the truth damaged the cause of right against wrong (ibid., 
p. 213). Christopher Holme (1995) argues that with so much propaganda 
issuing forth from Spain, it was ‘the straightforward news reporting’ 
of correspondents such as Hugh Christopher Holme (Reuters), Noel 
Monks (Daily Express) and George Steer (The Times) that provoked the 
greatest emotional responses to outrages such as the German bombing 
of Guernica on 26 April 1937 (p. 47).
But there were early attempts to apply some notion of objectivity into 
war reporting. An early pioneer of the approach was James Gordon 
Bennett, publisher of the New York Herald, who put the emphasis of 
coverage on reporting and gathering facts and information rather than 
sensationalism and propaganda. This, he thought, distinguished the 
Herald in its coverage of such events as the Canadian Revolution in 1837. 
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The political sympathies of his reporters were their own, he said, but 
‘their facts belong to history’ (Bjork, 1994, p.  857). James R. Gilmore, 
in his introduction to the collected letters of Charles Page, the famous 
American Civil War reporter, wrote that ‘in the thick of the fight, where 
sabres clash, and minieballs whistle’, or from a vantage point of ‘a friendly 
tree, or on some commanding hill’, the reporter could observe events 
first hand and achieve ultimate objectivity where even historians failed, 
dependent as they were on secondary sources. The reporter had only 
to ‘be cool, truthful, and intrepid’ to provide the readers with ‘a living 
photograph of the tremendous conflict’ (Page, 1898, p. vii). 
‘An attitude of clarity’: journalism and historiography
This comparison between journalists and historians is a persistent 
theme in discussions of objectivity. Like history, journalistic objectivity 
can be discussed in terms of either pure method or, as Pierre Vilar puts 
it, ‘an attitude of clarity’. Vilar was writing here about historiography, 
the method and the practice of history, but it could just as well apply 
to journalism. ‘Can one be objective in writing contemporary history?’ 
he asked:
Differences among historians are to be found in their attitudes. There 
is a dishonest attitude: to call oneself objective, while knowing oneself 
to be partisan; there is the blind attitude: to be partisan while believing 
oneself to be objective; and then there is the attitude of clarity: to state 
one’s position, while believing firmly that thorough analysis is the best 
way to buttress that position. It is pejorative to say of a work of history 
that it is a plea for a cause. Yet a good plea made by a good lawyer and 
for a worthy cause can become a model to the historian. (Southworth, 
1977, p. xvi)
In What is History?, E.  H. Carr considers R.  G. Collingwood’s 
philosophy of history as a model of development. This includes a number 
of principal axioms: that ‘the facts of history never come to us “pure” 
[but] are always refracted through the mind of the recorder’, so we must 
question the historian’s position as much as the facts he or she presents 
(1986, p.  16); that the historian requires ‘imaginative understanding 
for the minds of the people with whom [one] is dealing’ as opposed to 
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‘sympathy’, which implies partiality (ibid., p. 18); that ‘we can view the 
past, and achieve our understanding of the past, only through the eyes of 
the present’; that the very vocabulary we use to describe the great events 
of the past – ‘democracy, empire, war, revolution’ – have undeniable 
contemporary resonance from which we cannot escape (ibid., p.  19). 
‘The function of the past’, according to Collingwood’s idea of history, ‘is 
neither to love the past nor to emancipate [oneself] from the past, but to 
master and understand it as the key to the understanding of the present’ 
(ibid., p. 20).
However, Carr sees several dangers in adopting such a view. It 
encourages the belief that the historian does not require objectivity at all, 
that it is all subjective interpretation: ergo, ‘history is what the historian 
makes’ of it. This is ‘a purely pragmatic (Nietzschean) view of the facts...
that the criterion of a right interpretation is its suitability to some present 
purpose’. In other words, ‘the facts of history are nothing, interpretation 
is everything’ (ibid., p. 20ff). Carr believed the contrary, that objectivity 
was possible in history and that to call an historian objective meant two 
things: firstly, that one ‘has a capacity to rise above the limited vision of 
[one’s] own situation in society and in history’; and secondly, that one 
‘has the capacity to project [one’s] vision into the future in such a way 
as to give [one] a more profound and more lasting insight into the past 
than can be attained by those...whose outlook is entirely bounded by 
their own immediate situation...The historian of the past can make an 
approach towards objectivity only as he approaches towards the under-
standing of the future’ (ibid., p. 117–18).
objectivity under fire
Objectivity in journalism has come under serious critique from 
academics (Glasgow University Media Group, 1976; Lichtenberg, 1996; 
Streckfuss, 1990; Parenti, 1993). They suggest in various ways that the 
news media do not simply report and reflect our social world but that 
they more or less play an active part in shaping, even constructing it; that 
they represent sectional interests rather than society as a whole.2 When 
these criticisms are leveled at journalists, their traditional defence is their 
practice of objectivity but what does it mean to be objective in journalism 
in the first place? According to Michael Schudson (1978), objectivity is 
based on the assumption that a series of ‘facts’ or truth claims about the 
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world can be validated by the rules and procedures of a professional 
community. The distortions and biases, the subjective value judgements 
of the individual or of particular interest groups, are filtered out so that 
among journalists at any rate, ‘The belief in objectivity is a faith in “facts”, 
a distrust of “values”, and a commitment to their segregation’ (p. 6). Gaye 
Tuchman refers to this method as ‘a strategic ritual’, a method of news-
gathering and reporting that protects the journalist from charges of bias 
or libel (1972, p. 661ff). 
Radical critiques measure journalistic claims to objectivity against 
analyses of how the news media produce and represent their version 
of reality according to sectional interests. Bias is not in the eye of the 
beholder but is structured within the entire news process; the news 
filters and constructs reality according to a dominant or institutional 
ideology (Glasgow University Media Group, 1976). ‘What passes for 
objectivity’, for American scholar Michael Parenti, ‘is the acceptance of 
a social reality shaped by the dominant forces of society – without any 
critical examination of that reality’s hidden agendas, its class interests, 
and its ideological biases’ (1993, p. 52). It is the difference respectively 
between the journalist as the professional, instutionalised reporter and 
the journalist as the partial eyewitness and writer. John Pilger points 
to the transparency of this ideology of professionalism, especially in a 
public service broadcaster like the BBC whose coverage of domestic and 
foreign crises has demonstrated its true agenda and its true allegiances:
These people waffle on about objectivity as if by joining that institution 
or any institution they suddenly rise to this Nirvana where they can 
consider all points of view and produce something in five minutes. 
It’s nonsense and it’s made into nonsense because the moment there’s 
any kind of pressure on the establishment you find reporters coming 
clean, as they did after the Falklands. They were very truculent: ‘These 
were our people, our side. And now we’ll get back to being objective’. 
It’s the same with the term ‘balance’. I mean censorship for me always 
works by omission. That’s the most virulent censorship and what we 
have is an enormous imbalance one way, ...the accredited point of 
view, the sort of consensus point of view which has nothing to do with 




The pressure to pursue objectivity in reporting has had serious 
consequences for journalism as a form of factual writing. James Cameron 
thought that ‘objectivity in some circumstances is both meaningless and 
impossible.’ He could not see ‘how a reporter attempting to define a 
situation involving some sort of ethical conflict can do it with sufficient 
demonstrable neutrality to fulfil some arbitrary concept of “objectivity”.’ 
This was not the acid test for Cameron who ‘always tended to argue 
that objectivity was of less importance than the truth, and that the 
reporter whose technique was informed by no opinion lacked a very 
serious dimension’ (1967, p. 72). There are, however, alternative forms 
of journalism that subvert the very notion of objectivity: the ‘New 
Journalism’ of the 1960s and what has been called ‘honest journalism’, 
described as a compromise between the blind assumption of impartiality 
and ideological commitment. 
War and alternative journalisms
As practiced by writers such as Hunter S. Thompson, Ryszard 
Kapusciniski and Joan Didion,4 the New Journalism emerged from 
the counterculture of the 1960s as a rebellion against the practices of 
mainstream journalism. It is journalism as art, the writer’s moral vision 
and personal perspective always to the fore. The techniques of factual 
journalism (the use of the passive voice, the chronicling of events, the 
use of interviews) are blended with those of fiction (the authorial point 
of view or first person narrative, the use of style and imagination). Dan 
Wakefield argues that such writing is imaginative ‘not because the author 
has distorted the facts, but because [she or] he has presented them in a 
full, rather than a naked manner, brought out the sights, sounds, and feel 
surrounding these facts and connected them by comparison with other 
facts of history, society, and literature in an artistic manner that does 
not diminish but gives greater depth and dimension to the facts’ (1974, 
p. 41; see also Glasser, 1992). The New Journalism, therefore, rejects the 
notion of objectivity altogether and embraces subjectivity in its represen-
tation of reality and, as Hollowell puts it, serves ‘the function of fiction’ 
by illuminating ‘the ethical dilemmas of our time’ (1977, p. 11). 
Compare, for example, the ways in which Didion and Kapuscinski 
write about the nature of fear in a conflict situation. In her book, Salvador 
(1983), Didion reflects on the ‘mechanism of terror’ by which right-wing 
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death squads subjugated El Salvador since the beginnings of the civil 
war there in 1979. Here she writes about her immediate impressions of 
the country when she arrived for the first time and took a taxi from the 
airport to the capital, San Salvador:
Terror is the given of the place. Black-and-white police cars cruise in 
pairs, each with the barrel of a rifle extruding from an open window. 
Roadblocks materialise at random, soldiers fanning out from trucks 
and taking positions, fingers always on triggers, safeties clicking on 
and off. Aim is taken as if to pass the time. Every morning El Diario 
de Hoy and La Prensa carry cautionary stories...A mother and her two 
sons hacked to death in their beds by eight desconocidos, unknown 
men...the unidentified body of a young man, strangled, found on the 
shoulder of a road...the unidentified bodies of three young men, found 
on another road, their faces partially destroyed by bayonets, one face 
carved to represent a cross...The dead and pieces of the dead turn 
up in El Salvador everywhere, every day, as taken for granted as in a 
nightmare, or a horror movie...Bodies turn up in the brush of vacant 
lots, in the garbage thrown down ravines in the richest districts, in 
public rest rooms, in bus stations. (1983, pp. 14–15, 19)
Fear, in Didion’s account of El Salvador, is a reign of terror, a ‘given of 
the place.’ But the late Polish journalist Kapuscinski saw it differently. His 
book, Shah of Shahs (1982), on the fall of the Shah of Iran to the Islamic 
revolution in 1979, explores the underlying impulses and dynamics that 
make a revolution and reveals fear as a voracious monster that must be 
slain if revolution is possible:
Fear: a predatory, voracious animal living inside us. It does not let us 
forget it’s there. It keeps eating at us and twisting our guts. It demands 
food all the time, and we see that it gets the choicest delicacies. Its 
preferred fare is dismal gossip, bad news, panicky thoughts, nightmare 
images. From a thousand pieces of gossip, portents, ideas, we always 
cull the worst ones – the ones that fear likes best. Anything to satisfy 
the monster and set it at ease...All books about all revolutions begin 
with a chapter that describes the decay of tottering authority or the 
misery and sufferings of the people. They should begin with a psycho-
logical chapter, one that shows how a harassed, terrified man suddenly 
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breaks his terror, stops being afraid. This unusual process, sometimes 
accomplished in an instant like a shock or a lustration, demands 
illuminating. Man gets rid of fear and feels free. Without that there 
would be no revolution. (pp. 110–11)
In Didion, fear defeats; in Kapuscinski, fear is defeated. Both, however, 
reject the constraints of the ‘disciplined’ and ‘objective’ report and seek 
truth and revelation in the subjective, the meditative. Taken several steps 
further, the Russian journalist, Artyom Borovyik (1990), seeks his truth 
about the war in Afghanistan in more surreal terms:
One time I woke from a nightmare in a cold sweat. In my dream 
I’d seen a field strewn with corpses. Even awake, I could smell the 
vivid violet-like odor of carrion. In the morning, I learned that my 
refrigerator was broken. It was shaking feverishly (it was afraid too, the 
bastard) in a gigantic pool of blood. The blood was still oozing out of 
the freezer, which my predecessor had packed tight with meat. Despite 
all my efforts to scrape the linoleum clean, the large bloodstain had 
remained on the floor ever since. Every time I saw the bloodstain it 
reminded me of the dream, as did the war itself – a running, real-life 
nightmare. To find out about the meaning of my nightmare, I once 
borrowed a dictionary of dreams from an acquaintance, but apparently 
no one else had ever dreamed such vileness. (p. 110)
It was Kapuscinski, however, who revealed the deeper, broader picture, 
and like all great writers he forged his own unique style. He did not assume 
absolute truth or prescribe a moral course but, as James Aucoin (2001) 
puts it, he took you there, showed you an incomplete picture and then 
challenged you to find the missing pieces. He implicitly passed respon-
sibility on to the reader. It was not conventional, objective journalism, 
and it was not the journalism of attachment, but perhaps it was better 
journalism for that. This is close to the idea of ‘honest journalism’ in 
conventional reporting, whereby the journalist admits not just to the 
difficulties of objectivity, but to the constructed nature of journalism as 
a form. In his study of the US press corps in El Salvador during some of 
the worst years of its civil war in the 1980s, Mark Pedelty highlights a key 
difference between American and Salvadoran journalists in how they 
saw their job. The Americans insisted that they ‘report’ news as fact; the 
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Salvadorans talked in terms of ‘making’ news. The Americans adhered 
to notions of ‘objectivity’, while the Salvadorans thought the highest 
aspiration in journalism was ‘honesty’ (1995, p.  226–27). As Pedelty 
argues, the ethic of honest journalism comes somewhere between 
objective journalism and propaganda:
Objective journalists deny their subjectivities, rather than acknowledge 
them and critically challenge them. They reduce complexities, rather 
than explain them. They evade contradiction, rather than letting the 
reader in on the inevitable doubts and difficulties encountered in any 
act of discovery. (ibid., p. 227)
Put in this kind of historical and theoretical context, then, the 
journalism of attachment debate in the 1990s resonates with the reporting 
of some of the major conflicts of the last two centuries, not least the 
Spanish Civil War, where the battle lines were most clearly drawn. When 
Martin Bell advocated a more committed, moral approach to reporting 
the conflict in Bosnia – condemning atrocity from whatever side and 
speaking out for the defenceless – he seemed to be invoking the spirit of 
Martha Gellhorn (1993) in her writings from Spain but the controversy 
he provoked was intense and sometimes hostile. 
‘A twisted sort of therapy’? The journalism of attachment debate
‘I was trained in a tradition of objective and dispassionate journalism’, 
said Bell. ‘I believed in it once. I don’t believe in it anymore.’ Objective 
reporting was ‘bystanders journalism’ that ill-equipped the reporter for 
‘the challenges of the times.’ While he still believed in impartiality and 
in the facts, he wondered about the meaning of objectivity and whether 
it really existed, not least in the midst of some brutal war or human 
calamity (1998, pp. 102–03). Bell proposed an alternative journalism, a 
journalism of attachment ‘that cares as well as knows’. It does not take 
sides any more than aid agencies but it ‘is aware of the moral ground on 
which it operates.’ For him, reporting a conflict like Bosnia according to 
the traditional norms of objective journalism removes any sort of moral 
content from the story and leaves only an empty spectacle. He was by 
no means alone in rejecting ‘bystander journalism’. The veteran ITN 
reporter Michael Nicholson argued that it missed the real stories of war:
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All the great journalists that I’ve admired...were people who weren’t 
afraid to show their emotions, afraid to show their humanity. There’s 
this line isn’t there that the reporter should stand on the sidelines. 
[...] They should be a spectator trying to objectively report a story 
without trying to get emotionally involved. Well I’ve always said...that 
you’ve got to get as close to a story as you can and sometimes that 
means becoming a casualty yourself, a physical casualty or, as I was 
in Sarajevo, an emotional casualty. But I see nothing wrong with that. 
[...] One of the things about Sarajevo was that it was one of the few 
instances...in which you were very much part of the scene because 
you couldn’t get out of the place. You were under siege yourself...
and therefore how could you be objective? No, I don’t believe in this 
so-called objectivity. You can still report the facts. You can still be as 
close to the truth as any person can be and still show a commitment, 
an emotional anguish. I don’t see them to be contradictory.5 
Nicholson reported the story of the Bosnian War for the British 
company ITN, but decided to cross the line to become personally 
involved when he came across 200 orphans outside Sarajevo and helped 
organise a rescue mission to save them from the relentless Bosnian Serb 
bombardment of the city. In the end, he ended up adopting one of the 
children, nine-year-old Natasha Mihaljcic, and later wrote of the difficulty 
of staying detached and objective in this situation (Nicholson, 1993).6 
Issues of ‘objectivity’ and ‘attachment’, and the dilemmas they present 
to the war correspondent, provoked some bitter exchanges of fire on the 
home front. The most sustained critique of the journalism of attachment 
has come from Mick Hume, editor of the now defunct LM (Living 
Marxism) magazine. His pamphlet, Whose War Is It Anyway? (1997), is 
strongly argued and stands as a coherent and significant contribution to 
the debate. Hume sees the trend of personalised, crusading reporting as 
a ‘menace to good journalism – and to those whose lives it invades.’ It 
neglects the historical and political context of the conflict it reports and 
portrays it instead as merely a metaphysical struggle between good and 
evil. Journalists who adhere to this kind of reporting set themselves up 
– intentionally or by default – as judge and jury. Their mission is not to 
explain and contextualise but to promulgate the morally correct line and 
this, says Hume, obscures and undermines their role as impartial and 
objective reporters. Hume is adamant. ‘The journalism of attachment’, 
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he says, ‘is self-righteous. Worse, it is repressive. Those who fall the 
wrong side of the line the press corps draws between Good and Evil...can 
expect to be on the receiving end of more than a bad press’ (p. 4). Hume 
argues that there is nothing wrong with taking sides in a conflict. The 
problem is the tendency of reporters to mix emotion with the reporting 
of facts. When the facts are suppressed, when they do not fit the moral 
framework reporters have constructed for themselves, then the reader, 
the viewer, the listener, is the loser:
There is a difference between taking sides and taking liberties with the 
facts in order to promote your favoured cause. There is a difference 
between expressing an opinion and presenting your personal passions 
and prejudices as objective reporting. And there is a difference 
between reporting from the midst of a conflict and writing as if you 
were the one at war, so that journalists and their feelings become the 
news. (p. 5)
Robert Fisk, special Middle East correspondent for The Independent, 
also suspects the ideological impulses of reporting steeped in moral 
outrage and says it is not what he understands by ‘journalism’:
I can remember...in the Gulf, one of my colleagues, a normally very 
sensible, rational guy...became a bit odd. He said, ‘We’ve got to smash 
Saddam. It’s the only way to do it. The Arabs are with us!’ He was 
cheerleading in print. It was a very serious problem and it happened in 
the Kosovo war. [One of the] reporters came in talking about, ‘Here in 
Djakovice you can see evil and you can smell evil!’ To which my reply 
is if a guy is talking like that either he needs a holiday or he should go 
into holy orders. This is ridiculous! This is not journalism, you know. 
It is the sort of journalism I’m totally against. There’s another reporter 
who I have a lot of respect for but he’s always looking into his own 
heart: ‘Behind me, unimaginable horrors are taking place in our time.’ 
Big problem!7
While Martin Bell and reporters who share his general view insist that 
objectivity is still possible even if the reporter adopts a moral standpoint 
on the rights and wrongs of a conflict, Mick Hume and others argue 
that this is an untenable position. Stephen Ward (1998) wonders how 
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it can inform reporting of civil conflicts like Northern Ireland or 
Bosnia (p.  124). It allows for no grey areas, no doubts, no skepticism 
and no questions. What happens when certain facts fail to fit the moral 
framework? What happens when the ‘bad guys’ tell the truth? Or when 
the ‘good guys’ tell lies? 
The Bosnian War was reported as a titanic battle between good 
and evil in which journalists in general adopted a sustained anti-Serb 
narrative. Atrocity stories were reported with scant regard for their 
veracity – no checking, no official confirmations or denials, just the rush 
to instant judgement. Hume gives several examples of the Journalism of 
Attachment in action when reporting the war in Bosnia. Roy Gutman, 
reporter with Newsday, broke news of the existence of Serbian death 
camps, only to later admit that he got it wrong, that he neglected to 
check the story out in his rush to tell the world ‘the truth’ (Hume, 1997, 
p. 9). Media reports of the Sarajevo market place massacre of February 
1994 blamed the Bosnian Serbs despite a UN investigation that pointed 
to Bosnian Muslim involvement, a possible attempt to attract worldwide 
sympathy and provoke a tough military response against the Serbs. Then 
there was the Bosnian Serb officer who was tried and convicted for war 
crimes yet allowed to tell his confession to the world’s media; this was 
spun as testament to what the Serbs were capable of in Bosnia but much 
of it was unverified and based on half truths and exaggerations. In stories 
like these, Hume argues, ‘The reporters and their editors imposed their 
own external agenda in deciding which facts did and did not qualify as 
news’ (p. 11). 
Maggie O’Kane filed up to 50 reports on the war in Bosnia for the 
Guardian yet only one of those tried to explain the Serbian position in 
the conflict. ‘In retrospect’, she admits, ‘I could have seen more of the 
Serbian side...but you gravitate to where the bigger story is. We were all 
in Sarajevo writing human interest stories’ (cited in Hume, 1997; p. 13). 
But O’Kane is unapologetic in her basic ethical approach to the Bosnia 
story and she draws a clear line between professional objectivity and 
telling the truth; the two in her view, and that of many of her colleagues, 
are not always the same:
I think the highest thing we can achieve is the truth. The truth is not 
objective sometimes [and] actually there’s nothing very objective about 
a pogrom and a sweeping policy of ethnic cleansing across an entire 
journalism, objectivity and war
47
country. It’s very brutal, it’s very calculated and it’s very one-sided. [...] 
I think the interesting thing about objectivity is that the people who 
wave those banners are usually either people who’ve got something 
to hide as in the case of the Serbs who were criticising journalistic 
coverage and saying we weren’t objective and were biased, that’s one 
category. Secondly, political, establishment figures...were uncomfort-
able with the reporting and therefore attacked journalists for lacking 
objectivity. [...] So you have to ask where are they coming from? [...] 
I sort of feel that I try for the truth and sometimes the truth’s a good 
story and sometimes it isn’t and actually that’s all that matters.8 
Alex Thomson, for Channel 4 News, is of a similar view regarding his 
reporting of the Kosovo conflict in 1999. He is clear and unapologetic 
in his dismissal of objectivity in situations where it invalidates difficult 
or inconvenient truths or where it appears to legitimise torture, rape or 
ethnic cleansing:
I made no attempt to be objective in my reporting about the Serb 
pogrom which was being conducted in Kosovo...What is objectivity in 
that situation? What is objectivity!?...Do we mean by objectivity that 
there is essentially a kind of middle ground of explanation which can 
legitimately explain why these people are being raped and tortured 
and burned out of their houses? That’s bullshit! You just tell people 
what’s happening. You let them make their own moral judgement 
about it... But in my own personal feelings...I was overjoyed when 
they started bombing Novi Sad and wasting the Serb’s infrastructure 
– absolutely overjoyed!9
CNN’s Christiane Amanpour thinks that in a story like the genocide 
in Rwanda, in 1994, reporters should certainly be fair but that does not 
mean treating the perpetrators on an equal basis with their victims equally 
or ‘insisting on drawing a balance when no balance exists’. She attacks 
today’s ‘culture of moral equivalence’, where ‘journalism seems uncom-
fortable with identifying a victim and aggressor.’ In Bosnia, for example, 
‘Britain and France kept insisting both sides in that conflict were equally 
guilty. They were not. That has been recognised in retrospect, but in the 
meantime it caused international inaction and unnecessary loss of life, 
not to mention a sense of political impotence on the part of the west.’10
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This mode of reporting became the norm for covering conflicts 
elsewhere in the world, especially in Africa where, Hume argues, ‘western 
journalists could give even freer rein to their prejudices and force the 
facts into their preconceived framework’ (1997, p. 12). Furthermore, it 
should be noted that the journalism attachment debate was very specific 
to the reporting of the Balkan wars or other civil conflicts in the 1990s, 
where none of the NATO powers were directly involved as combatants 
on the ground in the way they were in the first Gulf War in 1991. In that 
conflict, the majority of Western journalists happily conformed to the 
pooling system of reporting, policed as it was by military minders, and 
barely considered or debated aloud the limits of objectivity and balance. 
In the prevailing control culture of the briefing rooms in that conflict and 
later in the Iraq War (2003), cheering on ‘our boys’ against ‘evil Saddam’ 
was a natural and unquestionable patriotic response. (Part II of this book 
will look at that control culture in more detail.)
explaining the journalism of attachment
There are two principal explanations for the journalism of attachment 
in the 1990s. One is the rising number of women war correspondents, 
bringing to the job a less gung-ho, more human-oriented sensibility 
to their reporting; another is the postmodern, cultural zeitgeist that 
privileged the individual and celebrity. 
There were two styles of reporting from the Crimean War in 1854: one 
that was concerned with the strategy and tactics of battle and another 
that focused on the human stories of war. The journalism of attachment 
as practiced in Bosnia tended to lean towards the latter which some 
say was influenced by the increasing number of women journalists 
reporting war and conflicts today. It is assumed that unlike their male 
colleagues, women journalists are keen to get beyond the obsession 
with military hardware and report the human costs of war: suffering, 
loss and bereavement, displacement and upheaval. But it is wrong to 
see the prominence of the woman war correspondent as a relatively 
new phenomenon (see for example Elwood-Akers, 1988; Sebba, 1994; 
Wagner, 1989), just as it is wrong to suggest that there is a strict gender 
difference in style between men and women reporters. Some women 
journalists see they have advantages over their male colleagues. Jan 
Goodwin, for example, reported on the Afghan resistance to the Russian 
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occupation during the 1980s and recalls ‘that as a woman, I was able to 
see a different side of guerrillas from the one that is normally shown to 
journalists – with me the freedom fighters could allow themselves to be 
vulnerable. And I in turn came to respect and care for these men’ (1987, 
p. xviii). One has to wonder if this image of the caring woman journalist 
helping heavily armed yet apparently vulnerable ‘freedom fighters’ get in 
touch with their feelings in the mountain wilderness of Afghanistan does 
anything for the efforts of most women journalists to struggle for and 
win credibility in a still male-dominated occupation. 
A better exemplar of the qualities of the woman war correspondent 
might be the crisis in East Timor in 1999. When Indonesia agreed to end 
its illegal, 25-year occupation of the country and allow a free referendum 
on independence, it promised to withdraw its troops. With its tacit 
support, however, pro-Indonesian militia set about a campaign of terror 
and intimidation against the majority of the population who wanted 
independence. They also lashed out at the United Nations and the 
assembled media, laying siege to the UN compound in the capital Dili. 
The UN eventually announced its intention to withdraw its western staff 
and advised journalists to do likewise. Three refused, choosing to stay 
with the local staff inside. Victoria Brittain thought it no accident that 
all three journalists were women. The Dutch freelance journalist and 
photographer, Irene Slegt, became ‘the voice to the outside world of 1,500 
desperate Timorese who had taken refuge in the compound and faced 
certain death if the UN plans to abandon them had been carried out’. A 
friend of Slegt described her as ‘The kind of woman who’s prepared to 
feel an emotional sympathy for the people she’s working among, where 
a man would override that in the interests of common sense.’ With her 
were Minka Nijhuis, a writer, and the late Sunday Times correspon-
dent, Marie Colvin.11 This presents quite a black and white picture that 
excludes the possibility of a man acting on emotion or sympathy and a 
woman acting on common sense but Brittain insists that:
Of course there are plenty of careerist women for whom common 
sense comes first but I think that most people who are on a sharp 
career track tend to be men; women are much more likely not to be so 
interested in that. [The] kind of choices that Irene’s made, you know 
to go after these unfashionable stories. East Timor turned out to be an 
unfashionable one but [Slegt] spent 20 years working on these kinds of 
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unfashionable stories. And she’s a good example of the kind of woman 
who’s not a journalist because she wants to make a big career or a big 
name or big money. She’s a journalist because she wants to find out 
what makes the world tick and communicate that to other people and 
I think that’s why I identify with her because that’s what I have tried 
to do. Men, particularly younger men, they want to be big or they 
wouldn’t go into journalism in the first place. They’d become primary 
school teachers.12
As Brittain wrote at the time, the gender gap is thrown into sharp 
relief in the ‘intensity of war [when] even outsiders find themselves 
uncomfortably revealed, shorn of the props and mannerisms which 
allow most people, men in particular, to mask themselves most of the 
time.’ Men respond to fear with bravado, she argued, and male war cor-
respondents are no different: ‘they become obsessed with weapons and 
start identifying with the military as role models, in the hope of feeling 
stronger and braver themselves’.13 The response of the women corre-
spondent to the extremes of the war correspondent, says Brittain, ‘is to 
identify with the people whose intimate lives are shattered. Irene Slegt 
[had] no hesitation in saying about women journalists what many of us 
would hesitate to put into words: “We are more courageous...you see men 
losing it quicker”.’ For young male correspondents coming up and taking 
on assignments in this war zone or that, ‘the shape of journalism now 
is very much about your ego, your starring and general you-ness’. Male 
correspondents ‘don’t make great companions in difficult situations...
whereas there’s something about women, not that they’re just sort of soft 
or anything. They’re just able to be more attuned to what else is going 
on in the situation’. This is particularly the case with television, which is 
why Brittain stopped doing TV news and prefers print journalism. She 
‘couldn’t stand the way it deformed what you were trying to see’. Television 
by its very nature, with its stand-ups to camera, projects the journalist 
and makes her very visible where maybe she prefers anonymity:
You know, you became the story whereas, particularly where you’re 
doing very difficult things like civil wars, the kind of stories that I 
do a lot in Africa. Obviously you stand out for a kick off because you 
are white but beyond that you want to be as invisible as possible and 
I think most male journalists find that a bit difficult. They don’t want 
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to be invisible. The whole reason they’re a journalist is because they 
want a picture byline on the front page. I just think that’s a shame and 
it makes the work that much more difficult.14
Yet the image of the macho male correspondent and his soldier fantasies 
is also a caricature, immortalised by cartoonist Steve Bell’s creation, Luke 
Hardnose (McLaughlin, 2002a, p. 174). Many male correspondents and 
cameramen take risks not for their own greater glory but for a story they 
care about. Maggie O’Kane praises the courage of a number of male cor-
respondents in East Timor who took risks to report what was happening 
outside on the streets and on the island. Their fortunes were mixed. The 
news cameraman Max Stahl filmed footage of people being forced by the 
militias into West Timor, for which he received international plaudits 
but Sanders Thoenes of the Financial Times, was shot dead by pro-Indo-
nesian militia and dumped in an alleyway.15 
The BBC’s Mark Urban also doubts that attachment can be wholly 
explained as part of the feminisation of war reporting. He prefers to see it 
as part of the cultural zeitgeist, a cultural condition ‘in which victimhood 
is everything in these conflicts and where it’s almost impossible in the 
reporting of somewhere like Bosnia or Kosovo for someone with a gun 
in their hand to be a hero in the way that it was, even in the early days of 
the Northern Ireland conflict or the Falklands.’ Much of what passes for 
war reporting now ‘is simply about how high you can crank the emotion-
ometer.’ But this, says Urban, does not come down to a ‘feminisation of 
news values.’ Rather, it is ‘a view of conflict in which you simply concentrate 
on the civilian victims and you only interview the military protagonists 
through a heavy filter of cultural bias or aggressive...innuendo [which] is 
utterly self defeating.’16 The assumption, that viewers and readers need to 
be led by the reporter through a minefield of moral distinctions, between 
good guys and the bad guys, good victims and bad victims, to be told 
whose side to take, is exactly what bothers critics such as Stephen Ward, 
who cautions against such moral leadership in ‘a pluralistic society with 
few common standards’ (1998, p. 124). 
In an interview with the author in 1999, BBC journalist, John Simpson, 
attacked what he called ‘look at me journalism’. ‘It’s not the purpose of 
being there’, he argued. ‘I don’t think the BBC is that kind of organisation 
and I don’t really want to impose those kind of views and attitudes on 
to people.’ He explained that his approach was rooted in the tradition of 
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BBC public service journalism that focuses not on the storyteller but on 
telling the story. Viewers want to know about events on the ground in 
Beijing or Belgrade, not what John Simpson is thinking or feeling about 
those events because what he feels just gets in the way of their under-
standing and is ‘of no value or of no interest to anybody.’17 This is all the 
more essential when reporting complex events on which it is possible to 
take more than one perspective. People should be able to appreciate the 
complexity and not have their opinions directed or their minds made up 
for them:
Nowadays you might say there’s only one view that you could take 
about the Tiananmen Square massacre [in Beijing, 1989] and that 
probably is true. But as I found when I was there, there was more than 
one view you could take about the bombing of Belgrade [1999]. I think 
that one of the strengths of my position there was that I wasn’t trying 
to tell people what to think and I wasn’t trying to whip up feelings, 
and I wasn’t telling people how I felt when I saw people dying or being 
killed. I was able simply to explain what was going on. Sometimes that 
was terrible and it was indeed – the death, the horrible death of people 
right in front of my eyes. I don’t feel the requirement to rant on how I 
personally felt about it and the effect it had on my life because I didn’t 
think that was what anybody else was interested in.18
Simpson’s rejection of ‘look at me journalism’ was to backfire in 
2001, when he reported on the invasion of Afghanistan and told BBC 
Radio 4 how he and the BBC liberated Kabul from Taliban control. ‘It 
was only BBC people who liberated this city!’ he claimed. ‘We got in 
ahead of Northern Alliance troops. I can’t tell you what a joy it was. I 
was very proud indeed to be part of an organisation that could push 
forward ahead of the rest’ (12 November 2001). The idea of the BBC as 
a spearhead in a military invasion may have come as a surprise to the 
Northern Alliance and it certainly grated with Simpson’s colleagues at 
ITN, Channel 4 News and other news outlets that could make equally 
valid claims to enter Kabul first. More to the point, the adverse publicity 
Simpson generated for himself and the BBC seemed to highlight the very 
phenomenon he identified in 1999: the trend for the reporter to become 
part of, or even more newsworthy than the story he or she is there to tell. 
In fairness, however, it should be noted that Simpson was one of the few 
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journalists in the international media to follow the fate of Afghanistan in 
the 1990s, when the Soviet occupation ended and gave way to brutal civil 
war and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. 
The journalism of attachment is also said to encourage voluntary and 
moral self-censorship. Robert Fisk recalls a poem from Humbert Wolfe’s 
The Uncelestial City (1930), which includes the lines: ‘You cannot hope 
/ to bribe or twist, / thank God! the / British journalist. / But, seeing 
what / the man will do / unbribed, there’s no occasion to.’19 Systematic 
censorship and control were largely absent from the Bosnian war 
because, says Mick Hume, it was not required. Nothing the international 
media said undermined the general propaganda framework as promoted 
in the West or threatened anyone’s security. And there was no need to 
control the movements of reporters because they rarely if ever ventured 
behind Serb lines to get the story there. He concludes that, 
[those] who pursue the Journalism of Attachment...are playing a 
dangerous game for high stakes. The language of evil, genocide, and 
Holocaust can exact a high price from the accused. Such a substitution 
of emotion and histrionics for rational and critical analysis must also 
prove a major set-back for standards of journalism. (1997, p. 27)
Lindsey Hilsum remarks that after reporting on the mass killings in 
Rwanda in 1994, she read something in Primo Levi’s work that she found 
herself disagreeing with: 
He said to understand is to justify and I don’t think [that is always 
true]. The job of a journalist is to try and understand, not to 
understand emotionally, but to understand historically. And so I am 
not objective about the fact that a government had a policy of trying to 
exterminate all the Tutsis and all the moderate Hutus in Rwanda. That 
was a terrible, wicked thing to do. But my job as a journalist is to try 
and understand how this situation came about and to understand why 
those Hutus in those villages picked up their machetes and slaughtered 
people. [...] Now some people will then say I am justifying it because 
I try and understand what was going on in the minds of those people 
who did that [...]. But that’s not the case at all. It’s my job.20
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Hilsum tells how she ‘crossed the line to commitment’ one day in 1997 
when she testified at the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda. She was summonsed by the prosecution to support the 
case that what happened in Rwanda in 1994 ‘constituted crimes against 
humanity and genocide’ (Hilsum, 1997, p.  29). Martin Bell and the 
Guardian’s Ed Vulliamy have both testified to the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (see Bell, 1993, and Vulliamy, 1993); 
others refused on the grounds that it is not for journalists to get involved 
in the story they report and that to testify against possible sources and 
contacts would be to erode a fundamental principle of journalism and 
destroy the credibility and effectiveness of the journalist. Who would 
talk to journalists again if they thought it might prejudice their position? 
But Hilsum argues that ‘the normal rules of journalistic ethics are 
overwhelmed by murder’ on the scale perpetrated in Rwanda. She was 
one of the very few western journalists actually there when it was all 
happening, so she felt it was her ‘moral duty to use [her] unique position 
to influence the historical record in the court’ (ibid., p. 30). She argues 
further for the ‘need to find a balance between the practical and ethical 
demands of reporting, and our responsibility as citizens – or human 
beings – in the face of extreme mass crimes’ (ibid., p. 32). 
Robert Fisk opposes crusading journalism but thinks: 
that when a journalist sees something which is outrageous, to write 
as if it’s just a road accident, or an earthquake or an act of God over 
which he has no opinions or no feelings as a human being, then there’s 
not much point being a writer let alone a journalist.21 
The radical Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett rejected ‘the 
commonly enough held opinion that journalists should remain aloof 
from politics, not join parties or accept the discipline that membership 
implies. Journalists are members of human society with the same rights 
and duties and social responsibilities as everyone else, including those of 
political options’ (Burchett, 1980, p. 328). For Burchett, journalism was 
about conscience and his obligations to his readers. He believed that he 
had in his working life achieved ‘a sort of journalistic Nirvana’, resistant 
to political, institutional or commercial pressure or interference:
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Over the years, and in many countries, I had a circle of readers who 
did not buy papers for the stock market reports or strip cartoons, but 
for facts on vital issues affecting their lives and their consciences. In 
keeping both eyes and both ears open during my forty years reporting 
from the world’s hotspots, I had become more and more conscious 
of my responsibilities to my readers. The point of departure is a great 
faith in ordinary human beings and the sane and decent way they 
behave when they have the true facts of the case. (Ibid., p. 328)
This is certainly pertinent to the problem of impartiality in coverage 
of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, specifically the serial attacks by Israel 
on Gaza in the period 2006–14. And the question is this: how can the 
broadcast media presume to report with balance and impartiality the 
most asymmetrical conflict of recent times?
balanced asymmetry: reporting israel and gaza
The journalism of attachment has usually only been possible in civil 
conflicts such as those in the Balkans in the 1990s, where western 
political and military involvement is peripheral or intermittent, and/
or where they involve a clearly definable enemy. The ongoing conflict 
in Syria and Islamic State’s campaign against the Yazedi minority in 
northern Iraq have also been reported with a degree of attachment, 
especially where they involve a humanitarian angle. Yet the journalism 
of attachment would have been an unthinkable way of reporting the 
conflict in Northern Ireland (1968–94);22 and it has been largely absent 
from coverage of the recent Israeli operations in the Gaza strip (2006, 
2012 and 2014). 
In my research to date into the media reporting of the Northern 
Ireland conflict, I have found no instance where a local, British or inter-
national journalist has stood before the TV camera and pronounced 
himself or herself unable to be impartial in face of what was happening 
on the streets of Belfast or Derry (McLaughlin and Baker 2010 and 2015). 
Part of this was professional – especially for broadcast journalists who 
adhered to strictures of internal control such as producer’s guidelines or 
the system of referral upwards (Schlesinger 1987; Miller 1994) – and part 
of it was a response to official British news management strategies (Miller 
1994). Indeed, the very fact that ‘both sides of the conflict’ consistently 
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complained that media reporting was biased against them was enough 
to convince journalists and editors that they were somehow getting the 
coverage right in very trying circumstances. Even more revealing than 
this piece of self-redeeming sophistry is the number of times journalists 
have asserted it without challenge. In Northern Ireland, the reporting 
narrative was simple and consistent, characterised by what David 
Butler (1995) has called ‘balanced sectarianism’. The narrative here was 
of a sectarian war between two tribes divided by religion and national 
identity, with the British state acting as neutral arbiter, containing the 
conflict as best it could while fighting a war on another front against the 
paramilitaries affiliated to both sides. Put simply, every sectarian attack 
or outrage perpetrated by one side was invariably balanced with one from 
the other. As Butler and others such as Miller (1994) and McLaughlin and 
Baker (2010, 2015), have argued, however, this reporting framework was 
rather too simplistic as a starting point for understanding the conflict, 
its history and its underlying causes and effects. But it worked for the 
media as a routine rule-of-thumb, and even as a training template for 
young British reporters such as Mike Nicholson, Kate Adie and of course 
Martin Bell, all of whom went on to report the Balkan conflicts of the 
early 1990s. 
The conflict in the Middle East between Israel and the Palestinians 
presents a different challenge again to western reporters and news 
organisations: how to explain the actions, motivations and attitudes of 
two of the most unequal protagonists in any recent conflict as if they 
were in fact equally balanced in military capability, political power and 
international sympathy. Allied to that problem are two others. How to 
report the diplomatic, peace-making gambits of the USA and the EU 
as neutral when in fact they arm and provide diplomatic legitimacy to 
Israel at the expense of the stateless Palestinians. And how to represent 
the countless resolutions of the UN Security Council and the General 
Assembly against Israel as anything other than empty gestures, routinely 
defused by US veto, Israeli pressure or diplomatic power play.
Before questioning the assumption of balance in media coverage of 
this conflict, particularly as it applies to Israel’s periodic assaults on Gaza, 
it is important to consider in outline the extent of the imbalance of power 
between the protagonists. According to Jane’s The Military Balance 2014, 
the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) comprises 133,000 soldiers, 9,500 navy 
personnel and 34,000 air force personnel – a total of 176, 500. It also has 
journalism, objectivity and war
57
a reserve force of 465,000 (mostly army) personnel. In Gaza, Hamas has 
20,000 personnel in active service, 10,000 of which normally serve in a 
police role but who can be called up for a military role in wartime. The 
other principal militia, Islamic Jihad, has up to 3,000 personnel. 
The imbalance of arms and munitions is even more striking. Jane’s 
Defence Weekly23 estimates that the IDF have at their disposal: 3,500 
tanks, 456 artillery guns, 620 self-propelled guns, 138 multiple rocket 
systems, 750 mortars, 900 anti-tank weapons, 200 anti aircraft guns, 
7,684 logistical vehicles, 64 navy ships including 3 destroyers and 3 
submarines; an air force equipped with 490 combat aircraft and 80 
attack helicopters;24 an indeterminate arsenal of long range conventional 
missiles; the Iron Dome missile defence system and, last but not least, 
200 nuclear warheads, the existence of which Israel has refused to 
confirm or deny. 
It is difficult to quantify the weapons capability of the Gaza-based 
al-Qassam Brigades (allied to Hamas) or Islamic Jihad because they 
do not publish such information; but various estimates sourced online 
suggest that al-Qassam have an arsenal of between 5,000–10,000 missiles 
of varying ranges (20 km, 75 km and 150 km). During the IDF’s latest 
attack on Gaza, Operation Protective Edge in 2014, Hamas released 
pictures to the international media of what it claimed to be one of two 
drone aircraft in its possession but the fog of the wider propaganda war 
made it impossible to confirm the authenticity or provenance of the 
images. Whatever the difficulties in establishing the true extent of even 
the combined military capacity of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, it would 
seem safe to conclude that it is minuscule in comparison with that of 
Israel, the Middle East’s dominant military power. Sadly for thousands 
of Palestinian civilians, this has been demonstrated time and again with 
devastating results. But the remarkable aspect of all this is that the inter-
national media rarely if ever emphasise such a gross imbalance of forces 
when reporting the latest flare-up in the conflict. 
Between 2006 and 2014, the IDF carried out four major military 
operations against Gaza, a tiny, densely populated strip of land cut 
off from the world by an Israeli blockade. They have pounded it with 
hundreds of tonnes of munitions including, in 2006, illegal phosphorous 
shells; razed hundreds of houses using military bulldozers; shot unarmed 
and innocent civilians on sight; and imposed other repressive, on-the-
ground security measures such as arbitrary arrest and internment 
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without trial. Israel consistently claims that such operations are carried 
out in ‘self-defence’, in response to ‘terrorist’ activities by paramilitary 
militia such as the al-Qassam Brigades and Islamic Jihad, specifically 
arms smuggling via tunnels across the border with Egypt and the firing 
of rockets into Israeli towns and settlements. These four operations 
alone (there have been many smaller ones in between) left over 3,000 
Palestinians dead, included hundreds of children, thousands injured and 
over half a million civilians displaced; the Israeli toll is much lower and 
more difficult to quantify but civilian deaths total less than 100.
All this information is in the public domain yet the mainstream media 
seem strangely impervious to it. The official Israeli version of what 
happens and why, is reproduced by large sections of the news media with 
little deviation or question. Even in the few instances where reporters 
stray from it, Israel’s propaganda machine is quick to respond with 
rebuttals, corrections and threats, the cumulative effect of which has 
been to create a culture of fear and inhibition. As a BBC news producer 
put it: ‘We wait in fear for the telephone call from the Israelis’ (Philo and 
Berry, 2011). Journalists such as Alex Thomson, who reported on two of 
the Israeli operations in Gaza, is scornful of this kind of timidity:
If anyone finds that a pressure, they’re in the wrong job! I mean, that’s 
what you expect. If you do stuff on the Israelis, you’re going to get flak. 
I mean what do people expect? It’s like saying I’m going to join the 
lifeboat but I’m a bit upset because I’m going to get wet and cold. This 
stuff is ridiculous! That comes absolutely with the turf. They should 
relish that, they should engage with that, they should be robust about 
what they’re doing and defend what they’re doing.25
It is difficult to find journalists willing to offer an independent 
critique of Israel’s actions and operations in Gaza. In Britain, Robert Fisk 
and Patrick Cockburn of The Independent and John Pilger have been 
persistent and critical voices in the media wilderness. On the broadcast 
front, Channel 4 News and ITN have been most open in allowing access 
to critical or oppositional voices. Apart from these, Middle Eastern media 
outlets such as Al Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV or the Israeli newspaper, 
Haaretz, give space to Palestinian perspectives, though these outlets 
would have very small audiences in the EU and the US. It is a situation 
that is no doubt replicable across the international media spectrum but 
what is curious is that this restrictive media narrative seems unresponsive 
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to a growing cross-section of wider public opinion that opposes the IDF’s 
increasingly punitive and disproportionate military operations against 
Gaza. It is a constituency that is turning to alternative sources via the 
Internet (e.g. The Electronic Intifada, Media Lens and Democracy Now!) 
and/or social media such as Twitter for information and discussion that 
is largely absent from mainstream media coverage. 
So what are the contours of mainstream media coverage of what Israeli 
journalist, Gideon Levy (2010), calls ‘the punishment of Gaza’? Greg 
Philo and Mike Berry (2004) provide an in-depth analysis of British TV 
news coverage of the Al-Aqsa or Second Intifada that began in 2000; and, 
more recently, Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2008/09 (Philo and 
Berry, 2011). This reveals persistent patterns of reporting that: absent or 
obscure historical explanation of the conflict; represent Palestinians as 
provocateurs and the Israelis as defenders; emphasise Israeli casualties 
and underestimate Palestinian casualties; obscure the military imbalance 
between the IDF and organisations in the occupied Territories such 
as Hamas, Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP); and that accept the peacemaking bona fides of Israel’s western 
allies even though these allies continue to arm Israel with the latest hi-tech 
weaponry. Philo and Berry consider a number of factors that might 
explain these patterns of coverage, such as organised propaganda and 
flak campaigns that shape or restrict the limits of how the media report 
and explain the conflict. They also demonstrate a direct link between 
this and public understanding. Using audience focus group research, 
they have found a significant level of public ignorance of the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict, its causes and consequences, with many of the focus 
group respondents admitting that their main source of knowledge of the 
conflict had been one or more of the main TV news networks in the UK. 
But this problem is more than one of intimidation, flak and propaganda 
on the part of the Israeli state. It depends on a certain cultural and 
ideological disposition among western journalists – a ready receptive-
ness to the propaganda messages and images that make it apparently 
easy to internalise them as natural and incontrovertible realities. Thus 
can the BBC’s Middle East correspondent Jeremy Bowen remark in his 
memoirs that the bitterness between the protagonists is deepened by 
‘the obduracy of the Palestinians and the stamina, determination and 
strategic vision of the Israelis’ (2006, p. 238) – hardly a statement that 
wishes a plague on both houses. And as Alex Thomson sees it:
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Hamas fires a rocket into Israel, it’s a war crime, in the sense that 
they’re just firing at a country. They’re not interested in what they 
hit and what they don’t. Almost all the ordnance fired by Israel into 
Gaza is not a war crime. It’s the legitimate use of munitions but the 
margin outside of that is going to kill a lot of people when perhaps 
the right care isn’t taken, when perhaps the right target selection 
isn’t gone through and so forth. But (it’s) very simple to report an 
asymmetrical conflict. I mean [...] the Americans, the greatest force 
the planet has ever seen, has just been defeated [....] by a bunch of 
guys with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and Kalashnikovs in 
Afghanistan. So the reporting of the essential truth that a conflict may 
be asymmetrical does not mean to say that...the heavy side of those 
scales is necessarily going to win.26 
Studies such as Philo and Berry’s go some way towards an evidence-
based critique of news coverage of the conflict as opposed to the kinds 
of tit-for-tat, partisan debates that are often played out in the media 
themselves. Yet even they tread carefully when they conclude in their 
original study (2004) that: ‘The dust-storms of propaganda, which are 
created by those seeking to defend their “own side”, will in the end do 
nothing more than prolong the conflict and the agony that the people of 
the Middle East are having to endure’ (p. 260). This appears to contradict 
the evidence of their own analysis, that in propaganda and media 
coverage, as much as in the war itself, the conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians is deeply asymmetrical and the fact that most sections of the 
mainstream media report it as otherwise is an indication one would think 
of the success of Israel’s well-funded propaganda and public relations 
machinery over the poorly resourced efforts of the Palestinians. In 
fairness, Philo is less circumspect elsewhere when he argues that western 
media accounts offer us ‘a one-sided account of the causes and origins of 
the conflict, which can then have profound impacts on audience beliefs 
to the detriment of any rational public debate on how this crisis may be 
resolved’ (Philo, 2012, p.  163). Alas, rational public debate in the UK 
or anywhere else in the West will not solve the crisis. Only two states 
can solve the crisis: Israel and the United States of America. So far, both 
have shown themselves unmoved by international criticism, democratic 
protest and media dissent. 
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The argument here is not that reporters should shed their impartiality 
in an asymmetrical conflict and overtly take one side against another. 
Rather it is that the reporting of the latest Israeli military operation 
in Gaza or the latest rocket attack on an Israeli settlement must surely 
signal, even if only occasionally, that this is a deeply unequal conflict – 
militarily, politically and diplomatically. 
concluding remarks
Looking back on his idea of the journalism of attachment and the debate 
it provoked, Martin Bell stands by it in principle but insists it was ‘widely 
misunderstood’. The ‘journalism of attachment’ he says, ‘is not a license 
for campaigning journalism, to which I am opposed.’
I’m very suspicious, and I’ve seen it happen, when people go into 
foreign countries, and war zones...knowing what they’re going to find 
and lo and behold they find it. I never belonged to that. I would in 
retrospect wish I had emphasised more the part of my doctrine which 
says that the facts are sacred. It’s just that I don’t believe that journalists 
should act as if they had no influence because they do. They affect 
the events that they are reflecting; there’s no question of that. They 
do have a moral responsibility, which I think is increasingly accepted. 
And I wasn’t so much prescribing a new journalism as describing a 
changed journalism; it changed in the 30 something years I was doing 
it and I was describing what I believed to be best practice at the time I 
was leaving it in 1997.27 
Bell tells an anecdote from Bosnia that he believes to be apocryphal, 
but a neat illustration nonetheless, of the kind of dilemmas journalists 
confront in the war zone. A reporter visits a sniper position in or around 
Sarajevo: possibly Serb, possibly Muslim, possibly Croat. The sniper tells 
him he has two civilians in his sights. ‘Which of them do you want me to 
shoot?’ he asks. The journalist turns to leave and the sniper fires twice. 
‘That is a pity!’ the sniper calls after him. ‘You could have saved one of 
their lives!’ (1997, p. 9).
While Bell may not have deserved the opprobrium that was heaped 
upon his head in the wake of his heresy, it is clear that he touched a nerve 
in the debate about the proper role of the journalist in the war zone. 
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The problem for critics of the journalism of attachment is that reporters 
are not accountable for the words they speak in the same way as dem-
ocratically elected politicians or international organisations such as the 
United Nations. It is not simply an issue of conscience, they argue, but 
the wider consequences of the decision to get emotionally or morally 
involved in the story. John Burns argues that journalists cannot lay claim 
to ‘providing the highest standards of objective and balanced reporting 
while still presenting themselves as impartial arbiters pressing for action’ 
(1996, p. 98). Phil Davison of The Independent has said that too many 
journalists in Bosnia took sides in the war on a purely emotional level, 
a reaction he thought was wholly unjustified.28 To do so with little or no 
objective knowledge of the conflict, its root causes and history, argued 
Misha Glenny, was tantamount to ‘fanning the flames of conflict in the 
Balkans.’29 In a three-sided civil war like Bosnia, each protagonist is 
acutely sensitive to the value of the international media and of harnessing 
world opinion in favour of their cause. Peter Arnett tells how he made 
contact with Chechen rebels in the first Russian–Chechen war and 
found their morale buoyant in spite of their isolation and their hopeless 
military position. ‘We have the support of the government of the interna-
tional media’, they told him, ‘and you are one of its ambassadors’ (1996). 
The problem with diplomatic immunity, of course, is that it can always 
be cancelled. Arnett’s anecdote should serve as a reminder to reporters 
everywhere of the delicate balancing act they must walk between 
‘caring as well as knowing’ and becoming ‘ambassadors’ for the next big 
cause. War correspondents are not diplomats or politicians and they 
are certainly not part of any government yet some forget this in their 
reporting of ‘humanitarian crises’ and call for ‘something to be done.’30 
In the high-octane, high-risk space that is the modern war zone, 
reporters are susceptible to a host of physical risks and ethical dilemmas 
around the practice of objectivity and impartiality. But they also face 
the pressures and challenges of the very media technologies that help 
make their job possible. There is the pressure to submit to the tyranny 
of the satellite uplink and the demands of the 24-hour, ‘real-time’ news 
agenda. And there is the double edged sword of the new social media 
that offer journalists the opportunity to report breaking news of war in 
an instant, raw and exciting style; yet present to journalists a challenge to 
their authority and professionalism as reporters and writers. 
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From Luckless Tribe to Wireless Tribe: 
The Impact of Media Technologies  
on War Reporting 
The Egyptian revolution was planned on Facebook, organised on 
Twitter and broadcast to the world via YouTube. The global news 
channels, above all Al Jazeera, became a massive amplifier for the 
amateur reports and videos, spreading the revolution’s impact across 
the world. 
Paul Mason, Channel 4 News1
One of the features of conflicts in the post-Cold War era of the late 1980s/
early 1990s was their live-ness, their status as instant television news. 
CNN became famous for its habit of being on the spot at the latest global 
crisis to report events live as they happened: the Tiananmen Square 
massacre in Beijing, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the East European 
revolutions, the Gulf War, and the August coup in the Soviet Union. It was 
this live-ness that concentrated the minds of policy makers and analysts, 
military strategists and media professionals alike. They identified 
something called the ‘CNN effect’, or ‘CNN curve’, by which live instant 
news of conflict and crisis appeared to lead to instant decision making 
by the world’s most powerful countries (Neuman, 1995). Yet something 
radical appears to have happened in the few decades since then: television 
news seems to have been short-circuited in its importance by the rapid 
emergence of the new social media – Internet blogs, Facebook, Twitter 
and Instagram, to name the most prevalent. Now it seems that the ‘mass’ 
in mass media is no more – we are all individuals with our smart phones, 
tablets and data clouds. Recent research from organisations such as 
Ofcom in Britain or the Pew Centre in the US suggests that such talk 
may be exaggerated.2 But the use of social media by all sides in the recent 
Arab uprisings, ‘the Arab Spring’ as they were rather hastily described, 
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not to mention various western militaries, authoritarian regimes, militia 
and terrorist groups, adds an important new dimension to the study of 
media and war. 
Yet it is not a simple case of there being a direct line of technological 
advance from the mid nineteenth century to the early twenty-first century 
because even a brief history of the technologies of war reporting throws 
up some surprising parallels. The telegraph is a medium that is barely 
thought about today in the age of Twitter yet it revolutionised journalism 
as a written form in the nineteenth century. Suddenly, reporters had to 
write to limits of space, punctuation and character. Photography and the 
moving image played a major role in reporting and visually representing 
the great conflicts of the twentieth century yet the authenticity of even 
the greatest and most iconic war photographs has been questioned. Radio 
was a medium that came into its own in the Second World War and for 
the first time allowed people to hear the sounds of battle, to experience 
something of war at first hand. Even today, in the era of digital sound 
recordings, the magnetic sound recordings from the BBC’s coverage of 
the Second World War still hold a certain excitement and fascination as 
authentic records of ‘history in the making’. Television emerged in the 
1950s as a new and apparently potent medium, bringing news of war 
into the living room, making it more personal yet more objective and 
impartial than any other form that preceded it; yet today, its authority 
and impartiality as a news source have been consistently challenged and 
debated. Each of these media forms had its day in the war zone and each 
in its own way appeared to bring new qualities of immediacy and drama 
to the reporting of war. In reviewing their various impacts and influences, 
this chapter assesses whether the advent of social media marks just 
another advance in the possibilities of war reporting – making it now ever 
faster, ever more immediate and impactful, and ever more personal – or a 
radical break in the paradigm? Is this the advent of the citizen war reporter 
– truly individual and independent of political or institutional restraints? 
And do social media have implications for the military and their need to 
control and restrict the reporting of what from whatever source?
the telegraph
The telegraph was invented in 1843 and was initially greeted with a 
mixture of scepticism, resistance and anxiety among politicians and 
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the press. In 1889, London’s The Spectator lamented the impact of the 
telegraph on diplomacy and journalism, complaining in an editorial 
that, ‘The world is for purpose of intelligence reduced to a village. All 
men are compelled to think of all things, at the same time, on imperfect 
information, and with too little interval for reflection.’ The telegraph, 
it went on, encouraged rumour, speculation and emotionalism in the 
conduct of international relations: ‘The constant diffusion of statements 
in snippets, the constant excitements of feeling unjustified by fact, the 
constant formation of hasty or erroneous opinions, must in the end, one 
would think, deteriorate the intelligence of all to whom the telegraph 
appeals’ (Neuman, 1995, p.  19). The armies of the great European 
powers, on the other hand, viewed it as a communications technology 
they could deploy to considerable tactical advantage. Diplomats also saw 
the advantages, although they were concerned that it was too instanta-
neous, that it would cut valuable negotiating time and rob them of their 
power and their sense of indispensability (ibid, p. 30). 
The status of the American Civil War as the first major conflict to 
receive comprehensive press coverage was helped by the telegraph. Its 
use coincided with other developments in transport and technology that 
speeded up the time it took a dispatch to reach the newsroom from the 
front line onto the front page. It lent immediacy to reports and therefore 
made them more valuable in the eyes of newspapers and their readers 
alike. The importance proprietors attached to coverage of the war was 
underlined by the level of investment they put in to it, ensuring that their 
reporters were at the front to describe the major battles and strategic 
developments. About 500 correspondents reported on the war on the 
Union side alone (Knightley, 2004, p. 19). The Confederate states were 
less well served – their press was much poorer in terms of resources and 
about 30 years behind the North in terms of technology. This situation 
was worsened as the South lost ground to the advancing Union armies. 
Only a few Southern newspapers, such as the Memphis Appeal and the 
The Chattanooga Daily Rebel, were able to up sticks and retreat with 
Confederate forces. Some were closed and dissolved by the North but 
most were forced into increasingly desperate measures to publish; the 
Pictorial Democrat and the Stars and Stripes were reduced to publishing 
on the blank side of wallpaper (ibid, p. 25). 
Yet as Knightley, Neuman and many others note, all this new 
technology had little effect in improving the quality of what journalists 
the war correspondent
66
reported. Wilbur F. Storey, editor of the Chicago Times, ordered his 
reporter at the front to ‘telegraph fully all news you can get and when 
there is no news, send rumours’ (Knightley, 2004, p. 23). Neuman shows 
how the telegraph’s use during the Civil War gave rise to two famous 
bylines in the history of the press. The first was ‘By telegraph’, signalling 
immediacy and freshness, if not accuracy. The other was the personal 
byline, ‘From our own correspondent’, which meant that the correspon-
dent and the newspaper had to take direct responsibility for the story in 
matters of libel, slander, and inaccuracy. As a result, journalists at the 
front became much more cautious and less direct in their reporting and 
that to a certain extent suited the military. 
William Howard Russell found reporting the Civil War for The Times 
a bitter experience, and part of his problem was an inability to adapt 
to this new technology. The telegraph speeded up communication from 
the front but shortened reporting deadlines that put more pressure on 
the journalist to write concise copy and write it at speed. It therefore 
encouraged the development of a new style of journalism that did not 
suit Russell and his elaborate narrative style. As press coverage of the 
American Civil war showed, there was little room in the telegraph age for 
detailed analysis of military strategy, descriptions of military technology, 
or careful, blow-by-blow accounts of the major battles. Alan Hankinson 
(1982) shows that even when Russell went to report the Franco–Prussian 
war in 1870, he was still as detailed as ever even though he was being 
scooped by rival correspondents, especially those that came over from 
America in numbers. Thanks to the transatlantic cable – an account 
of the battle of Metz on 19 August appeared only two days later in the 
New-York Tribune. Such a commitment cost the Tribune some $5,000, but 
it was a sound investment: it boosted circulation and thus profits in an 
era of intense competition to be first with the news. The press in London 
was quick to learn these lessons. The new style of commercial reporting 
was cut to suit the demands of the telegraph and the pressures of time 
and space (p. 216). It was an affront to everything Russell had stood for. 
To the new breed of journalist, ‘reporting was a job and a glorious game 
rather than a vocation.’ Accuracy and information were secondary on 
their scale of news values to being first and being entertaining. They 
bragged about their ‘courage and cunning’ and would think nothing of 
cheating to scoop their rivals (ibid, p. 217). 
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Indeed, the instantaneous nature of telegraph communication 
sometimes meant that the press could scoop even governments on news 
of a particular battle or war. In 1847, the US went to war with Mexico 
over the disputed territories of New Mexico and California. The fall of 
the key Mexican stronghold of Vera Cruz was a critical moment in the 
war but the first President Polk heard about it, says Neuman, was not 
through the War Department, as was the convention, but via telegram 
from the Baltimore Sun – and only then after the newspaper published 
the story (1995, p. 36). This probably exalts the role of the telegraph and 
the press somewhat. Information-wise, the Polk administration was 
prone to excessive leakiness and details of peace feelers and draft treaties 
were already in public circulation (Blanchard, 1992, p. 7ff). The Spanish–
American War of 1898 was a conflict that saw the worst excesses of the 
popular yellow press – the coverage was sensationalised and inaccurate 
and reporters had an inflated sense of self-importance, of their influence 
on policy and power. Most controversial, for example, was the role of 
William Randolph Hearst, owner of the New York Journal-American 
and mythologised by Orson Welles in the movie Citizen Kane. Much 
like Rupert Murdoch in the 1980s, Hearst attempted to monopolise 
the available technologies of telegraph and industrial printing for 
competitive advantage; truth and accuracy seldom got in the way. For 
example, he sent his chief illustrator to Havana to capture some of the 
action with dramatic images. Days later, he received a telegraph from 
him saying: ‘Everything is quiet. There is no trouble here. There will be 
no war. I wish to return.’ Hearst telegraphed back: ‘Please remain. You 
furnish the pictures. I’ll furnish the war.’ At one stage in the war, the 
Journal appeared on the streets with the front page emblazoned with the 
headline, ‘How Do You Like the Journal’s War?’ (Neuman, 1995, p. 43). 
In fact, the war transformed the Journal’s reputation and circulation 
figures. In 1896, the paper was selling 150,000 copies per day; by the 
time the Spanish–American War began in 1898, it was selling 800,000 
copies (ibid, p. 45). 
The growth and speed of communication via telegraph, and of mass 
literacy, fuelled increasing demand for newspapers. War correspon-
dents gained eminence because they provided sellable copy – reports 
of battles and heroism, most of the time inflated or invented, were 
immensely popular (Knightley, 2004, p. 44). The Franco–Prussian war 
of 1870 saw the first organised use of the telegraph by journalists to 
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report action from the front. At the instigation of George Smalley, of 
the New-York Tribune, they formed a news pool in which they shared 
the right to use each other’s dispatches and helped each other circulate 
them to the widest possible readership. The scheme worked well and 
enabled dispatches to be telegraphed to America and published within a 
day or two of the reported event, a tremendous advance on the previous 
standard of a week (ibid, p. 48). 
The Spanish–American War also became known as ‘the journalist’s 
war’ because of their tremendous freedom to report and to move, even 
in the midst of naval battles. The writing style that had emerged out of 
coverage of the American Civil War continued to change and develop 
during this period in a way that, as Neuman puts it, ‘made metaphors 
of facts and heroes of correspondents’ (1995, p. 52). But there was in its 
aftermath a sense of unease that the press had played an undue influence 
over the course of the war and, in eerie prefigurement of today’s anxieties 
about the impact of social media, even the swashbuckling Richard 
Harding Davis worried about the speed and seductive power of the new 
technology. ‘The fall of the war correspondent’, he said, ‘came about 
through the ease and quickness with which today’s news leaps from 
one end of the earth to the other’ via the rapidly expanding telegraph 
network (ibid, p. 53). In the Crimean War, the reporter’s dispatches took 
much longer to reach the front page, usually long after any information 
it contained could be of benefit to the enemy. In the Spanish–American 
War, the speed of the telegraph ended all that and threatened military 
security. The military responded by tightening censorship. Dispatches 
from Havana to New York, for example, were in some cases relayed to 
Madrid, ostensibly for military clearance, but actually as an effective 
delaying tactic. By the time Harding Davis went to Europe to report 
on the First World War in 1914, these techniques and devices had been 
developed and perfected to such an extent that he declared the end of the 
war correspondent (ibid). 
The telegraph, then, speeded up communication and lent reports 
immediacy and freshness. It increased the popularity of the war corre-
spondent as hero, but also fuelled the growth of the popular press and 
yellow journalism, encouraging a style of journalism that favoured the 
drama and sensation of war over truth and accuracy. The new technology 
improved the means of reporting war, but not the quality and reliability 
of the journalism.
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photography
The invention of photography and its development into a commercially 
viable technology of representation brought with it the possibility of 
bringing to the public a more ‘realistic’ or even ‘objective’ image of war. 
Without entering into a detailed history here, there are two aspects worth 
considering: photographic representation of war, and the potential for 
manipulation and propaganda; and the impact of war photography on 
public opinion.
As William Howard Russell is recognised as the first war correspon-
dent, Roger Fenton is widely regarded as the first photographer of war, 
if not a war photojournalist. His photographs from the Crimean front 
in 1855 show a war in which everything is in good order, in which the 
troops are well fed, and in which officers and infantry mix freely in 
harmony. They also show the aftermath of battle minus the dead and 
wounded. After the Charge of the Light Brigade, Fenton wrote how he 
surveyed the carnage on the battleground and decided not to take any 
photos of it. He packed up and returned home, satisfied he had done his 
job. What his work demonstrates, says Philip Knightley, is that ‘while the 
camera does not lie directly, it can lie brilliantly by omission’ (Knightley, 
2004, p.  14). However, it must also be noted that Fenton was limited 
by the technology; photographic hardware in 1854 was still bulky and 
unwieldy, and limited exposure times made it impossible to capture 
movement and action within a single frame. Fenton’s shots of the Valley 
of Death in the aftermath of the Charge of the Light Brigade showed 
a largely empty terrain, clusters of spent cannonballs the only visual 
evidence of what had passed. 
Images of the casualties of war have always presented a problem for the 
military censors. Vietnam is often called the first living room war for the 
terrible images of death and bloodshed that television brought nightly 
into people’s homes. But Vicki Goldberg argues that the ‘first living-room 
war’ was not Vietnam but the American Civil War because it was brought 
home to a mass public through the photographic image (Neuman, 1995, 
p. 78). This, as Neuman argues, overstates the case. Photography was not 
a mass medium at the onset of the Civil War and even when it developed 
into the twentieth century, it never really achieved the same audience 
reach or impact as television did in the 1960s. Nonetheless, the work 
the war correspondent
70
of Matthew Brady and other photographers added a dimension to the 
visual depiction of war that Roger Fenton could not or did not explore 
on his Crimean assignment. The Battle of Antietam saw 20,000 dead 
and wounded in a single day, 17 September 1862. There was nothing 
in the photographs of its aftermath to suggest the glory and heroism of 
war conveyed in the semi-fictional accounts of so many reporters. The 
carnage was recorded in explicit detail, showing, as Johanna Neuman 
puts it, ‘bloated, gouged, twisted, grotesque figures in painful demise’ 
(1995, p. 78). Yet the photos of Antietam, and of the war in general, did not 
turn public opinion; there were no public protests, no political backlash. 
Neuman guesses that perhaps too few people had seen them as they 
appeared in the newspapers or in a public exhibition in New York in 1862, 
for them to have had any real impact. She suggests the possibility that 
‘photography had to instruct before it could shock [and that] perhaps the 
emotional content of pictures was a learned response’ (ibid, p. 79). Such 
photos did not lead public opinion but followed it; they were viewed in a 
political context – the public will or lack of it to fight a war. Furthermore, 
the memory and experience of the viewer frame the photograph as much 
as the photographer. Sometime between Antietam and the Second World 
War ‘the public had learned to decipher horror, had been trained to focus 
on grief ’ (ibid, p.  82). Nonetheless, Susan Moeller acknowledges the 
historical significance of the Civil War photographs as ‘the first systematic 
attempt to document a conflict in its entirety’ (1990, p. 24).
In the two world wars, the military censored war photographers more 
severely than their reporter colleagues, and the penalties for breach 
of restrictions was much more severe. The fear was that photographs 
packed an emotional punch that would weaken public support for the 
war effort. For example in the First World War, printed publication 
of material deemed by the military as helpful to the enemy incurred a 
20-year prison term. For taking photos at the front, in the initial stages 
of the conflict at least, the penalty was death (ibid, p. 81). 
Photography has always been seen as a medium that is especially 
prone to simulation and manipulation. One of the most famous but now 
controversial war photographs is Robert Capa’s ‘Death of a Republican 
Soldier’, taken during the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39. It appears to 
show a Republican militiaman falling to the ground at the instant of 
being shot. It made Capa famous as a war photographer and has since 
become an icon of the Spanish Civil War, reprinted countless times in 
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historical accounts of that conflict. However, Philip Knightley (2004) has 
challenged its authenticity. What is significant about this photo for him, 
as it appeared first in Life magazine, was its dependency on the caption. 
On its own, the photo is ambiguous. It could easily be a photo of a soldier 
who had just tripped and fallen in training. It is blurred and unclear so 
we are unable to see if he really has been wounded. Only the caption fixes 
its memory: ‘Robert Capa’s camera catches a Spanish soldier the instant 
he is dropped by a bullet through the head in front of Cordoba’ (p. 227). 
Knightley set out to investigate the exact circumstances in which the 
photo was taken and discovered conflicting versions. One was that Capa 
took the photo by sheer luck during a Republican assault on a Nationalist 
machine gun position. Sheltering behind a parapet, he lifted the camera 
up at full stretch and snapped blindly in the hope of capturing some of the 
action. This would hardly be extraordinary or controversial since much 
of the great action photography is taken by photographers who are good 
enough to make their own luck. As Capa said, ‘If your pictures aren’t good 
enough, you’re not close enough!’ (Moeller, 1990, p. 209). Other versions 
of what happened are much more controversial. One has suggested that 
the photo was not Capa’s at all but that of another photographer on the 
scene, while the Daily Express reporter in Spain with Capa at the time, 
O. D. Gallagher, claimed that it was a posed photo, set up for the pho-
tographers when they complained to Republican officers about the lack 
of good photo opportunities. Capa apparently bragged to Gallagher that 
the photo was even out of focus, making it look all the more genuine. 
However, the late Martha Gellhorn, who reported the Civil War in Spain 
and knew Capa well, insisted to Knightley that the photo was genuine, 
that it was indeed a photo taken at ‘the moment of death’ for a republican 
soldier (Knightley 2004, pp. 227–30; Brothers, 1997, p. 178ff).
War photography can be used to good effect to represent war in 
all its horror but it can also be used to select certain truths and omit 
others, to ‘re-present’ reality in a way likely to change or manipulate our 
responses to what is being done in our name, to perhaps even influence 
our opinion. Caroline Brothers looks at the photography of the Vietnam 
War, the Falklands War and the Persian Gulf War and makes key 
distinctions between each. The photography of the Vietnam War was 
characterised by its ‘surfeit of realism’, the notion that its stark represen-
tation of war helped, like TV images, to turn public opinion against the 
war. In fact, many of the most celebrated photos from the war were not 
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originally taken as antiwar statements. The photo by Eddie Adams of 
a South Vietnamese army colonel executing a Vietcong suspect (1968) 
appeared in newspapers around the world, ‘firmly embedded in the 
rhetoric of American resoluteness’ and support for its South Vietnamese 
client against a ruthless enemy. But as the dominant consensus about 
the war collapsed, the image was appropriated by anti-war protesters as 
evidence of the horror of war (1997, p. 204). 
Compared with Vietnam, the Falklands War of 1982 was characterised 
by the relative absence of photographic record. The British naval task force 
set sail for the South Atlantic in April that year to retake the Falklands 
islands from Argentina, which had occupied them and claimed them as 
its own territory. It took with it a small, exclusively British media pool 
that included only two photographers. The navy and the military were 
determined not to make the same mistakes they thought the Americans 
had in Vietnam and sought to impose strict controls on media reporting. 
They made the job of taking, developing and transmitting photographs 
especially difficult. For a good part of the Falklands war, remarked Robert 
Harris, ‘the camera might as well have not been invented’ (ibid, p. 206). 
Only 202 photographs were transmitted, most of these contrived by the 
military for propaganda use. One of the most famous and deliberate 
propaganda photographs from the Falklands appeared in the Sunday 
Mirror as British forces retook the islands. Captioned, ‘Cuppa for a Brave 
Para’, it showed the residents of San Carlos welcome British troops onto 
the island and appeared to symbolise everything that was British about 
these distant islands. A soldier stands by a very English-looking, white, 
picket fence drinking a very English ‘cuppa tea’; the image provides an 
instant connection between the Falklands and home, communicating 
even to the doubters what the war was about (ibid, 208). Most images 
of battle action came courtesy of war artists but, like the war artistry of 
the American Civil War, this was very much comic book depiction. It 
promoted the heroism of British forces and their liberation of British 
territory from enemy occupation; and it did this by recalling all the old 
myths of the Second World War – of the Blitz and the Battle of Britain – 
that were sure to bolster domestic public opinion in support of the war 
(ibid, p. 207). 
The Persian Gulf War in 1991 is now thought of as the perfect 
‘television war’ and a case study in what Jean Baudrillard (1995) calls 
the ‘hyperreal’; in other words a conflict defined by the manufacture 
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of suitable images, not of what actually happened but what the allies 
wanted us to believe happened. For that reason, Baudrillard and others 
have argued that the Gulf war did not take place. What we witnessed was 
a virtual war, a Hollywood spectacle. We were not allowed to see or know 
about the death of up to 200,000 people or the untold economic and 
environmental devastation wrought on Iraq and Kuwait. Throughout the 
war, technology that made possible almost instantaneous transmission of 
photographic images was of little use when the US military ground rules 
for the media explicitly banned ‘Information, photography or imagery 
that would reveal the specific location of military forces or show the level 
of security at military bases or encampments’ (see US military regulations, 
Appendix 4). Photographers were reduced to taking photographs 
from approved television footage at the media centre in Riyadh. Only 
occasionally did we get a glimpse of the reality. In the closing stages of 
what was euphemistically called the ‘land war’, a large column of Iraqi 
soldiers in military and civilian vehicles, most of them conscripts, fled in 
panic from Kuwait City and up the road home to Basra. It was cut off by 
the Americans at a place near the border called Mutlah Ridge and wiped 
out by Apache helicopter gunships in what they called ‘the turkey shoot’. 
There is little photographic evidence of the carnage that ensued except 
for a gruesome photograph of the charred skeleton of an Iraqi soldier 
at the wheel of a burned-out army truck. Taken by Kenneth Jarecke, it 
was rejected by most of the international press, appearing only in the 
Observer in Britain, under the headline, ‘The True Face of War’ (3 March 
1991), and Libération in France (4 March).3 Other major newspapers, 
such as The New York Times, claimed that it was too indecent to publish 
but there was a suspicion that it simply did not fit the sanitised story 
of the Gulf War that the media had been peddling throughout. There 
was, however, military video footage of the slaughter at Mutlah Ridge, 
eventually broadcast on television after the war, not on the news but on 
a programme in Channel 4’s now defunct science and technology series 
Equinox (May 1991). The footage was taken from the cockpits of Apache 
helicopters and its pictures of helpless Iraqi soldiers being destroyed 
by missiles and machine gun fire makes for chilling viewing. Relating 
back to the point Brothers makes about the photographs of the Vietnam 
War, one cannot help wonder if the release of such pictures during the 
war would have made much difference given the level of public support 
that had been already achieved by anti-Iraqi propaganda? Indeed, the 
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demonisation of Saddam Hussein and his army was so effective that it 
persisted in western public consciousness even as the regime collapsed 
and yielded to invasion in 2003. 
news reel film and war
Of course we cannot talk about photography here without reference 
to film and its role and impact in representing the realities of war. The 
Boer War is said by many to have been the ‘first media war’, certainly the 
first major conflict covered by what we now call the mass media: press, 
photography, and a new medium: film. William Dixon of the Biograph 
and Mutoscope Company arrived in South Africa to capture the action 
in motion pictures (Foden, 1999a and 1999b). These prototype movie 
cameras were large, cumbersome and static in operation. In Ladysmith, 
Giles Foden’s semi-fictional novel about the Boer War, Dixon is depicted 
as a character called ‘The Biographer’, a man who thinks himself defined 
by the uniqueness of this wonderful new medium; as if the specialist 
skills required to handle it set him apart from journalists such as Winston 
Churchill (The Morning Post) and John Black Atkins (Manchester 
Guardian), men he spent time with socially as well as professionally:
The Biographer wished he was elsewhere. These people, these colonels 
and aides-de-camp, ...these civil servants and silver-tongued corre-
spondents...they were like another breed. Even the way they held their 
bodies was different. Look at Churchill now, for instance, listening 
as another one of them blathered on. Even when he wasn’t centre of 
attention, he had a patronizing air, a way of holding his head that said, 
‘I’m cock of the walk’. The Biographer never felt like that. He wished he 
had his big camera with him; with its armour in front of him – its huge 
elm-wood box, glass plate and hood – he felt protected, in control, 
unassailable. (Foden, 1999b, p. 34)
There was no doubt that, in the Boer War, film’s time had come as a 
medium of news and information, but Johanna Neuman questions film’s 
‘intersection with diplomacy and war, whether film mirrors truth or 
illusion, whether filmed propaganda should be sugarcoated or force-fed, 
whether leadership in an age of film can compete with its power to 
cast spells’ (1995, p. 121). In the Boer War, the illusory qualities of the 
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new form were more decisive than its potential for authenticity. For the 
British, one of the problems of fighting the Boers was their invisibility 
– it was a bush war fought not in the open battlefield but by guerrilla 
methods of ambush and hit and run. The film cameramen who wanted 
to shoot pictures of soldiers shooting each other faced the same problem 
– the lack of battle action to film – so they made it up for themselves. 
For the still unsophisticated audiences at home, any film footage of the 
war was viewed as real just because it was film and it made an enormous 
impact.4 For the first time, people were gathering as a public audience 
to ‘watch the news’ about a distant war rather than find out about it as 
individual newspaper readers. It was a new, immediate, and collective 
experience that signalled the advent of the mass media age. 
On the whole, journalists were divided about film’s potential as a tool 
of news or an instrument of illusion and propaganda. In America, the 
newsreels brought home to people images of two world wars and are 
credited with helping to bring about American intervention in each case 
but they were confections – part news, part entertainment or ‘info-tain-
ment’ as it is called today. Most newsreel battles were reconstructions, 
sometimes pure inventions, and they were cut with footage of natural 
disasters and human interest stories. American humorist, Oscar Levant, 
called the newsreel, ‘a series of catastrophes followed by a fashion show’ 
(Neuman, 1995, p.  123). Photography and film supplemented war 
reporting with images that lent some authenticity and realism, some 
emotional impact, to the printed word. But military leaders have realised 
their potential for propaganda and persuasion because of the ease to 
which the photographic image, still or moving, can be manipulated.
radio
Radio was just becoming established as a mass medium when the 
Second World War broke out in 1939, but throughout the 1930s the 
BBC had been developing methods of outside broadcasting that 
involved heavy, cumbersome equipment such as the Blattnerphone in 
1931 that recorded sound magnetically onto a large reel of steel tape 
at three  feet per second. In 1935, the Corporation experimented with 
gramophone-like machines that cut grooves on magnetic aluminium 
discs, instantly ready for playback. This was unreliable technology but it 
relieved radio broadcasting of the pressure to present every programme 
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live (Hickman, 1995). With further streamlining, they would come into 
their own during the war when reporters had to relay their reports from 
remote frontlines like the deserts of Northern Africa. Just months before 
the outbreak of war, saloon cars were converted into mobile recording 
studios, featuring a single turntable called the ‘Mighty Midget’, capable 
of four minutes recording time. The equipment did not require very 
much power and the recordings could be played back over telephone 
lines or even the less reliable short wave radio transmitter. These studios 
were in effect the first ever BBC radio cars and they were used to report 
major events like the Battle of Britain from Dover on the south coast 
of England. For a major reporting operation such as coverage of the 
8th Army’s North African campaign, the BBC fitted out a large van, 
nicknamed Belinda, which enabled multiple recordings to be made, 
transmitted, and broadcast within days. Developments like these helped 
reporters bring the realities of battle right into the living room with 
an immediacy and apparent authenticity which the printed word or 
photograph could never hope to match. Reporters had to match their 
style of address to the technology they were using. Just as the telegraph 
forced the reporter to describe the various battles, and the conditions 
of war, in a sharper, more economical style, radio forced the reporter to 
describe what was going on with a new intimacy, to communicate with 
the mass audience and the audience of one at the same time. The CBS 
journalist Ed Murrow understood this; so did Richard Dimbleby of the 
BBC. Murrow reported from Britain on the Second World War and was 
acutely aware that he was being used in a campaign to bring America 
into the conflict. He took advantage of the relative leniency shown to 
American journalists by the censor to consistently remind listeners of 
the fact and to complain about the quality of available information about 
controversial or difficult events such as the Battle of the Atlantic or the 
allied retreat from Dunkirk (Knightley, 2004, pp. 248–49). 
The BBC’s War Reporting Unit made the Corporation’s reputation 
as a serious news provider. Its regular War Report programme became 
essential listening for people with access to a radio and among its most 
famous correspondents was Richard Dimbleby. Dimbleby was present 
to witness the liberation of Belsen, one of the Nazi death camps, and 
his first dispatch was deemed so shocking that his bosses back home 
at the BBC refused to believe it was true at first (Dimbleby, 1975, 
pp. 188–94; Hickman, 1995, p. 189–91). Former BBC radio journalist, 
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Robert Fox, has argued that the medium never lost that quality and that 
even by the late 1980s it was still ‘the cleanest and quickest medium of 
serious journalism’, a point he says was vindicated by radio coverage of 
the Falklands War but lost on the politicians and broadcast executives 
(1988, p. 15). 
The broadcast potential of radio that made Murrow and Dimbleby 
famous also made it an ideal, seemingly instant and direct instrument 
of propaganda. ‘Germany calling! Germany calling!’ was the call signal 
of William Joyce or ‘Lord Haw Haw’, who broadcast crude German 
propaganda to whoever would listen in Britain. It had limited impact 
because it was broadcasting to a largely hostile and resistant audience. 
Fifty years later, in Rwanda (1994), radio propaganda of a more sinister 
nature played a significant part in genocide. The privately owned 
Radio-Television Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) was controlled by 
the Hutu extremists who carried out the slaughter of between 500,000 
and one million people in a matter of a few weeks in April 1994. Its 
basic message was that ‘Tutsis need to be killed’ but it targeted anyone 
deemed a threat to ‘Hutu power’, including many Hutu people (Keane, 
1995, p. 10). Another of its murderous slogans, ‘One Belgian Each’, went 
out just days before the torture and murder of 6 Belgian civilians and 
10 Belgian paratroopers by the Rwandan Presidential Guard. It also 
issued detailed instructions on handling weapons and a methods class 
in effective killing (Misser and Jumain, 1994, p. 74). RTLM was dubbed 
‘Radio Television La Mort’ as its true role became clear, although an 
Article 19 report has suggested that it did not so much incite genocide as 
actively organise it; the killing would have gone ahead with or without 
the help of RTLM (McNulty, 1999, p.  274ff). In his powerful account 
of the genocide in Rwanda, Philip Gourevitch (1998) writes that the 
station’s propaganda may have been crude and inflammatory but it acted 
as an accurate weather forecast of political developments in the country. 
It predicted the fate of President Juvenal Habyarimana days before he 
was killed on 6 April in a mysterious plane crash, hinting to listeners that 
‘there will be a little something here in Kigali and also on April 7 and 8 
you will hear the sound of bullets or grenades exploding’ (p. 110). So 
when Thomas Kamilindi, a reporter for Radio Rwanda, wanted to know 
what was going to happen in the wake of the assassination, he tuned his 
radio to RTLM and kept it tuned:
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The radio normally went off the air at 10pm, but that night it stayed 
on. When the bulletins ceased, music began to play, and to Thomas 
the music, which continued through his sleepless night, confirmed 
that the worst had been let loose in Rwanda. Early the next morning 
RTLM began blaming [the] assassination on the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front and members of UNAMIR [United Nations Aid Mission In 
Rwanda]. But if Thomas believed that, he would have been at the 
microphone, not the receiver. (Ibid, p. 111)
television
It has long been assumed in official quarters that pictures of dead or 
wounded American troops going out on television screens night after night 
took their toll on public opinion and turned it against the Vietnam War. 
As one critic put it, ‘for the first time in modern history, the outcome of a 
war was determined not on the battlefield, but...on the television screen’, 
while the US commander in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, 
complained that ‘television’s unique requirements contributed to a 
distorted view of the war...The news had to be compressed and visually 
dramatic’ As a result, ‘the war Americans saw was almost exclusively 
violent, miserable, or controversial’ (MacArthur, 1992, p. 132). 
Those who pushed this view at the time pointed to the anti-war 
protests on the streets of American cities, even though those protests 
accounted for a tiny proportion of the population. President Richard 
Nixon remarked that TV coverage of the war resulted in ‘a serious 
demoralisation of the home front, raising the question whether America 
would ever again be able to fight an enemy abroad with unity and 
strength of purpose at home’ (Cumings, 1992, p.  84). However, there 
is evidence to suggest that critical television coverage was minimal and 
the majority of the population disagreed with the administration’s war 
policy, not the morality of the fighting the war in the first place. Lawrence 
Lichty shows that although half of all TV reports filed from Vietnam 
were about military operations, ‘most showed very little fighting’. In a 
five-year period, from August 1970 to August 1975, about 3 per cent of 
all evening news reports from the war showed what Lichty calls ‘heavy 
battle’ footage of incoming fire and images of US casualties: a total of 76 
out of 2,300 reports on the war (MacArthur, 1992, pp. 133–34). Daniel 
Hallin uses a much broader definition of combat footage than Lichty 
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but reaches similar conclusions. In the period 1965–68, 22 per cent of 
all film reports from South East Asia included combat footage, and even 
then it was often shots of troops under fire from a sniper or a mortar 
position. Hallin also shows that 24 per cent of reports showed images of 
casualties; in the period 1965–68, 16 out of 167 stories showed a picture 
of a dead or wounded soldier (ibid; see also Hallin, 1989, for a full and 
extensive analysis of the Vietnam war as seen on TV). 
The sort of coverage the American news viewer was actually exposed 
to is summed up well by Michael Arlen when he describes it as a ‘nightly 
stylised, generally distanced overview of a disjointed conflict’ that featured 
little or no serious combat footage’ (MacArthur, p. 134). One reason for 
this was technological: instant satellite links were theoretically possible 
but far too expensive for even the big American news networks to afford. 
Journalists in Vietnam had to make do with canning their film reports 
and flying them back to their newsroom – a procedure that took two or 
three days. By that time, they were only good for background pieces and 
if the viewer ever did see battle scenes or war casualties, it was out of 
context, bearing little or no relation to current events. Public opinion 
turned against the war Vietnam because the pro-war consensus among 
the political elites in Washington broke down. If there was any media 
effect, it was not the sight of dead and wounded night after night but of 
politicians appearing on the news debating the war. According to Lichty’s 
analysis, in the period immediately following the Tet Offensive, three TV 
networks featured a rough balance of pro- and anti-war guests and that 
by 1970 the number of critics exceeded the number of supporters. He 
concludes that, ‘This opinion trend paralleled the trend in the publicly 
expressed opinions of many senators and congressmen, perhaps because 
senators and congressmen were so often those interviewed’ (ibid, p. 136). 
Hallin argues that editorial commentaries on TV shifted after Tet from 
4:1 for the war to 2:1 against. These shifts in media orientation away from 
a pro-war perspective are encapsulated in this recollection from Max 
Frenkel, executive director of The New York Times: ‘As protest moved 
from the left groups, the antiwar groups, into the pulpit, into the Senate...
as it became majority opinion, it naturally picked up coverage’ (ibid). 
Satellite, cable and the digital information age
By the 1990s, advances in satellite and cable television technology had 
changed the nature of TV news again. From being a novelty or special 
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feature for the big set-piece event, the live broadcast from ‘our own cor-
respondent’ on the spot quickly became an essential guarantor of the 
news organisation’s credibility and status in a hi-tech, competitive media 
market. The reputation of CNN was made in the late 1980s on its apparent 
knack of being in the right place at the right time with live, uninterrupted 
coverage of the most important world events of the period. The quality 
of its coverage at the time was derided by the major American network 
news programmes but these criticisms belied a certain nervousness, an 
attempt to distract from a crucial fact: CNN was there and they were not. 
The organisation was quick to shed its image as ‘Chicken Noodle News’ 
and build on the plaudits it received for its coverage of the Gulf War. It 
continued to beat its rivals to the big stories of the 1990s. Contrast that 
with the British news channel ITN, which suffered in the late 1980s when 
it missed some of those big international stories, including the August 
coup in Moscow in 1991 and the assassination of India’s president Indira 
Ghandi (McNair, 1994, p. 93). Taking live feeds from CNN and television 
news agencies was not good enough. 
For some, the quality of broadcast journalism suffered as a result 
of this competition for instant-fix news. In the early days of television 
coverage in Vietnam, there was the news crew of journalist, cameraman 
and sound-recordist, all ‘tied’ to each other with electric cables. In the 
present satellite and digital age, there is just the journalist and the satellite 
uplink – no cables – yet the journalist is still tied to the demands of the 
technology. Brent MacGregor calls this ‘palm tree journalism’ in which 
all that is needed is a stand-up journalist and a suitable backdrop or prop 
to authenticate location and convey immediacy (1997, p. 184). Maggie 
O’Kane of the Guardian tells the story of staying in a hotel in Srebrenica, 
Bosnia, during the Serb siege of the city, and watching an American 
reporter in the next room spend his entire working day standing on the 
balcony doing live, stand-up reports, telling the same story and giving 
the same information over and over again. But while he was doing all 
that, she wondered, where was he getting the time to be a real journalist, 
to go out into the city and see for himself what was happening?5 She 
is not the only journalist to understand the restrictions of the satellite 
uplink. Evan Wright (2004), who reported the Iraq War 2003 for Rolling 
Stone magazine, describes the frustrations of colleagues who kept faith 
with the technology: 
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I have observed other reporters in combat areas. They have so much 
equipment. Even wire service guys who are beaming up stories from 
their laptops. They have to get in line of sight with the satellite. That 
takes time. Even if you have solar panels, they never work. So you 
have to worry about recharging your battery. It becomes this big 
technical problem. You’re tethered to it. So in my situation, I would 
not have been allowed to go with the actual front-line troops had I 
carried equipment…I know some print guys who did have satphones 
and who did go close to the front. But most of the people covering the 
war were not magazine people. So it’s a technical advantage being low 
tech. (p. 332) 
Alex Thomson of Channel 4 News says that routine television news 
tends to select a leading story and structure everything around that. 
Foreign news is no different. ‘It’s the headline story everyday’, he says and 
sometimes that is led by technology. He presents the following scenario 
to illustrate the reporter’s predicament:
You’re in Pristina and something’s going on and you’ve got...maybe a 
hour, hour and a half to do a bit of filming; smash and grab something, 
put it together, come back because they want you live at the [satellite] 
dish for the lunchtime news. Smash and grab! Edit! Smell of burning 
rubber! Get it over the bird [satellite link]! Fine! Up to the stand-upper 
[to-camera piece]! Is the hair straight? Tie straight? Great! Mic 
working? Fine! Fire away! Out again in the afternoon! Maybe you’ve 
got an hour, two hours if you’re really lucky. Same thing! Smash! Grab! 
Live spot...for the 5.40! And then in the evening, fine! There may be 
nothing going on or there might be, so you can to some extent recut 
more leisurely, and they want another live [spot]. How do you do it?6 
Lindsey Hilsum thinks that ultimately this can only impair the ability of 
reporters to make proper judgements in complex crises: 
Obviously...if you are under constant time pressure...there is a danger 
of forming the wrong conclusion and there is a danger of making 
judgements too quickly because you have to get the story on the air...
So you have two dangers. One is making a wrong call, making a wrong 
judgement, misinterpreting because you haven’t enough time to do 
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enough research. And the second one is lowest common denominator 
journalism: ‘On the one hand this, on the other hand that, I can’t quite 
conclude because I haven’t had time to find out. Lindsey Hilsum, 
Channel 4 News in the middle of nowhere’. So you have to be very 
careful about that.7 
Other journalists were more optimistic about the impact of technological 
change in the 1990s. Nik Gowing was an enthusiastic advocate of the 
liberating potential of the new technologies and how they would 
compress still further the time and space it takes the correspondent 
to report fast moving events across the world and to do that on a self-
sufficient basis:
To me it’s actually the fascination with the dynamic of how information 
flows...The technology has arrived. It’s cheaper [and] you’ve got the 
compression of the time line between gathering and transmitting the 
news and you’ve got the removal of filtering processes. […] It’s got to 
be now because the technology lets you do that. You can sit in a hotel 
room, somewhere, with a tiny edit pack and a satellite uplink called 
Livewire or one of the new systems, which means you can put that stuff 
out…close to real time. You don’t have to rush back…to a feed point or 
a hotel. You do it now! […] So you’ve got this compression there but at 
the same time you’ve got the broadening. No longer have you just got 
ITN, BBC, Sky. […] You’ve now got a fantastic broadening right across 
there and this enormous tree includes email, the internet, websites.8
Gowing recognises the danger of fetishising technology as an end in itself, 
of blinding oneself to its potential for manipulation. He is interested in 
the inherent contradictions of the information age between ‘low-cost, 
high-penetration, highly mobile hardware and the quality of what we put 
out’. Does the technology help improve the quality of the end product, 
the actual reporting? There is in his business ‘the temptation and the 
pressure...to get it out now and to get it out right but [these are] not 
necessarily the same thing’. He worries that ‘a lot of people in this [news] 
environment haven’t yet worked out the dynamic and the pitfalls of this 
wonderful new technology. […] You may have someone on a satellite 
dish in the middle of a jungle but does that mean they’re telling you 
good things which are accurate, enlightening you even more?’9 David 
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Halberstam writes that ‘immediacy doesn’t necessarily mean better, 
more thoughtful reporting’ and wonders whether ‘the lack of satellites 
and comparative slowness of the transmission process in the old days 
permitted the news desks...to act less as prisoners of technology than 
they do today’. He argues that improvements in the technology of news 
have seen an inverse decline of ‘the editing function, the cumulative sense 
of judgement – the capacity...to blend the visual and non-visual’ (1991, 
pp. 385–86). For Philip Knightley, in this respect, print journalism still 
has an edge in the television age: ‘A good picture to illustrate a thoughtful 
report is still a bonus in quality print journalism, not an imperative’ 
(1988, p. 13). Bob Woofinden believes that these fears are unfounded. 
The major television news organisations put their editorial priorities and 
resourcing issues first and that in this respect ‘the technology can only be 
a huge advantage’ (1988, p. 15). 
The instantaneousness of news that these technologies make possible 
can be used against journalism as much as by journalism, what Gowing 
(1998) calls ‘the information boomerang’. He draws examples from his 
own research on the media and the Great Lakes crises in Africa: 
[You are] sitting in the desert or the jungle broadcasting the horrors 
up on your [satellite uplink] and it’s broadcast on BBC World and the 
people who are committing this are sitting in their villas nearby and 
thinking, ‘Those people, they’re spies!’, whereas in fact all they are 
doing is good journalism...That’s a part of the downside of technology. 
So you’ve got the accuracy and credibility problem and the other one 
is the impact, which can actually be more profound than many people 
feel comfortable with.10
The BBC’s John Simpson appreciates,
the standing danger that because you can report 24 hours a day from 
anywhere in the world that people will try to get you to do that and 
that...it leaves less time for finding out what’s really happening...but I 
think everybody now understands that so fully that that’s been pretty 
much counteracted.11 
During the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia from March to June, 1999, 
Simpson made hundreds of hours of broadcasts from Belgrade without 
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feeling confined to the spot for the next satellite link. If he needed to 
go out he would simply put it off until he was ready. He dismisses the 
idea that reporters are burdened by the tyranny of technology: ‘We’re 
able to do what we pretty much need to do. Otherwise, the advances 
in technology are purely advantageous...We’re in charge rather than the 
machine I think.’12
The degree to which reporters are in charge of the machine is a 
moot point but it is clear that most if not all journalists are aware of 
the impact of new technologies and the opportunities and dangers that 
they present. Perhaps the most fatalistic view comes from Pete Williams, 
National Broadcasting Company (NBC) correspondent and ex-Pentagon 
spokesman (during the Gulf War): ‘I suppose there are purists who 
argue that sending back a live picture isn’t journalism...It may not be 
journalism, but it is television, and that is a fact of life’ (Dunsmore, 1996, 
p. 4). Neuman argues that what is new today is not technological change 
so much as the sheer speed of that change, with some startling advances 
in brief periods of time (1995, p. 7).
There is also a political angle to this low-tech versus hi-tech 
debate, which I set out in more detail in the first edition of this book 
(McLaughlin, 2002a, pp.  182–98). Suffice to say here, arguments 
about the quality and reach of television coverage extended logically 
to its impact on foreign policy and military interventions in civil or 
humanitarian conflicts, most especially in the 1990s. Television pictures 
of thousands of Kurdish refugees stranded on a wet, windswept hillside 
in northern Iraq, in April 1991, for example, became emblematic of the 
Gulf War. Just as the images of ‘smart weapons’ seemed to say something 
about the superiority of military technology in the west – war it seems at 
the flick of a switch – images of these stranded people seemed to bring 
home to people the contradictions of the war and undermine the purity 
of western real politik. Martin Shaw (1996a) sees the Kurdish crisis as 
possibly the clearest cut example of how intense media pressure can in 
some way affect foreign policy. It was, he says, ‘TV’s finest hour. The 
same media that had been so thoroughly managed in the Gulf campaign 
were gloriously liberated in its aftermath.’13 Daniel Schorr (1995) is just 
as fulsome in his celebration of the US media’s role in apparently forcing 
a complete foreign policy U-turn on the crisis:
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Score one for the power of the media, especially television, as a policy-
making force. Coverage of the massacre and exodus of the Kurds 
generated public pressures that were instrumental in slowing the hasty 
American military withdrawal from Iraq and forcing a return to help 
guard and care for the victims of Saddam Hussein’s vengeance. (p. 53)
Yet, in the case of the Kurds at any rate, the western alliance was simply 
put on the spot: it had encouraged the revolt in the first place only to 
then stand back and allow Saddam Hussein to crush it. It was now being 
held accountable and responsible for the terrible consequences. ‘The 
Allies’, argues Nik Gowing, ‘had thought about only fighting a war to get 
the Iraqis out of Kuwait, not what happened next. They didn’t envisage 
the Kurds spilling over from Northern Iraq to southern Turkey and so 
that’s why there was no policy; there was a policy vacuum, policy panic’.14 
It is less clear whether that set a precedent for subsequent crises 
such as Bosnia, Rwanda or Somalia. These featured some of the vital 
components determining decisive media influence. In Bosnia (1992–95) 
and Rwanda (1994), there were plenty of pictures of atrocities and 
human suffering on a wide scale but they provoked limited international 
action. The massacre in Rwanda in 1994, mainly of the Tutu population, 
was truly horrific and much reported and written about. However, other 
waves of mass killings of Hutus by Tutus in Burundi in 1993 and again 
in 1996 in the former Zaire barely made the international news agenda 
(Gourevitch, 1998; Gowing, 1998). None of these crises reached the 
critical mass that would invoke concerted international intervention. In 
Somalia in 1993, by contrast, pictures of dead US Rangers being dragged 
through the streets of the capital, Mogadishu, provoked public outrage 
in America and, apparently, the subsequent withdrawal of US troops 
from the United Nations Aid Mission in Mogadishu. However, Gowing 
suggests that a policy reversal was already underway and that those video 
pictures simply hastened the inevitable.15 
war, ‘citizen journalism’ and social media
In the second decade of the twenty first century, these important debates 
of the 1990s – about television news, its technological advances and its 
impact – already seem rather distant. The agenda has moved on and 
has been dominated by debates about the emergence and growth of the 
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new social media – weblogs, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram among many 
others – that seem to have closed the gap between audience and news 
stories even further and faster than any predecessor technology. Indeed, 
their potential to bypass or short circuit traditional forms and spaces of 
journalism, to usurp the apparent authority and objectivity of the tightly 
packaged article or broadcast report and empower the private citizen to 
make his or her own news, presents a serious challenge to the future of 
traditional journalism. In the context of this book, we may now have 
to reconsider the future of war reporting and our image of what a war 
reporter is or should be. 
Even by the close of the twentieth century, commentators were 
highlighting the potential of the Internet and e-mail for offering a diversity 
of sources of latest news about conflicts such as that in Kosovo to a new 
public of internet users (Fleming, 2001). It would mean greater choice 
of content and create hundreds of fragmented, niche audiences whose 
value to advertisers would be determined by differentiated incomes and 
lifestyles rather than narrowly fixed social categories. Caryn James, of 
The New York Times, argued that the diversity of news sources available 
to the American public in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new ‘war against 
terrorism’ rattled the major television networks, which expressed unease 
at the threat these new media sources represented to their monopoly 
yet at the same time were happy to use web-based content to fill an 
information vacuum.16 One of the most high-profile examples of this 
at the time was ‘the Baghdad blogger’ Salam Abdulmunem, or Salam 
Pax as he was also known. His daily blog posts about life in Iraq before 
and after the US invasion of 2003 were syndicated by major newspapers 
around the world and quickly published in book form (Pax, 2003; see 
also Carruthers, 2011, pp. 209–52).
Other commentators have pointed to the propaganda potential of the 
new social media. Ariel Peled argues that the use of social media during 
Operation Pillar of Defence, Israel’s assault on Gaza in 2012, bypassed 
not just traditional media outlets but traditional propaganda sources as 
well. For the first time in this long-running conflict, civilians on both 
sides were actively involved in the propaganda war, not just passively 
subject to it:
Civilians from both sides of the conflict and interested citizens 
worldwide shared news reports, blogs, stories, links, pictures and 
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videos that supported their point of view or refuted others’ claims or 
mainstream media reports. Beyond the physical war, a high-intensity 
virtual war on the hearts and minds of all netizens was being waged.17
Yet Paul Mason points to the ‘networked consciousness’ of the social 
media user and its power to resist spin and propaganda:
Sure, you can try and insert spin or propaganda but the instantly 
networked consciousness of millions of people will set it right: they 
act as white blood cells against infection so that ultimately the truth, 
or something close to it, persists much longer than disinformation. 
(2013, p. 77)
In an updated interview for this book, Alex Thomson remembers 
reporting the bombing attacks on London in July 2005, for Channel 4 
News. He recalls the novelty of getting instant footage from inside King’s 
Cross tunnel via someone’s mobile phone and reflects on how quickly 
and so expected that has become since then, even in the most routine 
news bulletins. ‘Now, when anything goes wrong’, he says, ‘when there’s 
a war, a revolution…or some attack like that in London or somewhere 
else, the first thing you expect…is that someone, somewhere, would have 
filmed [it] on their mobile phone or would have got something.’ Whether 
that constitutes citizen journalism or not is, for him, another question:
I mean we can get all highfalutin about everyone is a citizen journalist 
or everyone’s a paparazzo. No! Everyone’s got a means to film stuff 
and everyone’s got a means to take pictures of it. That is not the same 
actually as being a paparazzo. At the end of the day, clearly people 
value the need for someone who’s been around the block a bit to have 
a look at events and put them into some kind of context and I think 
that’s very important.
Thomson offers Channel 4 News’s coverage of the tenth anniversary 
of the bombings as an example of where the difference between the 
professional and amateur journalist really matters:
There’s a world of difference between a tourist outside St Paul’s 
cathedral today, standing there with an i-Phone filming what’s going 
on with people arriving at the church and perhaps someone like myself 
the war correspondent
88
standing there saying, you know, the state and the media need an 
occasion like this but actually the pain is there for everybody who lost 
people and there are families, don’t you know, across Iraq and across 
Afghanistan today, just as innocent, who are feeling exactly the same 
pain and they deserve our thoughts also. And I can say that because 
I’ve seen those people and I know that’s true and that tells you a rather 
difficult fact about 7/7 and why that happened and that’s the difference 
between one and the other, you know. I think if you conflate both of 
those as journalism, you’ve got a problem. (Original emphasis)18
Peter Preston of the Guardian is also convinced that in the confusion 
and uncertainty of civil wars such as in Libya in 2011, where citizen 
journalism, not the mainstream media, provided the first draft of 
history, ‘war reporters are still absolutely essential.’ Events there, he 
argues, ‘only got clearer when actual reporters…got over the border and 
near to the heart of the action. Then we actually had an information 
revolution: facts we could more or less rely on.’19 On the other hand, his 
phrase ‘actual reporters’ belies a rejection of the very notion of ‘citizen 
journalism’ yet what is so often missed by critics is that the concept of 
the citizen journalist or even the citizen war reporter is rarely if ever 
self-ascribed. Of all the background reading I carried out for this topic, I 
did not come across a single example where someone using social media 
to communicate the latest events of the Arab uprisings called themselves 
a journalist of any description. The closest historical precedent for this 
phenomenon might be the English radical press of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries – challenging the status quo of establishment rule, 
mobilising the emerging working classes on a mass scale around causes 
and protests, yet surviving by necessity on an ethos of voluntarism and 
contingency. The citizen journalists of the radical press may not have 
seen themselves as such; they certainly were not seen as such by their 
professional counterparts in the elite press; but that did not mean that 
they were not. 
concluding remarks
These debates highlight the problems of theorising the role of social 
media in the reporting of conflict. Social media content is so ephemeral, 
provisional and anonymous that we can only speak definitively of its 
the impact of media technologies on war reporting
89
significance in the moment: as instant communication, as immediate 
source of raw information, as channel for the mobilisation of protest or 
resistance. Demonstrating its long-term outcomes is a different matter. 
What cannot be denied, however, is the challenge that social media and 
citizen journalism present not just to state repression or authoritarian-
ism, but to the authority and primacy of the international mainstream 
media and official discourse. As Paul Mason (2013) argues:
Slowly, quietly, the mainstream media have become, for many involved 
in activism, politics and journalism itself, a secondary source of 
information, while social networks have become the primary source. 
This, in turn, speaks to the emergence of an undeclared dual power 
between the world of ideas and the world of official politics. (p. 269)
If the argument here about social media and their role and impact in 
conflict reporting seems speculative and loosely formed, then that is 
because it is so. This chapter has traced the journey from luckless tribe to 
wireless tribe but it is too soon yet to identify an obvious transition from 
traditional war reporting to a definably new form of correspondence, a 
move away from the professional to the amateur, from the careerist to the 
citizen. But from being a sceptic and even a cynic about the significance 
of social media in the reporting of conflict, this author has moved from 
a rejectionist position to, at the very least, the contemplation of radically 
different technologies, forms and spaces by and through which we may 
come to understand the next major conflicts of this century.
Part I of this book has looked at the risks, motivations and traditions 
of the contemporary war correspondent, the problem of reporting the 
horrors of war in an objective or impartial way, and the opportunities 
and challenges presented by media technologies. It is the war corre-
spondent as sovereign individual, making choices and justifying them. 
But as we shall see in Part II, there is another dimension to the story 
– the relationship between journalist and soldier. With its history of 
conflict, control and collusion, it appears to leave little or no room for 
the individual agency of the journalist. 

Part II
The War Correspondent  




Getting to Know Each Other:  
From Crimea to Vietnam
One of the deadliest weapons wielded by the ruling classes of all 
countries is their power to censor the press for thereby they are able 
to create under the pretext of military necessity an artificial public 
opinion with the object of hiding their fell designs.
Morgan Philips Price, ‘The Truth About 
the Allied Intervention in Russia’, 19181
The relationship between the war correspondent and the military is often 
portrayed in media journalism as a power struggle in which the corre-
spondents do their best to get the right stories and the right pictures, 
while the military do their best to stop them. Indeed, the relationship 
was one of the biggest stories of media coverage of recent major conflicts 
such as Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The pros and cons of the 
embed system of reporting and the military briefings; the treatment of 
independent reporters, or ‘unilaterals’ as the military call them; and the 
deaths of reporters at the hands of the US military, were reported and 
debated in feature articles and television documentaries as if they were 
new and shocking realities of the modern warzone. However, in this 
section of the book, I want to show that the military–media relationship 
has a long history and that it is defined by one persistent truth. This is the 
fact that from the Crimean War, 1854–56, to the Iraq War in 2003, the 
various militaries involved have learned valuable lessons from previous 
wars in how to manage the demands of the media, while the media it 
seems have not learnt anything at all. Indeed, the ability of governments 
and armies to censor and control journalists in the warzone, to create this 
‘artificial public opinion’ as Morgan Philips Price put it, is as much down 
to the passive acquiescence of the international media as any other factor. 
This chapter begins with the Crimean War and traces the early 
development of military media management up until the aftermath of the 
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Vietnam War, an historical turning point when the military’s relatively 
ad hoc approaches to previous conflicts was replaced by something more 
evolutionary and above all systematic. 
the crimean war, 1854–56
While William Howard Russell and Edwin Godkin were quite different 
in journalistic style and approach, both of them were appalled by the 
inadequacies in British military leadership in the Crimea – Godkin 
described the officer class as a ‘slutten aristocracy’ – and the terrible 
conditions suffered by the troops (Knightley, 2004, pp. 10–17). Russell 
wrote to his editor that a once proud army had been reduced to a sorry 
collection of ‘miserable, washed-out, worn-out spiritless wretches’. And 
while he agonised over his criticisms of the military leadership, his editor 
John Delane encouraged him to, ‘Continue as you have done, to tell the 
truth and as much of it as you can, and leave such comment as may be 
dangerous to us who are out of danger’ (ibid., p. 11). 
Russell’s criticisms of the military in the Crimea attracted vehement 
protest among the officers at the front and the authorities in England. 
They objected to his reports revealing troop and artillery deployments, 
arguing that once these found their way into the pages of The Times 
they would be picked up in Moscow and lend the Russian army much 
valuable intelligence. Delane agreed and ordered Russell to confine 
his reporting to past events even though the Russians learned about 
British military tactics and movements on the battlefield, or through its 
spy-network, not from the pages of The Times (Knightley, 2004; p. 11; 
Hankinson, 1982, p. 58). Britain’s ally, France, imposed strict censorship 
on the French press, and tried to make a case with Britain for excluding 
journalists altogether once their armies went into action; though, as 
Hankinson argues, this would have been impossible to enforce (1982, 
p. 57). Public opinion at home had expanded due to the increases in the 
electoral franchise and the growth of literacy and, since newspapers were 
powerful organs for amplifying such opinion, there would have been 
uproar had there been any attempt to exclude the correspondents. The 
alternative option, of direct censorship, would have been problematic, 
too, for the same reasons, but it could have been achieved through a 
workable system agreeable to military and journalists alike. In the end, 
the Commander of British forces, Lord Raglan, froze journalists out, 
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offering them no information or assistance at all. As Hankinson remarks, 
‘It was the policy of the ostrich and it was to cost [Raglan] dearly’ (ibid., 
p. 55). The military’s experience of this new breed of journalist influenced 
the introduction of formal military censorship commonplace in most 
wars since. Sir William Codrington, the new Commander-in-Chief at 
the Crimean front, issued a general order in February 1856 prohibiting 
correspondents from reporting military details of value to the enemy on 
pain of removal from the front. Although the war ended before the order 
came into effect, it was to make its impact on the reporting of subsequent 
conflicts (Knightley, 2004, pp. 15–17). 
the american civil war, 1861–65
In spite of the opportunities it offered journalists to shine, the American 
Civil War marked for many critics a low-point in the history of war 
reporting. Philip Knightley writes that most were ‘ignorant, dishonest, 
and unethical’ and filed some of the most ‘inaccurate...partisan and 
inflammatory’ copy of the war (ibid., p.  21). Battles were reported that 
had not taken place, towns were invaded by armies that had not reached 
them, journalists were praised for reports they had simply invented, 
and war artists indulged in a high degree of artistic license to sketch 
non-existent battle action. One journalist tried to interview a mortally 
wounded soldier, begging him not to die until the interview was finished 
and promising him that his last dying words would be published in ‘the 
widely-circulated and highly influential journal I represent’ (ibid., p. 26). 
The story was no different among Southern correspondents. In general, 
journalists refrained from reporting negative news about the war such 
as dissension in the ranks, the punishment of deserters, racism in the 
army, rivalries between eastern and western regiments in the northern 
armies, inadequate medical facilities at the front, and civil resistance to 
conscription. Knightley mentions some honourable exceptions: Ned 
Spencer of the The Cincinnati Times and Samuel Wilkinson of The New 
York Times reported the war with integrity and sensitivity to its horror 
and brutality (ibid., pp. 33–34).
A contributory factor in the poor coverage was the antagonistic 
relationship between reporter and soldier. General Sherman hated the 
press and saw their presence at the front and on the move with the army 
as a burden and an unwarranted interference in the conduct of the war 
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(ibid., pp. 28–29). A correspondent for the New York Tribune wrote in 
April 1865 that ‘a cat in hell without claws is nothing [compared] to a 
reporter in General Sherman’s army’ (Hammond, 1991, p.  5). Sherman 
saw journalists among other things as ‘dirty newspaper scribblers who 
have the impudence of Satan’, as ‘spies and defamers’ and ‘infamous lying 
dogs.’ The day would come, he was sure, ‘when the press might surrender 
some portion of its freedom to save the rest or else it too will perish in 
the general wreck’ (Ewing, 1991, p. 19). Just before Christmas of 1862, he 
issued an order, directed mainly at war correspondents, that ‘Any person 
whatever...found making reports for publications which might reach the 
enemy giving them information and comfort, will be arrested and treated 
as spies’ (Lande, 1996, p.  110). His colleague, General George Meade, 
was quick to show the way when he had reporter, Edward Crapsey of 
the Philadelphia Inquirer, put backwards on a horse with a sign round 
his neck, ‘Libeler of the Press’, and chased out of camp to the tune of 
The Rogue’s March. However, on that occasion, reporter solidarity was 
such that Meade’s name was left out of future dispatches, a factor said 
to have done some damage to his career ambitions (Knightley, 2004, 
p. 28). Another commanding officer, General Burnside, would have had 
William Swinton of The New York Times shot for espionage had it not 
been for the intervention of General Grant (Roth, 1997, p. 6). 
Some of this flak was aimed at newspapers as well as individual 
reporters. The Union government prosecuted those that publicised 
information likely to aid and abet the enemy or compromise military 
security; and closed down those that printed material harmful to the 
Union war effort. The Chicago Times was closed down temporarily for 
criticising President Lincoln (ibid.). By 1864, the Union Secretary of War, 
Edward Stanton, was so concerned about the state of public morale that 
he took on the role of propagandist, ‘dispatching’ his own reports ‘from 
the front’ complete with favourable embellishments, strategic omissions, 
and downsized casualty figures (ibid.). Southern papers were allowed a 
greater degree of freedom of reporting and of opinion. The Confederate 
President, Jefferson Davis, promised freedom of the press in his inaugural 
address and, unlike President Lincoln in the north, he never closed 
down a newspaper during the war. This was perhaps more by default 
than enlightened military policy; the authorities simply did not have 
the resources to police and censor journalists. By 1862, the Confederate 
Army at the Potomac tightened existing reporting restrictions. All 
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reports had to be dispatched through the military censors and corre-
spondents were banned from the front; the breach of these restrictions 
would be treated and dealt with as a criminal act (ibid.). 
Looking back at his many angry, bitter clashes with journalists during 
the war, General Sherman came to recognise the need to find some 
compromise between the military and the press. ‘So greedy are the 
people at large for war news that is doubtful’, he conceded, ‘whether any 
army commander can exclude all reporters without bringing down on 
himself a clamor that may imperil his own safety. Time and moderation 
must bring a just solution to this modern difficulty’ (Ewing, 1991, p. 29). 
Ironically, some 40 years after the war, journalist Henry Villard found 
himself in sympathy with Sherman’s original hard line; the presence of 
the press on the frontline, he thought, ‘must lead any unprejudiced mind 
to the conclusion that the harm certain to be done by war correspondents 
far outweighs any good they can possibly do. If I were a commanding 
general I would not tolerate any of the tribe within my army lines’ (ibid.). 
These conflicting requirements for secrecy and publicity continued to 
influence the relationship between military and journalists in subsequent 
conflicts during the final decades of the 19th century, a period known, 
ironically enough, as ‘the Golden Age’ of the war correspondent. 
from the ‘golden age’ to the first world war, 
1865–1914
The disillusionment and cynicism that infected journalism during the 
American Civil War were not symptoms of some new malaise. They were 
endemic to the evolution of a commercial and fiercely competitive press 
in the nineteenth century. The decades that followed the American Civil 
War, up until the first world war, are commonly regarded as the ‘golden 
age’ of the war correspondent but reporting in this period had more 
impact on the circulation figures of major newspapers, and in feeding 
into the popular myths of war as glamourous adventure, than it had in 
influencing people’s opinion against war (Knightley, 2004, p.  43–66). 
When it came to the development of modern military censorship, 
however, the blueprint was the Japanese model during the Russo–
Japanese War of 1904. Japanese reporting restrictions effectively kept 
western journalists well away from the front but, as Michael Sweeney 
argues, the way in which Japan dealt with foreign war correspondents 
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was not uniquely eastern but learned from historical precedent, from 
the way in which other militaries had dealt with journalists in previous 
wars; not so much their restriction of movement as the denial of factual 
information, censorship by omission (1998, p. 555). 
Thus, from the onset of the First World War in 1914, Britain and 
France similarly learned from the past, their concerns about the press 
fed by decades of experience going back as far as the Anglo Zulu War 
of 1879. The commander of British forces in that campaign, Lieutenant 
General Lord Chelmsford, complained in a bitter letter to the Secretary 
of War that it was ‘more probable with such a large number of newspaper 
correspondents in camp, that many false impressions may be circulated 
and sent home regarding our present operations either intentionally or 
ignorantly.’ He resented the journalists whom he felt were ‘always ready 
without insufficient data for their guidance to express opinions on every 
conceivable military subject ex cathedra’ (Laband and Knight, 1996, 
p. v). One of Chelmsford’s officers, Sir Garnet Wolsely, saw the corre-
spondents as a ‘race of drones [and a] newly-invented curse to armies’ 
(Hankinson, 1982, p. 243). Nonetheless, the correspondents themselves, 
people such as F.  R. MacKenzie of the London Standard and Francis 
Francis of The Times, identified closely with the might and right of the 
imperial cause and if they were ever critical it was of issues of leadership 
and strategy. They saw the officer class as primary sources and saw little 
benefit in alienating them with undue criticism. Conversely, the officers 
appreciated the benefits of a ‘good press’ for their reputations and careers 
so they tended for the most part to cultivate good relationships with the 
correspondents. The only significant exception to this cosy relationship 
was the antipathy felt by Chelmsford towards Archibald Forbes, whose 
persistent criticisms of his leadership damaged his standing in military 
and political circles back home in Britain (Laband and Knight, 1996, 
p. viii). The British commander, Lord Kitchener, was especially hostile to 
war correspondents and tried to impede their movements and obstruct 
their work in every possible way (Knightley, 2004, p.  56). ‘Out of my 
way, you drunken swabs!’ was his dismissal of correspondents in Sudan, 
setting the tone for his approach to press relations in the Boer War and 
the First World War. Still, his antipathy to journalists did not blind him 
to their uses and he was never beneath the occasional letter to the press 
to advance his career ambitions (Royle, 1989, p. 46). 
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It was no surprise to the press in the First World War that Kitchener 
should adopt a policy of the strictest censorship and control. Corre-
spondents were refused official accreditation in the first year of the war 
and they had no choice but to submit to an official drip of information 
from the newly formed Press Bureau, which censored British Army 
information before passing it on to the British and international press. 
The Bureau’s communiqués were usually old news that the newspapers 
already knew about because it was published elsewhere (Farrar, 1998, 
p.  5). The aim essentially was to do or say anything but not mention 
the war, an objective clearly on the mind of Winston Churchill, himself 
a former war correspondent, when he talked about the ‘fog of war’. In 
the first few months of war Britain and France treated all journalists the 
same, wherever they came from: they were free to report anything they 
wanted except what the war was really like. Lloyd George told C. P. Scott, 
editor of the Manchester Guardian, that if people really knew what was 
going on in the war, it would be stopped immediately: ‘But of course’, 
he said, ‘they don’t know and can’t know’ (Knightley, 2004, pp. 116–17). 
The British discouraged neutral correspondents from moving between 
fronts with the threat that if they were caught, they would be shot as 
German spies. The Germans subsequently introduced this ruling, too, so 
that most neutral journalists decided to stick with one side or the other 
for the duration and became fully immersed in the propaganda war 
(ibid., p. 122). It was a situation that provoked Philip Gibbs of the Daily 
Telegraph to conclude that ‘By one swift stroke of military censorship, 
journalism was throttled’ (Farrar, 1998, p.  9). The picture was hardly 
any better with the Russian army on the Eastern front; indeed, it was 
probably worse. The few western reporters to make it there were very 
much on their own, enjoyed little or no privileges, access or facilities, and 
were rarely allowed to visit the frontline (Washburn, 1982). 
There were early instances of voluntary censorship in which the press 
chose not to report significant events such as the mobilisation of the BEF 
(British Expeditionary Force) to France. How such mass movement of 
troops could be kept secret was not considered but there was a vain hope 
that the War Office would reward the press for playing a responsible 
and patriotic role. The official argument was that censorship had to be 
imposed blanket fashion since it was impossible to predict or anticipate 
what information would or would not be useful to the enemy (Farrar, 
1998, p. 11). The attitude to journalists who tried to operate outside of 
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these restrictions was unforgiving. Any reporters found in the field of 
combat would be arrested, stripped of passport and deported back to 
England; they were ‘outlaw correspondents’. The official daily briefings 
and press releases so common in war reportage today were unknown 
then so journalists depended on a high degree of mobility and flexibility 
to gather information and build credible reports and stories (ibid., p. 12). 
But how could they do this if they were treated as potential spies or 
have their reports so severely delayed or heavily censored as to render 
them useless as news? As Farrar shows, the ultimate effect of the War 
Office policy on the press in this early phase of the war was to create an 
information gap that bred uncertainty at home and lent tawdry respect 
to rumour. Philip Gibbs wrote how the press became so desperate for 
information that they would report ‘any scrap of description, any 
glimmer of truth, any wild statement, rumour, fairy tale, or deliberate lie’ 
if it would fill the vacuum (ibid., p. 14). 
However, the unaccredited ‘outlaw’ correspondents in France were 
sending back dispatches that undermined official censorship. Gibbs 
and also Arthur Moore of The Times moved around France, relying on 
fortitude and luck to avoid arrest and get real information on events at 
the front, especially strategically important battles such as that of the 
first battle of Marne (5–12 September 1914) and the first battle of Ypres 
(October–November 1914). Their accounts presented a very different 
picture of the situation than provided by the military, particularly the 
change of strategy from fighting along mobile fronts to the static trench 
warfare for which the First World War became notorious (ibid., p. 25ff). 
The War Office publicly denied their very existence but was careful at the 
same time to place restrictions on their dispatches: ‘No correspondents 
are at the front’, it said in a press release, ‘and their information, however 
honestly sent, is therefore derived at second or third hand from persons 
who are in no position to tell coherent stories and who are certain to be 
without the perspective which is necessary to construct or understand 
the general situation.’(ibid., p.  22). The government eventually made 
some concession to the rising public clamour for news from France but 
it was, to use Farrar’s term, ‘renovation’ rather than complete overhaul. 
An official army correspondent, Colonel Ernest Swinton, was assigned 
to General Headquarters (GHQ) in France, in September 1914, and 
charged with the job of writing articles on military operations (also 
subject to censorship) with the byline ‘Eyewitness’ (ibid., p. 23). Swinton 
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however was not a journalist and his ‘dispatches’ were written in turgid 
military-speak unfit for public consumption. Crucially, though, it was 
never intended as an alternative source of public knowledge about the 
war; it was simply a cover for continuing the policy of non-information 
(ibid., p. 24). 
The real breakthrough in this situation came in March 1915 amid 
continued public debate about the role of correspondents at the front. 
Four journalists were invited to visit British GHQ during the battle of 
Neuve Chapelle; others joined the Admiralty Fleet on its way to the 
Dardanelles where plans were afoot to open up another front and put 
pressure on German forces. As a result, news from Neuve Chapelle 
reached the front pages back home within days rather than weeks 
(ibid., p. 47ff). Furthermore, in May 1915, the military finally granted 
permanent, pooled accreditation to five war correspondents under strict 
censorship and control: the hitherto ‘outlaw correspondent’ Philip Gibbs 
(Daily Telegraph, Daily Chronicle), as well as Herbert Russell (Reuters), 
William Beach Thomas (The Daily Mail, Daily Mirror), Perry Robinson 
(Daily News, The Times) and Percival Philips (Daily Express, Morning 
Post). Their reporting from and movement in the war zone was governed 
by the War Office’s ‘Regulations for Press Correspondents Accompanying 
a Force in the Field’. There was also an official register of accredited 
reporters who could be trusted to comply with regulations and not 
betray military information to the enemy by accident or design (ibid., 
p. 4). Correspondents were to be accompanied at all times by military 
minders, invariably officers who despised journalists and made it their 
business to obstruct them as much as possible. They had the power to 
read and censor not only journalists’ dispatches but also their private 
mail. Once reporters typed up their dispatch, it was given to their minder 
who vetted it before sending it onwards to GHQ where it was telephoned 
to the war office and from there by hand to the newspapers. Neither 
the War Office nor the newspapers could edit or alter a dispatch once 
it was passed by GHQ. There was little or no resistance to any of this 
from the five, pooled correspondents or their newspapers (Knightley, 
2004, p. 102). Farrar passes severe verdict on their performance. ‘The 
introduction of journalists to the Western Front could have helped the 
Home Front in their search for the truth’, he says. ‘What was created, 
however, was a group of correspondents who conformed to the great 
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conspiracy, the deliberate lies and the suppression of truth.’ These cor-
respondents, with their honorary officer ranking and uniforms became 
part of the establishment and their primary job, to report news of the 
war as truthfully and accurately as possible, became an inconvenience 
(1998, p. 73). 
As the First World War went on, public opinion in Britain became 
more apathetic. The government tried desperate measures to renew their 
propaganda campaign against the Germans, including the revival of false 
atrocity stories like that of the factory that boiled the corpses of German 
soldiers to produce glycerine for munitions. The knock-on effect of wide 
public skepticism about news reporting was a reluctance to believe true 
stories such as the Turkish atrocities against Armenians (Knightley, 
2004, p. 111). If the journalists in the First World War had not become 
propaganda tools and if censorship had not been so rigid, what stories 
should or could they have filed? The real stories, the stories not fit for 
public consumption included: the stalemate at the front that turned the 
war into one of attrition with millions of dead and injured; the shortage 
of arms and ammunition at the front; the use of black soldiers from the 
colonies to save the lives of white soldiers; and the hostility between 
officers and troops (ibid., p. 115). 
A look at the work of journalists from neutral countries in the early 
stages of the first world war provides some useful comparisons with 
those from the combatant countries. All parties to the conflict had 
an interest in good public relations when it came to handling such 
journalists, especially Americans. Britain and France wanted the United 
States to enter the war, while Germany wanted it to stay neutral. This 
meant that in the early stages of the war, American correspondents were 
able to report stories that were officially censored or embargoed, like 
the German army’s first use of gas at the front, which Britain wanted to 
keep secret unless it should undermine public support for the war effort. 
While America remained neutral (up until 1917), its newspapers were 
so starved of information that they would send over amateur correspon-
dents in the vain hope they might get accredited; over 20 had made the 
journey to neutral Austria by mid-October 1914. They were to say the 
least naive adventurers and the type of correspondent lampooned in the 
Evelyn Waugh novel, Scoop. One identified himself as a ‘special corre-
spondent’ of the Transcript Press, a Boston publisher. He had bet his 
friend a box of cigars that he would make it to the front and return home 
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for Christmas: ‘Hence my determination to smell the smoke of battle in 
order to puff the cheroot of peace’ (Crozier, 1959, p. 39). 
Accredited journalists were none too keen on these new arrivals and 
accused them of being too ready to believe everything they were told 
about German atrocity stories, without interference from the censor. 
The reality was rather different. Knightley argues that American cor-
respondents were less gullible when it came to atrocity stories and 
some of them expressed concern about the nature and reach of official 
censorship.  Westbrook Pegler, of the United Press news agency was 
censored when he reported, during the winter of 1917–18, on the high 
incidence of fatal pneumonia among American troops at the front; and 
that this was being covered up by the authorities. He was soon recalled 
when the US army persuaded United Press that he was too young and 
inexperienced for war reporting. He wrote that ‘Censorship is developing 
more in the news interests of the military than in that of the American 
reader’ (Knightley, 2004, p.  140). A leading American journalist in 
London wrote that: ‘The news hungry public was often misled in that 
period...News, lies, local color, human interest, fakes: all went down the 
public gullet in gargantuan gulps’ (Crozier, 1959, p. 41). The American 
correspondents resisted the censorship and the intimidation and some 
of the best even went home rather than compromise their professional 
integrity, a principled stand that was very rare then and almost unheard 
of now (Knightley, 2004, p. 123). For the initial period of the First World 
War, while America remained neutral, American press coverage was 
better, more comprehensive, and certainly more impartial than anything 
available in the pages of the British, French or German newspapers. A 
poll asked 367 proprietors which side had their sympathy – two thirds 
expressed no particular preference. Editors, too, were careful to preserve 
neutrality in their selection of war news (ibid., p. 127). However, once 
America entered the war in 1917, the situation for American corre-
spondents predictably changed. US Army censorship was managed by 
a committee of ex-journalists and ex-army officers and, in its short life, 
its job was bolstered by the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act 
of 1918, which respectively legislated against aiding and abetting the 
enemy and criticising the conduct of government or military (Kirtley, 
1992, p. 475). In effect, these Acts were catch-all legislation deployed to 
control the press with impunity.
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According to Knightley, the key characteristics of most reportage 
from the front in this period were the exaggeration of military success, 
underestimation of casualties, and little or no sense of the true reality of 
trench warfare. When the hard questions were asked on the Home front, 
the truth of what was happening came as a shock to all (2004, p. 103). 
Farrar takes issue with Knightley about the degree to which journalists 
became propaganda mouthpieces, but they largely agree on the basic 
outcome of the censorship regime: subservience among reporters to the 
military and, as a result, public ignorance at the home front. They and 
many other writers agree that the ‘Golden Age’ of the war correspondent 
came to a close during the First World War; reporters were no longer 
the free booting adventurers of the Spanish American War or the Boer 
War. Not everyone thought such an age ever existed. An article in The 
Daily Mail defended the First World War correspondents against critics 
who hearkened back to reporters like Archibald Forbes whom, it was 
thought, would have done a much better job. ‘There is a great deal of 
nonsense spoken about the old school of war correspondents’, said the 
writer. ‘The truth is, they were not supermen at all’ (Farrar, 1998, p. 206). 
In the latter stages of the First World War, argues Farrar, they ‘yielded to 
military pressure and became a propaganda tool. They betrayed the trust 
of their readership’ (ibid., p. 226). Reporters came to accept the idea of 
systemised restrictions on both their reporting and their movement; it 
seemed to them that being near the front, bivouaced in some chateau 
under strict military supervision was better than sitting at home relying 
on second hand news. It was to prove a costly compromise. Henry 
Nevinson, described how correspondents ‘lived chirping together like 
little birds in a nest’, wholly dependent on the military to feed them news 
(ibid., p. 227). As Knightley puts it, ‘What it came down to in the end 
was that, in the eyes of GHQ, the ideal war correspondent would be one 
who wrote what he had been told was true, or even what he thought was 
true, but never what he knew to be true. Given these restrictions, the war 
correspondents might just as well have stayed in London’ (2004, p. 101).
the second world war, 1939–45
War correspondents during the Second World War were known in the 
armed services as ‘warcos’. By 1944, as the allies pushed the Germans 
out of France and Belgium, there were 150 warcos from Britain and the 
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US all filing stories to 278 million readers worldwide ‘like the script-
writers of a long running soap opera’ (Collier, 1989, p.  178). They 
were fitted out in officers’ uniforms, including caps, Sam Browne belts 
and arm badges with the gold letter ‘C’ for correspondent. They were 
forbidden to carry arms, although if captured and held as prisoners of 
war they could assume the status of captain. However, an American 
press officer remarked that when at large the warcos ‘assumed the rank 
of field marshal...and recognised no conventions’ (ibid.). The warcos had 
come to expect good treatment from the military without considering 
the cost in terms of professional integrity and independence. Alan 
Moorehead, of the Daily Express, admitted that ‘Like the children of 
very wealthy parents it seemed quite natural to us that we should occupy 
the best houses and hotels, that we should have at our command cars, 
motor launches, servants and the best food’ (ibid.). The big question 
mark, of course, hung over the parents. What would their attitude be to 
their spoilt and unruly children? One of indulgence or discipline? It is 
instructive to compare the British approach to control of the media with 
that of Germany in the early stages of the Second World War and then to 
compare both these with the new, public relations approach taken by the 
United States army when it eventually entered the war in 1941. 
In Germany, all agencies of communication were brought under the 
direct control of the state so that journalists were conscripted along 
with film and radio producers, printers, artists, writers, and photogra-
phers, into the ranks of the Propaganda Division of the Army. They were 
given basic military training and were sent to the front to fight when 
necessary. But their principal role was as propaganda shock troops: 
they were to help to keep up morale on all fronts, and to damage enemy 
morale (Knightley, 2004, pp. 240–41). The German approach to neutral 
correspondents, especially Americans before the US entered the war, 
was rather more seductive. Its Ministry of Propaganda under Goebbels 
facilitated neutral correspondents through its Foreign Press Department. 
They were given a range of perks and privileges (extra rations, petrol 
expenses and special exchange rates, among others) and a free hand 
to report what they wanted. However, in practice, all communications 
out of the German theatre of operations were carefully monitored and 
journalists who filed negative copy were intimidated or even arrested 
for spying. As Knightley suggests, this was an easy charge to make in 
wartime where the line between journalism and espionage is a rather 
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fine one; its effect was to encourage self-censorship. Still, the conditions 
experienced by foreign correspondents in Berlin in the early stages of 
the war were much more favourable than those prevailing behind Allied 
lines and it was little wonder that over 100 journalists based themselves 
there (ibid., p. 240). 
The British approach was just as effective but far from seductive or 
subtle. The government used the Emergency Powers Act to censor all 
public and private communication out of the country that was thought 
to be of use to the enemy. The media – which now included radio as well 
as the press – were subjected to the same reporting restrictions as in the 
First World War. A limited number of correspondents were allowed to the 
front under the watchful eye of a senior Ministry of Information minder, 
called ‘Eyewitness’ as in the First World War (ibid., p. 238). They were 
subjected to strict procedures of accreditation and essentially became 
part of the BEF. Furthermore, their dispatches from the front were 
censored so they would not undermine morale at home. Four British cor-
respondents accompanied the BEF to the Maginot Line in France where 
they worked in a pool system. The system of media control in France 
was so stringent that by the time a correspondent’s dispatch reached the 
newspaper it was barely news any more. Such was the dearth of hard 
news and skilful media management from the Ministry of Information, 
The Daily Express complained that Britain would need to launch a leaflet 
drop on itself to inform its citizens about the course of the war so far 
(ibid., p. 242). Its correspondent O. D. Gallagher suggested that British 
Army public relations was so ineffective that it would be better to adopt 
the German system instead. After pressure from the military, Gallagher 
was recalled from the front and sent around Britain to report on civil 
defence arrangements (ibid., p. 243).
The approach of American reporters to British censorship was to fight 
it. Ben Robertson, of the New York paper PM, was covering a dogfight 
between German and British planes mid-channel and reported the loss 
of three Spitfires to seven Messerschmitts. But one of the censors on 
duty in the Ministry of Information struck out the references to British 
losses. Robertson took exception and appealed upwards, eventually to 
the Minister himself, Alfred Duff Cooper, who agreed to let it through. 
For Robertson, the main obstacle was not so much the system in place 
as the individual censor, often lowly ranked and poorly paid, and quite 
unwilling to stray from the rules (Collier, 1989, p. 49ff). 
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Robertson and his compatriot colleagues were used to a different 
culture of information and expected openness and public relations 
skills from their military. The US army saw public relations and news 
management as a vital part of overall strategy; as General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower put it to a meeting of US newspaper editors, ‘Public opinion 
wins war’ (Knightley, 2004, p. 344). Considerable resources were afforded 
to the job of accommodating and controlling the burgeoning demands 
the media were making for information about the latest developments 
in the war. Military officers became adept at handling journalists and 
catering to their professional requirements. The concern was to strike 
a working balance between necessary censorship and good public 
relations: to bring reporters on side and accommodate their needs as 
much as possible; to give them good stories and pictures; and to be 
mindful of the impressions of the military journalists would bring back 
home after the war (Braestrup, 1985, p. 30). 
Eisenhower told reporters that it was ‘a matter of policy [that] accredited 
war correspondents should be accorded the greatest possible latitude in 
the gathering of legitimate news’ and that ‘Public Relations Officers and 
Conducting Officers give...war correspondents all reasonable assistance’ 
(ibid., p. 31). Of course, the power to define what ‘legitimate news’ was 
rested with the military. American reporters were subjected to censorship 
but they were allowed easy access to the front, accompanied always by a 
public affairs officer. Reporters from other countries, including Britain, 
envied the facilities offered to the American press corps. American field 
commanders were more open with reporters, British commanders more 
suspicious. American reporters were treated as active officers and given 
room and equipment to do their job, including the services of a press 
officer; while British reporters were watched closely at all times by a duty 
escorting officer and were subject to a raft of reporting restrictions and 
censorship procedures (ibid., p. 41). 
Braestrup notes that the US Army allowed journalists in on the 
planning of major operations such as the D-Day landings and both 
parties got to know each other quite well. ‘The journalist had time to 
understand the problem and the plan – and hence gain some basis 
for later assessments of what actually took place’ (ibid., p.  28). The 
amphibious landings by the US army in Europe and the Pacific were 
‘set-piece affairs’, well planned in advance to include the accommodation 
of a select number of journalists. Just before the Normandy landings, 
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reporters based at Army headquarters were assured that they would be 
well looked after by the Public Relations division, which would offer 
them ‘the very best in information and communication.’ They were 
encouraged to see the Public Relations Officer as ‘true friends’, some 
of whom were reporters themselves and who knew a good news angle 
(ibid., p. 36). The public relations strategy did not quite work in practice 
when the invasion finally went ahead. The contingent of reporters with 
US forces was small and severely stretched. Reporters found themselves 
isolated and unable to access communications facilities. John McVane of 
NBC remarked on ‘All the vast public relations preparations and only a 
lieutenant there to help us’ when he tried to report on the Omaha beach 
landing (ibid., p. 40). 
The treatment of journalists at the Normandy landings was not 
flawless but it was a great improvement on earlier operations, such as 
the disastrous raid on Dieppe when reporters were largely kept in the 
dark, given little or no information and subjected to unreasonable 
censorship (ibid., p. 41). It was also true that improved military public 
relations translated into better or more extensive coverage of the war 
by the American news media. The Asian and Pacific theatres were not 
well covered at all simply because there were not enough reporters to 
cover every battle. Important battles such as the now famous ‘Battle of 
the Bulge’ at Bastogne in December 1944 went unreported by American 
correspondents (ibid., p. 27). 
This was not to say that all sections of the British armed services were 
lacking in public relations skills. The British army in the North African 
theatre was taking a very different, more media friendly approach 
(Knightley, 2004, p. 332; Hickman, 1995, p. 155ff). For the British army, 
the North African campaign was a chance to shine against the enemy in 
apparently wide-open and empty spaces without having to worry too 
much about civilian casualties. Furthermore, it distracted from their 
own deficiencies in the European theatre of war where it was becoming 
apparent that defeat could only be averted by American intervention – 
both financial and military. The war in the desert also appealed to the 
warcos. When the offensive began, in December 1940, six reporters 
accompanied the British armoured brigades. Within a year and a half, 
there were 92 of them, and more arriving by the day (Knightley, 2004, 
p.  332). Field Marshal Montgomery was a charismatic and dynamic 
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military leader and appreciated the value of a friendly and amenable 
press corps for self-promotion and propaganda in his personal duel 
with the German Field Marshal Rommel. He went so far as to regard 
journalists as elements of his staff (ibid., p.  333). BBC correspondent 
Frank Gillard remembers ‘the kind of relationship which could develop 
in this war between a war correspondent and the commander-in-chief ’ 
and says that it was ‘crucially important to a correspondent that he 
should be recognised and trusted as a member of the Army family, even 
though he could never allow the army to use or manipulate him. This 
delicate relationship was greatly strengthened if it was seen that the cor-
respondent was approved of in the top ranks of command’ (Hawkins, 
1985, p. 12). Duly approved of, and some with egos greatly inflated, the 
warcos saw little problem with this and some even considered giving 
up the job to enlist. They reported the desert campaign as a romantic 
adventure in which the British triumphed and where even the enemy 
displayed chivalry and military greatness. 
Yet for all the public relations, few journalists ever got close enough 
to the North African frontlines to witness a single tank battle. Alan 
Moorehead, of the Daily Express, recalls that they ‘were simply conscious 
of a great deal of dust, noise and confusion’ (Knightley, 2004, p. 337). 
Furthermore, the PR approach did not extend to the few women cor-
respondents accredited in the second world war and who turned up to 
report the action in Northern Africa. Army command barred women 
reporters from working in active combat zones and were especially irked 
whenever they caused a fuss and made difficult demands for equality 
with their male colleagues. The head of the British Army’s Press Division, 
Lieutenant Philip Astley, wondered why women reporters could not be 
content with special ‘visitor status’ and segregated facilities (Sebba, 1994, 
p. 153).
Although journalists soon realised the implications of censorship 
during the Second World War, few if any confronted the system. They 
accepted it because they thought the situation would change for the better 
or that the war would soon be over. The criticisms and reservations were 
saved or their post-war memoirs when it was too late to have any real 
effect. A Reuters correspondent admitted that journalists were simply 
propagandists for their governments, mere cheerleaders: ‘It wasn’t good 
journalism’, he said. ‘It wasn’t journalism at all’ (Knightley, 1995, p. 45). 
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the korean war 1950–53
In the Korean War, General MacArthur repeatedly refused to provide a 
formal system of censorship and regular briefings, which he thought was 
impossible. Subtly, he shifted the burden of censorship onto reporters 
themselves, trusting on their good sense not to compromise military 
security or undermine the authority of a field officer with ‘unwarranted 
criticisms’ or personal attacks (Braestrup, 1985, p. 50). Reporters felt a 
deep sense of unease about this and actually demanded from MacArthur 
direct censorship and ‘uniform guidance’ with reporting (ibid., p.  50; 
see also Adams, p. 27ff). According to Braestrup, journalists feared that 
McArthur’s permissive policy would put increasing pressure on them 
to disclose more information than their rivals. They also thought the 
lines of transgression too vague. How was a reporter to judge what might 
compromise security or endanger lives? And when did a reporter cross 
the line to make ‘unwarranted criticism’ of army operations or damage 
the prestige and pride of American forces? Where were the definitions 
and ground rules? For all their fears and anxieties, the voluntary code 
remained in place until the end of 1950 during which time, said the US 
Eighth Army censor, ‘the disclosure of security information by corre-
spondents was virtually a daily occurrence’ (Braestrup, 1985, p. 52). 
The situation changed radically when the Chinese army turned the 
tide of the war against UN forces from mid-September 1950. Suddenly, 
the need for tighter security and secrecy of information became more 
pressing. On 20 December, the Far Eastern Command (FEC) imposed 
a system of censorship in which all media material relating to the war 
would be submitted first for clearance. A Press Advisory Division was 
set up and based at the FEC public information office in Tokyo for 
the purpose of censorship.  Field censorship in Korea was handled by 
the Press Security Division of the US Eighth Army (ibid. p. 53). It was 
estimated that 90 per cent or more of reporters favoured this formal 
system of censorship because it lifted the burden of self-censorship and 
eased competition with rivals. Some however tried to get round the new 
restrictions through loopholes and subterfuge and, as a result, invited 
further tightening of restrictions. But Braestrup argues that despite the 
imposition of formal ground rules in December 1950, the FEC attitude 
was still relatively lax throughout the war compared with other conflicts, 
getting to know each other: from crimea to vietnam
111
before or after Korea, and the army rarely took drastic action against 
errant reporters. Journalists were allowed considerable latitude to 
criticise and analyse military operations, and to portray the war in its 
full horror. During the peace talks, they spoke out against misleading or 
inadequate UN briefings. Notably, says Braestrup, the military did not 
blame ‘the security lapses, mood swings, exaggerations, or forebodings’ 
of journalists for the growing dissatisfaction at home with the war (ibid., 
p. 54). 
The Australian correspondent, Wilfred Burchett, reported the Korean 
War from a radical perspective and he always thought that the real ‘press 
war’ in Korea was between journalists and their American press officers 
(1980, p. 174). The most interesting phase of the war, as far as the role 
of journalists is concerned, came as it drew to a close with the ceasefire 
talks in Kaesong. The UN was deeply divided over bringing the war 
to a close and Burchett, along with Chinese journalist, Chu Chi-p’ing, 
and Alan Winnington of the British Daily Worker, found themselves 
in the position of unofficial briefers for journalists attached to the UN 
command. This happened, said Burchett, because of the ‘suppression, 
distortion, and untruthful accounts of conference proceedings given by 
the official UN spokesmen’. Other international media outlets covering 
the talks increasingly took to lifting the accounts of these journalists 
and publishing them alongside reports of news agencies because their 
reports were generally found to be more accurate than those using the 
UN as a principal source (ibid., p. 165). 
A significant example of how this worked concerned a crucial battle of 
words over the final line of demarcation that would define the ceasefire 
settlement: the 38th parallel. Using the UN as diplomatic cover, the 
Americans tried to get the line pushed back 35 miles from the existing 
Chinese–Korean front. The Chinese and Koreans argued that the 
existing positions on either side of the 38th parallel more or less reflected 
the original balance of forces and seemed a fair enough compromise 
for a settlement. The UN command produced a map to support its 
identification of the line but western journalists found themselves 
cross-referencing the three reporters over the precise demarcation line 
in question because there was ‘an obvious discrepancy between what 
they were told and what we knew’ (ibid., p. 166; emphasis in the original). 
The UN map released to the western press was a fake, something the UN 
press officer, Brigadier General William P. Nuckols eventually admitted. 
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In response, the UN launched a propaganda counter-offensive in which 
it contrived a breakdown of negotiations, one provoked by the Chinese 
and Koreans and resulting in their banning of western journalists from 
Kaesong. Before Burchett and his two colleagues had a chance to offset 
the crisis, and point out that only one day of talks had been cancelled, 
it was too late. Contact between the press and both sides had broken 
down, with the UN chief liaison officer, Colonel Andrew J. Kinney (US 
Air Force) claiming it was all down to communist obstruction, and that 
the communists were the ones who banned the press (ibid., p.  166). 
The policy of disinformation by UN press officers, and the habit of 
accredited journalists of cross-checking with Burchett and his other 
two colleagues, continued throughout the ceasefire talks with frequent 
crises and breakdowns in the relationship with the UN command. It 
presaged a new phase of military–media relations that would define and 
be defined by future international wars and the invasions and interven-
tions that marked the latter stages of the Cold War. And it started with 
the Vietnam War. 
the vietnam war, 1965–75
One of the most enduring myths in the recent history of war reporting 
is the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’, the widespread belief that the mainstream 
US media were opposed to the Vietnam War and openly hostile to the 
US military and its South Vietnamese clients; and that as a result of their 
critical coverage they lost the war for the US. This of course bears little 
or no relation to the media’s actual coverage of the war, yet it has shaped 
and influenced political and military control of the media in subsequent 
conflicts from the Falklands War to the US invasions of Grenada and 
Panama and in the Gulf War in 1991 (Hallin, 1986; McArthur, 1992; 
Williams, 1993). 
The following discussion of the American media’s relations with the 
US military in the Vietnam War relates to the period between 1965–75 
during which US military involvement was at its most direct; so-called 
US military advisers were in place long before this, helping the South 
Vietnamese regime put down the nationalist and communist insurgents, 
collectively labelled the Vietcong. The turning point during this period 
came in 1968 when the North Vietnamese army launched a surprise 
offensive against the South Vietnamese regime on the traditional Tet 
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holiday. From then on, the consensus among Washington elites about 
the conduct of the war began to leak. Popular support also waned, 
apparently because of hostile media coverage and the nightly images 
of dead and injured American soldiers. By 1975, US resolve had finally 
collapsed; total withdrawal swiftly followed. 
Both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were extremely 
sensitive to ‘negative’ news from Vietnam and, by extension, negative 
domestic comment and analysis in the elite press. Negative news was 
essentially any news that contradicted the official line that the military 
was making progress in winning the war (Braestrup, 1985, p. 62). The 
White House and the Pentagon consistently tried to counter every piece 
of ‘negative’ news with optimistic assessments and projections and 
Johnson even went so far as to second military commanders in Vietnam, 
including General Westmoreland, to help sell the war at home, which 
Braestrup describes as ‘an unprecedented use of the military to achieve 
domestic political objectives’ (ibid., p. 63). 
The history books offer numerous examples of the freewheeling 
journalist in Vietnam, undermining military security and public morale 
with daily reports of tactical blunders, strategic incompetence and the 
terrible rate of attrition suffered by US troops for vainglorious ends. 
The reality was quite different. Reporters like David Halberstam and 
Neil Sheehan cultivated good relationships with their military sources, 
most notably Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann. They also got on well 
with the rank and file and delighted in hitching rides on the combat 
helicopters, describing their experiences in the first person plural rather 
than singular (Halberstam, 1979; Sheehan, 1989). With few exceptions, 
the American press corps in Saigon was composed of ordinary journalists 
who knew where their sympathies lay (MacArthur, 1992, p. 118).
Halberstam, who reported for The New York Times, is still thought of 
by liberals in the west as an exemplary war reporter: bold and courageous 
in the pursuit of truth in spite of the criticisms ranged against him at 
home for his reporting of the Vietnam War. In late 1963, the CIA 
produced an analysis of his ‘lugubrious and pessimistic’ reporting, 
which although accurate with the facts, drew conclusions from those 
facts that apparently impugned his objectivity (ibid., p. 116). Some of the 
most conservative sections of the US media also took exception to his 
subversive journalism. He recalls how the New York Journal-American 
accused him of being ‘soft on Communism’, and ‘paving the way for a 
the war correspondent
114
bearded Vietnamese Fidel Castro’ (ibid., p.  119). President Kennedy 
wondered aloud to New York Times’ publisher Arthur O. Sulzberger if 
he was planning to move Halberstam somewhere else (ibid., p. 120). In 
fact, like almost all of his colleagues in the Saigon press corps, he was 
a patriotic journalist who questioned certain operational and strategic 
decision-making that undermined the war effort against the Vietnamese 
communist and nationalist insurgents. As Neil Sheehan wrote of him, 
Halberstam was an example of ‘the genius of the Anglo Saxon society 
of the Northeast for co-opting the talents and loyalty of outsiders 
with its social democracy. A society that would give...the grandson of 
immigrant Jewish peddlers a Harvard education and a job at The New 
York Times was innately good, incapable of perpetrating evil in other 
lands’. Halberstam was ‘full of gratitude to that society and wanted to 
spread its good’ (1989, p. 321) and rarely questioned the morality of US 
involvement in Vietnam or indeed anywhere around the world. In his 
book, The Making of a Quagmire, he wrote of his belief that ‘Vietnam is 
a legitimate part of [America’s] global commitment...perhaps one of only 
five or six nations in the world that is truly vital to US interests. If it is 
this important it may be worth a larger commitment on our part but if 
so we should be told the truth, not spoon-fed clichés as in the past’ (cited 
in Braestrup, 1983, p. 4). 
Halberstam, Sheehan and others were pressured not so much because 
of what they believed or wrote but because of the ideological battles 
raging on the home front over what was happening on the ground in 
Vietnam. Anyone who questioned any aspect of official policy was at 
best ‘a liberal’, at worst a ‘communist’. It all depended on the nature of 
the critique and the context of its presentation. The more vital the policy 
to the economic and political interests of the state, the further left the 
critiques were regarded. Mildly critical journalists became unpatriotic 
subversives who, as the famous war correspondent turned establish-
ment columnist, Marguerite Higgins, complained, would love their 
country to lose the war so they could be proved right (MacArthur, 1992, 
p. 120). Peter Arnett writes that ‘Caught between the truth of what we 
saw and the nation’s sense of patriotism, the Vietnam reporters became 
something like outcasts, destined to defend their professionalism for the 
rest of their lives’ (1996).
This sets in context the daily US military briefings in Saigon and 
explains why they quickly became known as ‘The Five O’ Clock Follies’. 
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These were simply designed to feed the news media with a daily ‘hard 
news’ story but were not taken seriously by most journalists because they 
were based on ‘hasty, fragmentary, inevitably inaccurate field reports’ of 
action in a theatre of war where there was no actual frontline, moving 
or stationary (Braestrup, 1985, p.  63; see also Braestrup, 1983, p.  17). 
Only the US aerial bombardment passed as ‘hard news’ despite the 
fact that it was entirely detailed in army press releases; journalists were 
not allowed to accompany the aircrews on bombing sorties. The myth 
of heated clashes between spokesmen and journalists was, Braestrup 
suspects, more about journalist giving vent to frustrations about the lack 
of real news than sharp, perceptive reporters holding out tenaciously for 
the ‘truth’. Any such journalist knew the truth was not to be had in the 
briefings. And as Braestrup points out, official optimism had become 
such a devalued currency over the first few years of war that journalists 
in Saigon ‘were inclined to discount all optimistic assessments by 
official spokesmen, even as they dutifully reported them’ (1985, p. 64). 
John Pilger recalls from his own experience that reporters like himself 
regarded the Follies as ‘a bit of theatre’ in which some journalists amused 
themselves by tormenting the briefer: 
In fact I went down there and filmed the briefer...and asked him 
A-B-C questions like, How many men were serving in Vietnam? How 
many people were killed by friendly fire? How many men were killed 
by accidents? How many helicopters fell out of the sky because they 
were badly serviced? They threw him into a panic. He couldn’t even 
tell me how many men were in the country. So from my point of view 
they were useless.2 
Jacques Leslie reported the war for the Los Angeles Times from 1972 
until July 1973 when he was expelled from the country for his habit 
of reporting inconvenient exclusives: the torture of women prisoners, 
corruption and ceasefire violations, and even a conspiracy by South 
Vietnamese army generals to smuggle valuable used artillery shell 
canisters out of the country for very profitable return. These stories were 
possible because Leslie cultivated good official and unofficial sources. 
‘The result, of course, was that I was finally kicked out of the country in 
July, 1973, an act the U.S. Embassy heartily endorsed.’3
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Drew Middleton of Associated Press reflects that in Vietnam, as in 
Korea, no one was quite sure what the ground rules were so the military 
were much more wary of talking openly and freely with journalists 
(Knightley, 2004, p. 465). There were about 40 US and foreign journalists 
in Saigon in 1964, increasing to more than 400 by summer 1965 when 
daily briefings were provided for 130 correspondents. By 1966, there 
were 419 journalists from 22 countries, 179 of which were American 
(Braestrup, 1985, p. 64). The most troubling aspect was that, with few 
exceptions, the Follies became for the majority of reporters the principal 
source of information about the war. Pilger reveals that out of 649 
journalists accredited to the Saigon press corps from 1968, only about 
eight of them made regular forays into the field (2001, p. 263). Jacques 
Leslie remembers it differently. He says that ‘most journalists, unless 
they were too frightened or concerned for their safety, got out of Saigon 
– the good stories weren’t in Saigon’. He takes credit for being the first 
American correspondent to go into Viet Cong territory, ‘only because 
of the arrival of the ceasefire in late January, 1973. Before that, it was 
impossible – anyone trying before that was likely to enjoy the fate of 
my friend Alex Shimkin, a Newsweek stringer, who blundered into Viet 
Cong territory in 1972 and was immediately killed.’ He does not see his 
actions as particularly daring or heroic. It was about being sensible and 
about being a good journalist. He had simply nurtured good contacts 
and sources, in this case Viet Cong sources, who assured him that with 
the ceasefire in place he would be safe and that he would be treated well. 
As he points out, ‘it wasn’t laziness on the part of other journalists that 
kept them out – rather, it was a quite reasonable fear of being killed, and 
the dearth of sources like mine.’ Once he set the example and showed it 
could be done, others followed his footsteps, some of them quite literally 
‘to the very village I’d visited, until the village chief told them they were 
taking up too much of his time, and to pass the word to stop going there.’ 
The majority of journalists never considered meeting the Viet Cong 
because they had nothing to learn. The VC were the enemy, they were 
evil; end of story. Leslie’s bureau chief, George McArthur, ‘rarely left 
Saigon for any reason, relied on his CIA sources for many if not most of 
his stories, and probably figured anyone who pulled off the feat would 
be treated to nothing more than a Potemkin Village-like performance 
for his efforts.’4
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concluding remarks
Pilger, Braestrup and many other critics discount the myth that the 
media lost the Vietnam War and firmly point to political divisions at 
home, and poor news management at the White House, as part of the 
problem.5 Braestrup himself reported the war and, like so many of his 
American colleagues in the press corps, supported its fundamental jus-
tification. Thus, he argues, the real folly in Vietnam was Kennedy’s and 
Johnsons’ habit of accentuating the positive while doing little or nothing 
to progress the war on the ground, of which the briefings in Saigon 
were merely an extension. Nixon took firm and positive action on the 
ground first and then sold it to the media but there was still a significant 
credibility gap there that could not be closed. Braestrup argues that 
any administration sending troops to war must prepare a clear media 
strategy and ‘a sturdy resolve...not to gloss over difficulties’ (ibid., p. 75). 
As I will go on to show, the post Vietnam era would see the development 
of a media strategy that put the emphasis on censorship and control, 
whilst appreciating the usefulness of public relations spin and gloss. 
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Learning and Forgetting:  
From the Falklands to the Gulf 
[The briefers in the Gulf] are making reporters look like fools, 
nitpickers, and egomaniacs; like dilettantes who spent exactly none 
of their lives on the end of a gun or even a shovel; dinner party 
commandos, slouching inquisitors, collegiate spitball artists – people 
who have never been in a fistfight much less combat; a whining, 
self-righteous, upper middle class mob.
Henry Allen, Washington Post, 19911 
The prevailing and erroneous myth of a hostile media in Vietnam quickly 
took root in US military thinking about how to manage the media in the 
field of operations; and they were to learn much from the successes and 
failures of British military and political information policy during the 
Falklands war (1982). American military planners were impressed with 
British information restrictions but not with their approach to public 
relations and sought to develop a more balanced media strategy when 
planning their own subsequent operations in Grenada (1986), Panama 
(1989) and the Gulf (1991). The deployment in those instances of a more 
formal and restrictive pooling system than that used in both World 
Wars (Chapter 5), coupled with tightly managed daily media briefings, 
suggests that the historical development of military media strategy has 
been evolutionary rather than revolutionary or new. It is an argument 
that sets the context for what follows in Chapter 7: a proper understand-
ing of the embed system deployed to great effect during the early stages 
of the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.
the falklands war, 1982
When the Falklands crisis moved onto a war footing in 1982, the British 
armed forces struggled to formulate an information policy and media 
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strategy. They too fell victim to ‘Vietnam Syndrome’. As far back as 1970, 
Air Vice Marshall Stewart Menaul bemoaned coverage of Vietnam, 
concluding that ‘television had a lot to answer for in the collapse of 
American morale’. At the same time, the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD’s) 
Director of Defence Operations advised colleagues to ask themselves: 
‘Are we going to let television cameras loose on the battlefield?’ (Glasgow 
University Media Group, 1985, p. 8). With thinking like this it was little 
wonder that their approach to media management in the Falklands was 
so problematic. A limited number of British journalists were allowed to 
accompany the fleet to the South Atlantic. Only 29 correspondents – all 
of them British – were assigned to various pools on board the Royal Navy 
ships and the amount of help and assistance given to them was minimal. 
The government and military line was a familiar one: that reporting 
restrictions were necessary and vital to safeguard operational security 
and the lives of the troops. However critics argued that it extended far 
beyond such terms of reference and was designed to ensure coverage 
that would convey a favourable impression of the war at home (Glasgow 
University Media Group, 1985; Harris, 1983; Morrison and Tumber, 
1988; Mercer et al, 1987). Journalists such as Brian Hanrahan (BBC) 
and Michael Nicholson (ITN) complained bitterly of heavy-handed 
censorship; and when they took to prefixing their reports as having 
being censored, this word itself was censored (Glasgow University Media 
Group, 1985, p. 9). 
In a report for the Home Office, Valerie Adams (1986) argues that 
many of the problems experienced between the military and media were 
down to oversight or to specific failures of planning by the MoD, which 
failed to think in advance about how the media should be handled. 
For their part, journalists failed to understand some very practical, 
operational limits prevailing aboard ship (p. 4). None of this, however, 
should detract from the reality of direct and deliberate censorship of the 
media during the Falklands War. It operated on three levels: 
• direct censorship and control by the MoD in the South Atlantic
• restraints imposed by the lobby briefing system
• self-censorship by journalists in the name of military security, or in 
respect to public opinion, taste and decency. 
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Direct censorship and control of the news media  
by the MoD in the South Atlantic
Unlike the army, with its media experience in Northern Ireland, the navy 
was not accustomed to having journalists aboard their ships and had the 
government not intervened there would have been no media presence in 
the Falklands at all. Once on board and at sea, the media pools were at 
the mercy of their military minders. They had no facilities of their own 
for sending reports via satellite and were forced to rely on ship com-
munications. In many cases this was made extremely difficult; phones 
were mysteriously busy when a journalist wanted to send a report on a 
dramatic development, especially when things were going badly. From 
a naval point of view, journalists expected to dispatch copy via ships 
communications when it suited them but it soon got to the point where 
almost 30 percent of traffic was press copy, not a situation the Navy could 
easily tolerate for obvious operational reasons (Adams, 1986, p. 14). The 
effect of all this on the quantity and quality of coverage was serious. In 
some instances, unfavourable reports or pictures took days to find their 
way to the newsroom.
Restraints imposed by the lobby briefing system
Things were no better for journalists reporting from the home front. The 
MoD’s public relations department was headed by a civil servant, Ian 
McDonald, whose attitude to media management was so negative that he 
was quickly dubbed the ‘Minister for No Information’. He would appear 
before the assembled media and read out brief, perfunctory statements; 
questions from reporters or off-record briefings were not allowed. The 
MoD’s PR officers were even less helpful. They were ‘relatively junior 
people, lacking the authority, the experience, or perhaps the ability to 
negotiate successfully’ (ibid., p. 14). Walter Rogers reported the briefings 
for the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) and thought that the 
British journalists were too passive. If they had stood up for themselves 
and demanded better treatment, the MoD would have given in sooner 
(Philo and McLaughlin, 1995, p.  155). The Canadian CBS correspon-
dent, Morley Safer, thought that the major difference between the MoD 
briefings and the Five O’Clock Follies in Vietnam was that in the former, 
the journalists knew less than Ian McDonald; in Vietnam, the journalists 
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knew much more than the hapless briefer, ‘at least those...who’d been out 
of Saigon at all’ (Pilger, 2001, p. 261). But McDonald’s approach was soon 
challenged from within the MoD itself, namely from PR professionals 
like Neville Taylor who believed that it could give the media what they 
wanted – news and pictures – but on its own terms. By the middle of May 
1982, off-the-record briefings were restored.
Self-censorship by journalists
In many ways, the MoD had no need to adopt such heavy-handed 
information management. It could rest assured that in a spirit of 
patriotism and a general atmosphere of fear most British journalists and 
their editors, on public service television as well as the press, could be 
relied upon to practice a large degree of self-censorship. The principal 
and ultimate tool at the MoD’s disposal was the D-Notice, which barred 
publication of information thought by the authorities to compromise 
military security. But Morrison and Tumber have shown that apart from 
a set of standing orders issued three weeks before the Argentine invasion, 
no D-Notice was ever imposed during the conflict itself. Instead, the 
MoD favoured a more ad hoc arrangement in which journalists would 
seek informal guidance by telephone or meeting about whether or not 
to include certain information. In effect, journalists were cooperating 
with a system that put the onus of censorship not on the authorities but 
on themselves. Three criteria influenced the selection of combat footage 
for primetime television news: military security, standards of taste and 
decency with respect to pictures of dead and wounded, and intrusion 
of privacy with respect to interviews with families of troops killed in 
action (Morrison and Tumber, 1988, p.  220ff). A Commons Defence 
Committee inquiry into military–media relations during the Falklands 
War, led by Lord Beech, heard evidence from media and government 
representatives and concluded, perhaps not surprisingly, that the basic 
goals of information policy had been successfully met, the war was won 
and no serious breaches of security had been committed by journalists. 
The Beech Report concluded that in war time disputes will always arise 
about what constitutes ‘operational security’, but, crucially, ‘where there 
are conflicting views...the military view must prevail’ (Adams, 1986, 
p. 161). The Beech inquiry also looked at two other policy issues: the 
public’s right to know and the government’s duty to withhold information 
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for security reasons. It recognised that censorship and propaganda had 
a place in concealing information from the enemy and also deceiving 
the enemy. ‘Propaganda in itself is not objectionable’, it reported, ‘and it 
certainly need not involve lying and deception’ (ibid., p. 15).
Lessons from the Falklands
Valerie Adams argues that journalists are not always in a position 
to judge and determine the boundaries of operational security and 
therefore they differ about what justifies censorship (ibid., p.  161ff). 
Max Hastings saw his reporting as ‘an extension of the war effort’, 
giving help and succour to the troops when needed (ibid., p. 47), while 
David Fairhall, of the Guardian, remarks that ‘Much of what suspicious 
journalists regarded as news management could probably be explained 
as a mixture of ignorance, wishful thinking and a natural desire to put 
the best light on things when seen from a particular point of view’ (ibid., 
p. 53). Mike Nicholson accepts that ‘sensible censorship’ is inevitable and 
to be expected but he objects strongly to ‘idiot censorship, total blanket 
censorship by men who are too cowardly or too arrogant to allow things 
to happen as they should.’ He is also aware that there is disinformation, 
and that ‘it’s terribly, terribly hard to know when you’re being lied to. It’s 
not until afterwards that you realise you have been lied to...I mean we’re 
always the puppets here and unless you say to them, “I’m not going to 
report anything you say because I think you’re going to lie to me”, what 
do you do? It’s a Catch-22!’ (Emphasis in the original).2
Mercer et al. (1987) identify a crucial difference between the British 
and American information culture. The American Department of 
Defense (DoD) advocates public openness and accountability in 
accordance with the constitutional principles. ‘Propaganda’, it says, ‘has 
no place in [DoD] public affairs programmes’ (p. 4). The British MoD 
public relations staff seek to inform the public of its activities, also, but 
in wartime its primary function is of propaganda, in other words to 
‘create a favourable climate in support of these activities by the use of 
the news media, films, exhibitions and literature’ (ibid., p. 5). Journalists 
may see that as quite ironic given the MoD approach to briefings but the 
Ministry was nonetheless successful in ‘creating a favourable climate’ in 
support of the war against Argentina; indeed, its approach was noted 
by military planners in the USA. In a US Army journal, Commander 
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Arthur Humphries drew a vital lesson from news management during 
the Falklands. Criticising British heavy handedness in their dealings 
with the news media, he advised that the military must give regular and 
friendly media briefings, and cultivate a relationship with the media 
based on mutual trust. This, he believed, would ensure ‘the flow of 
correct information’ and prevent ‘faulty speculation.’ He also accused 
the British of failing to ‘appreciate that news management was more 
than just information security censorship. It also means providing 
pictures.’ The crucial lesson, however, was control: ‘Control access to the 
fighting, invoke censorship, and rally aid in the form of patriotism at 
home and in the battle zone.’ Whatever about the rhetoric of free speech 
and democracy, ‘the Falklands War shows us how to make certain that 
government policy is not undermined by the way a war is reported.’ 
Humphries recommended that ‘to effect or to help assure “favourable 
objectivity” you must be able to exclude certain correspondents from 
the battle zone.’ In sum, then, Humphries advised that military planning 
‘should include criteria for incorporating the news media into the 
organisation for war’ (MacArthur, 1992, pp. 138–40). 
Adams concludes that ‘given the accessibility of many potential theatres 
of war and the immediacy of modern systems of communication, the 
problems raised by information-handling, and by the speculation and 
commentary surrounding operations in the South Atlantic in 1982, seem 
likely to pale into insignificance’ in any future conflict (1986, p.  194). 
Only a year after the Falklands War, the USA invaded the tiny Caribbean 
island of Grenada on 25 October 1983. Retired US army general, John 
E. Murray, argued against media presence in the combat zone on the 
grounds that ‘engaging the press while engaging the enemy is taking 
on one adversary too many’ (Braestrup, 1985, p.  21). It also appeared 
from opinion polls that media protests notwithstanding, a majority of 
Americans supported the decision taken to exclude journalists from 
Grenada when it mattered (ibid.). It seemed from the way their media 
strategy unfolded that the military were learning lessons about control 
first before thinking about public relations. 
the us invasion of grenada, 1983
The aim of the invasion of Grenada, what the Americans called ‘Operation 
Urgent Fury’, was to overthrow the Grenadan government, itself imposed 
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by military coup d’état days earlier, on the grounds that it had allowed 
Soviet and Cuban forces to build up a military base there. The unease 
that the coup had caused among Grenada’s neighbouring islands, and 
the apparent threat to resident American students on the island, was 
adequate pretext for the Reagan administration to order an invasion. It 
was left to the US army and navy to decide how to manage the operation. 
A key feature of their approach was to keep the news media in the dark 
as much as possible (Braestrup, 1985, p. 86). The Secretary of Defence 
James Baker even excluded his spokesman, Larry Speakes, from National 
Security Council planning; although the spokesmen at the Pentagon and 
at the State Department were told of the plans just before the invasion 
began. The reason for excluding those who routinely dealt with press 
enquiries was the conviction among planners that spokesmen would 
be forced to lie to the press to keep the secret and therefore undermine 
their integrity as press officers (ibid., p. 88; Baker, 1996). The military 
convinced the administration that the need for absolute secrecy in 
advance of the invasion was paramount for maximum surprise of attack 
and the ultimate success of the invasion. In his report to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, in 1984, Admiral McDonald, insisted that: ‘The absolute need 
to maintain the greatest element of surprise in executing the mission 
to ensure minimum danger to US hostages...and to the servicemen 
involved in the initial assault dictated that the press be restricted until 
the initial objectives had been secured’ (ibid., p. 90). 
Operation Urgent Fury was an improvised affair that pitted quite a 
small force against a rather noncommittal defence. The way the military 
dealt with the media at large during the initial phases also seemed 
improvised. Again, the Pentagon left it to the commanders closest 
to operations, Admirals McDonald and Metcalf (ibid., p.  92). Metcalf 
was the commander in the field and he devised a system of relaying 
information, most of it inaccurate and fragmentary, from the USS Guam 
to the Commander-in-Chief of the US Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANT) in 
Norfolk, Virginia, where it was used to form the basis of press releases. 
Looking back at his role in handling the media during the operation, 
Metcalf was unapologetic: ‘I cannot duck the issue’, he said, ‘I had a 
great deal to do with keeping [the media] out. I think I did the right 
thing’ (ibid., p. 93). Moves to accommodate the media were made only 
after the operation was carried out and its objectives secured. A Joint 
Information Bureau was quickly established at Grantley Adams Airport 
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in Barbados. This had no direct link to Admiral Metcalf. To contact him, 
Joint Information Bureau officers had to go through the US Embassy, 
who rang CINCLANT in Virginia, who in turn contacted Metcalf, and 
back again (ibid., p. 94).
Even when Metcalf finally gave permission for a small press pool 
to come onto the island from Barbados, on 27 October, they allowed 
only 15 reporters and photographers: twelve from the major American 
media and three from Caribbean media (ibid.). ABC reporter Mark 
Scheerer recalled the mood of frustration among reporters in Barbados 
at being corralled away from the action and given inadequate facilities 
(four telephones between 300 reporters); and the heavy-handed, hostile 
approach of the US Air Force, whose officers routinely went ‘bonkers’ 
and confiscated film and audio tape. Press briefings were constantly 
cancelled and the pool list kept changing (ibid., p. 98). Thomas E. Ricks, 
of the Wall Street Journal, had a similar tale of woes: ‘There are no press 
briefings, no press releases, no nothing. Some television cameramen 
have been sitting here in the airport for six days. They talk half-seriously 
of storming the barricades’ (ibid., p. 99). Once in Grenada, journalists 
were restricted to guided tours of preselected locations – restrictions that 
were not lifted until 30 October. There was only a trickle of information 
available during that period to Americans keen enough to look for it: ham 
radio broadcasts at first, threadbare press releases from the Pentagon, US 
students ‘rescued’ from the island, and reports from various Caribbean 
media (ibid., p. 19). An ABC crew captured the first news pictures of US 
marine activity at Grantley Adams airport, but, to their dismay, their 
material was held back from broadcast when the station’s Pentagon cor-
respondent ‘waved the story off ’ after a briefing from a ‘trusted’ DoD 
source (Hertsgaard, 1988, p. 206ff). 
Braestrup (1985) puts the Grenada coverage into some historical 
perspective when he compares it with the Normandy landings in the 
Second World War, the US intervention in Dominican Republic in 1956 
and several operations in Vietnam, when the US handled the media more 
or less well than might have been expected. Journalists were generally 
free to move round Vietnam but their reporting of several operations 
was restricted by news embargo, or they were banned from the battle 
zone altogether. The key and crucial difference in Grenada was, says 
Braestrup, ‘both an attitude and a lack of planning by the Pentagon and 
the White House.’ The lack of on-the-ground guidance, of well-informed 
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and experienced press officers, or of proper press briefings and press 
releases in Barbados and in Grenada itself meant that reports that passed 
for news were based almost entirely on erroneous Pentagon briefings 
(ibid., p.  104). However, Braestrup blames the media for their lack of 
imagination and laziness in overcoming the restrictions. It was possible at 
the time to see from the contradictions between various official sources, 
between CINCLANT and the Pentagon and the White House, that there 
were inaccuracies and exaggerations and lies, and to ask some hard 
questions. ‘Oddly enough’, he argues, ‘the [media] seem to have devoted 
more of their energy to agonising over why they were excluded than on 
redeploying their man power and seeking to piece together the full story 
during the weeks that followed Urgent Fury’ (ibid., p.  109). However, 
Martin Hertsgaard points to a much more fundamental problem: 
the ‘remarkable tendency’ of the US media to accept government 
information as the ‘basic truth’ rather than think about its strategic value 
as propaganda as was clearly the case with the Grenada invasion (1987, 
p. 209). It was also evident that the restrictive media policy throughout 
the operation had been ‘a major coup for the “bad cop” faction within 
the [Reagan] administration who favoured taking a hardline against the 
press’ (ibid., p. 236). 
The only formal legal challenge against the reporting restrictions came 
from an unlikely source: the pornography publisher, Larry Flynt. He 
filed suit against the Department of Defense in the Washington Federal 
District and sought an order preventing further government restrictions 
on the media in Grenada on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. 
The court did not decide on the case until the following June, 1984, when 
it granted the government motion to dismiss the complaint as ‘moot’: in 
other words, as being a unique situation that was unlikely to recur. The 
court also ruled, crucially, that reporting restrictions in the theatre of 
operations were up to the commander in the field (Kirtley, 1992, p. 478). 
The indignant media were more successful with their call for a public 
inquiry into the affair. Led by veteran US Army Major-General Winant 
Sidle, it finally reported in August 1984 with a number of recommenda-
tions aimed at improving military–media relations in the event of future 
conflicts. The Sidle Commission advised that:
• the media should cooperate voluntarily with security guidelines
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• the military should pay more attention to its relations with the 
media
• the military should help the media with logistics wherever or 
however possible in coverage of military operations
• any pooling system should be as big as possible but kept in 
operation for the minimum time possible.
The military’s response to Sidle was to create the official DoD media pool 
that was basically a formalised version of the ad hoc system deployed in 
Grenada. It was intended as a temporary, stopgap measure that would 
satisfy both the media’s need for information and the military’s need for 
security at the critical moment of an operation. A small, select group of 
journalists would be ready at a moment’s notice to go with the first wave 
in a military offensive, with the rest of the media pack joining up when 
the situation allowed. The first test for the Sidle recommendations, and 
the DoD’s new pooling system, came in December 1989 with ‘Operation 
Just Cause’, when US forces invaded Panama to overthrow President 
Manuel Noriega. 
the us invasion of panama, 1989
Ostensibly, the invasion of Panama was launched to overthrow the 
dictator and paid CIA informant, Manuel Noriega, for corruption and 
drugs-related crimes. Its real purpose was to secure US interests in the 
crucial Panama Canal Zone, with its bases, installations and commercial 
interests, before the Panama Canal Treaty returned the area back to 
Panama in 1999. Martha Gellhorn was in Panama City to report the 
operation and she saw it as a clear message to the developing countries of 
central and south America: that with the Soviet Union in retreat, the US 
was the only superpower left in town. She tells the story of how she tried 
to cash some travelers’ cheques in Panama City only to find most banks 
closed because of the upheaval wrought by the invasion. She eventually 
found the Swiss Bank open for business but it was an international bank 
dedicated to transferring large sums of US dollars around the world; it 
did not cash travelers’ cheques. Gellhorn left the bank with the thought 
that, ‘24,000 armed men, attack helicopters, tanks and riotous disorder...




It did however interfere with media reporting. Sandra Dickson (1994) 
convincingly shows that coverage of the invasion by the US press was 
ideologically skewed towards a narrow, status quo explanation of why 
the invasion was launched and what it hoped to achieve. She points to 
the dependence of the news media on institutional sources such as the 
US State Department and the Pentagon, which, she correctly argues, is 
linked to professional and institutional routines. However, she barely 
mentions the means by which those sources forged that dependency 
and restricted public understanding of the invasion’s geopolitical and 
strategic impulses: the media pooling system (p. 809ff).
William Boot defines the Department of Defense media pool as ‘A 
select group of combat journalists that is never permitted to see combat. 
Sometimes referred to as “the public’s eyes and ears”’ (1990).3 Up until 
the latter half of the operation, journalists were corralled like cattle at 
isolated US bases, well away from the action. The US Army Southern 
Command only briefed journalists once during the four days of the pool’s 
deployment, while its ‘media centre’ was beset with technical problems, 
causing serious delays for the transmission of copy and photographs 
(Hoffman, 1991, p. 92).
The International Centre on Censorship pointed out that during the 
invasion, the pool was ‘activated’ too late to be of any help to journalists 
(Philo and McLaughlin, 1995, fn.  8). However, this was exactly what 
the US Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, had intended. He made 
no apologies for it but mollified media outrage by commissioning an 
inquiry into what happened, led by Fred S. Hoffman. The resulting 
Hoffman Report (1990) criticised the Department for excessive secrecy 
and noted that the reports sent back from Panama by the news pool 
were of ‘secondary value’. It made 17 recommendations for improving 
the situation in future operations, among which were that in advance 
of future operations, the Secretary of Defense should state his or her 
official sponsorship of the media pool, and that the DoD should monitor 
the development of a public affairs strategy that includes proper accom-
modation of the media. The pool should be briefed regularly by senior 
officers and coordinated by public affairs officers and escorts from the 
section of the armed services involved in the operation. For their part, 
the pool participants should share all ‘pool products’ – news pictures 
and copy – with the other participants. The report also recommended 
that proper channels of communication and accountability be kept open 
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throughout all stages of an operation so that problems and difficulties 
are rectified on the spot or as soon as possible thereafter. As an adjunct 
to this, there should be regular liaison between media and military to 
discuss any problems and clarify rules and responsibilities in the event 
of future operations; the armed services might also consider incorpo-
rating the media pools into military exercises (Hoffman, 1991, p. 105). 
In response, Dick Cheney welcomed the report but said he ‘[did not] 
agree with all the facets of it in terms of recommendations’. He accepted 
responsibility for his policy of secrecy and explained that he was ‘very 
concerned about the possibility of premature disclosure of the operation 
[which would have] created enormous problems for us, obviously, and 
put at risk the lives of the men conducting the operation’ (ibid., p. 108). 
Effectively, it was ‘thanks but no thanks’ to Hoffman. 
In both Grenada and Panama, the military control of the media was 
highly successful and effective but it was arguably let down by poor 
Public Relations. They kept the media away from the battle zone but not 
on side and ‘on message’. In the next major offensive involving US forces, 
the Persian Gulf War, in 1991, they exercised some public relations 
with the help and cooperation of a good number of journalists present. 
The Pentagon was ecstatic with the result, what assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Pete Williams, celebrated as ‘the best war coverage we’ve ever 
had’ (Boot, 1991, p. 24). 
the gulf war, 1991
Williams was right to be pleased with the outcome of the media 
operation during the Gulf War. It fostered an acquiescent posture among 
the journalists based in Saudi Arabia, and a skeptical, critical response 
among their colleagues in Baghdad to Iraqi efforts at public relations. 
For critics, two aspects of the military’s handling of the media in the 
Gulf stimulated considerable debate: the news pools and the daily media 
briefings. 
The news pools
As seen in the previous chapter, there was nothing new historically about 
the concept of the news pool in wartime – it had been first deployed to 
control journalists in the First World War. What was new about its use 
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in the Gulf War was its purpose in a system of information management 
planned well in advance of hostilities. In fact, as early as 13 August 1990, 
just nine days after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the overall coordinator for 
the military’s media operation, Michael Sherman, and his team began 
work setting up the main military briefing room and TV studio in the 
International Hotel in Dhahran, in Saudi Arabia.4 Over 1,500 media 
personnel from the US (Fialka, 1992) and around 160 from Britain 
(Thomson, 1992) were accredited to report the war from bases in Saudi 
Arabia. These were grouped into news pools or ‘Media Response Teams’ 
that would be allowed to accompany troops on certain operations; each 
pool was overseen by a military minder, or ‘public affairs officer’ as the 
US military called them (Thomson, 1992, pp. 39–82). 
John Fialka (1992) argues that when the news media came to the 
Gulf, they expected a long, Vietnam-style war of attrition in which 
they could move around on different fronts. Instead, what they got was 
a short and remote aerial bombing campaign followed by a brief ‘land 
war’, a strategy that evidently could not accommodate large numbers of 
journalists. Media pressure for increased accreditation on the news pools 
overloaded and finally collapsed the system. It led to bitter competition 
between informal media cartels among the news pools and to pedantic 
squabbling among journalists over definitions, rules and privileges 
(ibid., p. 8). Some journalists came prepared for a particular type of war, 
often with surreal results. Robert Fisk of the Independent remembers 
them well:
One guy turned up from a small town [American] newspaper...wearing 
camouflage costume and he had boots with leaves painted on – Saudi 
Arabia of course has no trees as you’re aware. And some of them came 
along in desert camouflage would you believe, from the Gulf, and 
turned up in Kosovo where there are leaves and trees and grass. These 
guys! Who are these people? What possesses them to behave like this? 
It’s definitely not journalism, not the kind I’m involved in anyway.5
As the Gulf War entered its final stages, Pete Williams told the US 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs that the pool system was a 
compromise and designed for three reasons: ‘It gets reporters out to see the 
action, it guarantees that Americans at home get reports from the scene 
of the action, and it allows the military to accommodate a reasonable 
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number of journalists without overwhelming the units that are fighting 
the enemy’ (Williams, 1995, p.  334). This was a very positive spin on 
the pooling system that gave no clue to its function as an instrument of 
control. The control was inbuilt and depended on one crucial dynamic: 
the degree to which the media would play along with it and effectively 
police themselves. The system bred an overweening competitiveness 
among them and some went so far as to inform on other journalists such 
as Robert Fisk, who tried to operate independently of the system. As Fisk 
argues, the last thing a journalist needs in the difficult environment of a 
warzone is for his or her colleagues to report them to the authorities and 
try to have them removed.6 Fialka remembers that in-fighting among 
the American news pools was ceaseless and they were organised and 
controlled from within according to different priorities. There were 
arguments over what exactly was being pooled: the information or the 
correspondents? The ‘big three’ American networks – NBC, ABC, and 
CBS – objected to their correspondents having to do stand ups on CNN. 
The photography pool was ‘a plutocracy’ run by the elite of three news 
magazines, Time, Newsweek and US News and World Report; as well as 
two press agencies, AP and Reuters (1992, p. 37). This cosy arrangement 
was blown apart just as the war started when the newspaper photogra-
phers appeared in force and demanded fairer play from the ‘Big Five’ in 
terms of shared use of materials and shared responsibility for running the 
pool. The stakes were high. John MacArthur mentions the freewheeling 
French photojournalists who dubbed themselves the ‘Fuck the Pool pool’ 
that, by operating out with the system, captured some of the best images 
of the war (1992, p. 155). 
The pool system also nurtured a culture of grievance and encouraged 
poaching and plagiarism of pooled dispatches; there were even paranoid 
suspicions that ‘foreign reporters’ were looking for material from the 
US news pool attached to US military units (Fialka, 1992, p. 32). Fialka 
and the other journalists in his pool ‘discovered that the military had 
also found ways to make working conditions there more difficult. We 
encountered multiple layers of control, at least one of which always 
seemed to be there. Barriers seemed to raise automatically to blur the 
reality; buffers were always at the ready to blunt the sharp edges of truth’ 
(ibid., p. 55).7
Perhaps forgetting the recent precedents of Grenada and Panama, 
Margaret Blanchard sees the Gulf War as the ‘first time in American 
history [that] reporters were essentially barred from accompanying the 
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nation’s troops into combat’ (1992, p. 6). Thus, Pete Williams’ argument, 
that the media pools would allow journalists to see the action, was quite 
disingenuous in one way, but oddly accurate in another. The news pools 
offered journalists very little in the way of first-hand action with the 
possible exception of the Iraqi incursion into the Saudi border town of 
Khafji, or the final skirmishes in Kuwait City as the Iraqis withdrew in 
disarray. They saw little or nothing of the brief and much vaunted ‘land 
war’. Instead they found themselves watching planes taking off from and 
returning to air bases or cruise missiles being launched from ships in the 
Persian Gulf; or even worse still, watching CNN and NBC in their hotel 
rooms for the real action in Baghdad. 
Some journalists questioned the pooling arrangement while others – 
such as Chris Hedges of the New York Times and Robert Fisk – refused 
to work in it altogether and were dubbed ‘unilaterals’ or ‘freelancers’ by 
the military. Fisk points out that such labels were pejorative; he was a 
full time staff journalist with a British newspaper, not a freelancer. The 
term was purely a military moniker too readily accepted by the pool 
journalists who perhaps felt threatened by what could be achieved by the 
independents.8 Chris Hedges (1991) writes of his experiences with other 
independent journalists and how some US and Egyptian army units 
subverted the rules to allow them unofficial passage in their successful 
bid to reach to Kuwait City before its official liberation. Their success was 
‘due in part to an understanding by many soldiers and officers of what 
the role of a press is in a democracy. These men and women violated 
orders to allow us to do our job’ (p. 27). 
In spite of the obvious vagaries of the media pools, most journalists 
cooperated with the system in something of a Faustian bargain. Kate 
Adie says the media and the military must ‘do a deal and they must do 
it publicly – that is the pool’;9 while Martin Bell sees the need for trust 
between journalists and their military minders: 
It’s essentially part of being a journalist, understanding people and 
seeing soldiers as human beings and not as numbers in an order of 
battle. It does help, if you’re reporting on soldiers, to have been a 
soldier. They get alienated by daft questions from reporters who don’t 
know the difference between a brigade and a battalion. And they’ll 
simply tell you more if they trust you more. I never saw that as a 
hindrance to good journalism; it was a help to it.10 
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Indeed, British journalist, Mark Urban, suggests there is a key difference 
between the American and British approach:
The Americans will try to short-circuit the gap between reality and 
publishable reality by telling lies sometimes and it’s very rare that you 
catch the Brits doing that. I mean when they said in the Gulf War 
that they were not targeting Saddam it was plainly rubbish...We know 
absolutely it was their intention to try and kill him if an opportunity 
presented itself...it was a patent lie. You get other occasions when 
they’re flustered, like when the Iraqis went into Khafji, where they’re 
not exactly lying but they’re on the hind foot and they’re talking 
rubbish. The Brits are more trustworthy in that respect.11
That may come as a surprise to journalists who have tried to report, 
independently, other more contentious conflicts in which the British 
have been directly involved such as Malaysia and Northern Ireland 
where disinformation and psychological operations were used to create 
a ‘favourable climate’ for effective propaganda (see Carruthers, 1995; 
Glasgow University Media Group, 1985; Miller, 1994). Michael Nicholson 
learned a bitter lesson in media–military trust from his reporting of the 
Falklands War:
[My] first instinct was to believe what the [British] military were 
telling me. But of course it transpired that they were telling lies. People 
you trusted or thought you trusted were lying to you for their own 
military purposes and sometimes for their own reputations...[When] 
you go to war with Brits, with your own people, there is this naive 
assumption you’re on the same side and you all want that side to win 
and therefore they can be trusted. But they don’t trust you. That’s 
the whole point of the aggravation that happened out there and in 
the Gulf. The military do not trust the journalists which I think was 
unfair...It was constant hostility’.12
The media briefings
If the pooling system brought out the worst in journalists, the picture 
was hardly any better when they assembled in the briefing rooms in 
Dhahran or Riyadh. While the pooling system kept reporters well away 
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from the action, the briefings kept the information away from reporters. 
Yet they said or did nothing to escape the accusation that they let the 
military get away with it. According to John MacArthur, journalists 
were made to look ‘so bumbling and informationless […] contrasted 
as they were with the purposeful and self-assured military briefers’ 
(1992, p. 151). Added to this are the charges that they failed to challenge 
the slick Pentagon videos of ‘smart bombs’ hitting their targets with 
questions about their real accuracy and the actual ratio of ‘smart bombs’ 
to conventional, ‘dumb’ munitions used. Had these questions been asked, 
had journalists investigated further, with some research, they may have 
been able to ascertain that only 7 per cent of all munitions used were 
smart weapons. Instead, the briefings were like video war games that 
played to the whoops, cheers and laughter of the assembled journalists, 
most of them seemingly oblivious of the reality that human beings were 
dying in their tens of thousands under some of the most lethal firepower 
ever deployed – ‘smart’ or ‘dumb’ (Philo and McLaughlin, 1995). Their 
amnesia was probably induced by a directive from General Schwarzkopf 
that the briefings were not going to turn into the ‘Five O’Clock Follies’ 
of the Vietnam War, when briefers offered daily body counts. There was 
to be no body count in the Gulf, only weekly bomb damage assessments. 
Journalists were given details of how many tanks or artillery pieces had 
been knocked out but nothing about estimated casualties amongst the 
soldiers who presumably manned them (Thomson, 1992, pp.  97–98). 
This was restricted information according to the extensive media ground 
rules at the military’s disposal (see Appendices 3 and 4) but, as Massing 
argues, an experienced and resourceful journalist could easily extrapolate 
hard information from the welter of statistics the military did release on 
a daily basis as a kind of fodder for those happy to take what they were 
given (1991, p. 24). The most damning indictment of these journalists 
must surely be that they did not ask the right questions at the right time 
and recognise that the briefers were military officers with a war to spin 
and sell. As in all wars, there were honourable exceptions but not enough 
to make a real difference. 
The impact of these briefings and the easily processed images they 
provided made for ‘good television’ and certainly filled many hours of 
saturation coverage during the first week of the war. In London, two 
senior BBC journalists, anchor David Dimbleby and defence correspon-
dent David Shukman, played and replayed the first video images from the 
learning and forgetting: from the falklands to the gulf
135
briefing rooms as if they were analysing a soccer match, using laser light 
pens to circle targets and bring home to the viewer that this was indeed a 
hi-tech, low-casualty war where bombs and missiles were so smart ‘they 
are able to destroy [a military target], no doubt kill all the occupants of it, 
but without causing casualties amongst the civilian population around’ 
(Philo and McLaughlin, 1995). Journalists might wonder in response 
what useful information could be obtained from briefers who responded 
to questions in terms such as ‘We just don’t discuss that...I can’t tell you 
why we won’t discuss it because then I’d be discussing it’ (Thomson, 
1992, p. 83). But blaming the military for the briefings is rather futile; the 
briefings and the information policy that supported them fitted into a 
successful and effective military public relations campaign from the very 
outset of the Gulf crisis in August 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Like 
entertaining a party of children, the briefers kept the journalists occupied 
and out of harm’s way. The journalists for their part got their ringside 
seat at the circus and wanted to keep it. But British and American media 
coverage of the war was not confined to Saudi Arabia or in TV studios at 
the home front. Some journalists based themselves in Baghdad and the 
test would be to see if their response to Iraqi news management tactics 
would be as compliant.
Media responses to Iraqi propaganda in the Persian Gulf War
In the first few days of the Baghdad blitz, journalists such as Brent Sadler 
(ITN) and Peter Arnett (CNN) came under heavy political flak in Britain 
for acting as propaganda dupes for Saddam Hussein. As Walter Goodman 
put it, ‘Much of the abuse was strictly political. The Scuds came mainly 
from the [political] right’, from critics who worried about images of 
civilian casualties being beamed around the world (1991, p. 29). 
Typical of the type of material the critics had in mind was an ITN 
report by Brent Sadler, in Baghdad, that showed cruise missiles flying 
overhead on their way, it was assumed, to preprogrammed targets; it was 
probably the first footage of these missiles being fired in anger. What 
enraged right-wing opinion at home was hearing Sadler report how 
‘simple gunfire’ brought down at least one of the much vaunted, hi-tech 
missiles; and seeing pictures of a hospital filled with civilian casualties 
from missiles that missed their target. The journalist also interviewed a 
doctor and civilian eyewitnesses, including a woman in a UN tracksuit, 
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shouting to camera: ‘This is not a game! These are human lives!’ (ITN, 
22.00; 1 February 1991). Mark Urban thinks such reports expose the 
myth that the media helped to sanitise the war and explain why they 
attracted such opprobrium from conservative media critics:
We saw that there was a wobble in public opinion after the Amiriyah 
shelter bombing and we can only speculate, for example when a British 
Tornado dropped a laser-guided bomb on the market in Falujah and 
killed it is believed 160 civilians, what would have been the effect in 
the UK if Jeremy Bowen or John Simpson had been allowed to go 
there and say, ‘We did this. The Brits did this’, with all the sort of gore 
and suffering and screaming, which comes about when something 
like that happens.13
Urban’s reference to the Amiriyah shelter bombing is an interesting case 
in point. This was a civilian air-raid shelter in Baghdad that was packed 
with civilians when it was hit by a missile, killing all or most of the 400 or 
more occupants. As Urban would expect, many good western journalists 
filed harrowing dispatches but the problem was what happened to those 
when they reached the newsroom for broadcast. ITN withheld the most 
difficult footage on the grounds that it was ‘too distressing’, an extension 
one could say of media policy during the Falklands War. However, 
the BBC’s treatment of a report from Jeremy Bowen, its correspon-
dent in Baghdad, stands out for the way in which it was so effectively 
interrogated and then emasculated not by some military censor but by 
the news presenter, Peter Sissons. In a pre-recorded two-way, Sissons in 
London questioned Bowen within the strictures of the Pentagon claim 
that the bomb shelter was a military command and control bunker. He 
left no doubt whose account he believed:
Sissons: A few moments ago I spoke with Jeremy Bowen in Baghdad 
and asked him whether he could be absolutely sure there was no 
military communications equipment in the shelter, which the allies 
believe was there?
Bowen: Well, Peter, we looked very hard for it. I’m pretty confident, as 
confident as I can be, that I’ve seen all the main rooms.
Sissons: Is it conceivable it could have been in military use and was 
converted recently to civilian use?
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Bowen: Well, it would be a strange thing to do...
Sissons: Let me put it another way, Jeremy, is it possible to say with 
certainty that it was never a military facility? (Emphases in the original)
When Bowen replied that he could only report what he could see, 
Sissons closed the two-way with the caveat that the reporter was ‘subject 
of course to Iraq’s reporting restrictions’ (BBC, 18:00, 14 February 1991; 
emphasis in the original).14 
An important point to stress here is that negative media reporting 
from the Iraqi side was only occasionally a response to intense political 
pressure back home. In most instances, the media could be relied upon 
to provide the negative spin without cues or prompts. An example of this 
was an ITN report broadcast on 26 January 1991, six days before Sadler’s 
cruise missile footage caused such a political storm. It surveyed what the 
allies called ‘collateral damage’, that is damage to the civilian population 
and infrastructure. Right away, the news anchor rouses the suspicions of 
the viewer in less than subtle terms. The footage, we are told, was taken 
by an ITN camera but ‘operated by a Jordanian cameraman’ (anchor’s 
emphasis), the implication being that we could trust the camera because 
it was British but not the cameraman because he was Arab. The film goes 
on to show footage of children in hospitals, and images of bombed-out 
houses and churches. The sources of the pictures are variously labeled 
on screen as being from ‘ITN’, ‘Iraqi TV’ and the ‘Iraqi Ministry of 
Information’, while the journalist underscores his voice-over report with 
the heaviest qualifications. The pictures ‘show extensive damage caused, 
the Iraqis say, by allied bombers...an image of life in Iraq that Saddam 
Hussein is anxious for the world to see and believe.’ A sequence of 
images ‘supplied by the Ministry of Information [which] as propaganda 
graphically illustrates the suffering [and is] being used as a weapon...as a 
means to influence world opinion.’ The problem, the reporter says, is that 
‘Iraqi-supplied material draws natural suspicions about its authenticity.’ 
For example, over images of civilian casualties, he comments that they 
are ‘claimed by Iraq to be recent victims of the bombing but they have 
not been independently verified as such’ (ITN, 21.45, 26 January 1991; 
emphases added). Walter Goodman highlights similar attempts by 
American reporters in Iraq to signal images of civilian casualties as Iraqi 
propaganda (1991, p. 30). The Gulf War, then, was sanitised because the 
western news media played a key role in constructing it as such. Under 
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fire from politicians at home, reporters were sensitive in the extreme to 
charges of being propaganda dupes. Western supplied material did not 
raise ‘natural suspicions about its authenticity’ because, presumably, any 
such suspicions that existed would have been classified as ‘unnatural’.
Lessons from the Gulf War
There were some attempts after the Gulf War to create a meeting place 
between journalists, military, and academics to discuss issues of media 
censorship and the freedom of information. However, such encounters 
took place on a rather unequal footing, as Mike Nicholson recalls from 
personal experience:
I was once asked at some dinner, by some admiral if this was a 
wonderful thing to do, wouldn’t this make things easier in the future? 
And I said no, of course it won’t make things easier in the future. 
Nothing will ever change. All you’re doing is learning our tricks – 
that’s what it’s all about. You’re spending money employing us to come 
and talk to you because you want to know how we work. But you’ll 
never let us know how you work. And he shut up after that.15
A collection of essays edited by Lloyd J. Matthews, entitled, Newsmen 
and National Defense: Is Conflict Inevitable? (1991) highlights the gulf 
of misunderstanding between the military officer class and commercial 
mainstream news media in the USA. For example, journalist Richard 
Halloran surveyed a sample of army officers to discover their perceptions 
of the media. Chief among these were: that the media were an all 
powerful entity with a liberal agenda that was instinctively anti-military; 
that journalists were just in it for the money or to ‘sell newspapers’; that 
journalists were not really professionals; that, unlike the military they 
reported, they were not accountable to the public; that they were usually 
inaccurate with the facts; that they only ‘printed’ bad news; that they 
relied on unnamed and unattributed sources; that they often published 
classified material and used unauthorised information without thought 
about the consequences; that war and defence correspondents often 
lacked military knowledge or experience; that they took up precious 
military time and resources; and, worst of all perhaps in the eyes of the US 
military, they lacked patriotism (pp. 39–59). Other individual contribu-
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tions to the volume crystallise the inherently contradictory assumption 
that the media are staffed by liberal elites from top to bottom and are run 
by all powerful corporations, in some cases corporations such as General 
Electric and Westinghouse which are instinctively anti-liberal in their 
business practices and that arm the US military with missile and radar 
systems (Sarkesian, pp. 61–71). Yet as William Hammond argues in the 
same volume, the US military has developed an acute sense of public 
relations as a cure for all these ills in the media–military relationship. 
However, he warns that after the sales pitch and the ad campaign, ‘sales 
still depend on whether the product itself fulfills...expectations’ and on 
the fact that ‘the truth has greater ultimate power than the most pleasing 
of bromides’ (1991, p. 15). 
But there are lessons from ‘abroad’, from journalists in parts of the 
world not known for their celebration of the freedom of the press such as 
Russia. In the first Chechnyan war, from 1994 to 1996, the Russian army 
was ruthless in its attempts to intimidate the Russian and international 
media from reporting the story of its brutal war with Chechen rebels. 
Public opinion in Russia suggested that the army had considerable 
popular support to do what it deemed necessary to win. A favourite 
tactic was to suspend accreditation procedures at critical moments 
in the conflict and to tell journalists that their safety could not be 
guaranteed. Yet Russian journalists simply sought out alternative sources 
in the age-old tradition of good reporting (Peters Talbot, 1996, p. 48). 
As a result, they were able to resist the twin pressures of government 
censorship and economic constraint to ‘break Soviet traditions of passive 
reporting and provide Russian readers with a broad array of views’ on the 
first Chechnyan war (ibid., p. 51). They were praised for ‘the frankness 
of their coverage’ and their criticisms of the government’s conduct of the 
war, ‘the first time in Russia’s five year democratic experiment that [they] 
have played such a role’ (Rutland, 1996). Russia’s second, still more brutal 
campaign in Chechnya, 1999–2009, coupled with an unstable, political 
and economic climate at home, took its toll on the concepts of freedom 
of speech and media pluralism. Yet, the Russian media’s experiment with 
independence has shown their western counterparts that there is always 
a space in which journalists can ask hard questions of their military and 
political leaders in a war situation; and a space in which they can be 




Military public relations over this period, then, became more effective 
than direct censorship of the type familiar in both world wars. Serious 
examination of the most critical phases of the Falklands War, the 
invasions of Grenada and Panama, and the Gulf War, shows that these 
operations were carried out with most journalists under the thumb and 
the public in the dark. In this regard, the pooling system was successfully 
‘activated’ in every instance while journalists, on the other hand, were 
effectively deactivated. As Martha Gellhorn wrote after the Gulf War:
In the Falklands, Grenada, Panama and the Gulf War, our governments 
have shown a fine skill in controlling and manipulating the press. The 
press is shown what the government thinks fit when the government 
ordains. The press is treated to military briefings instead of finding 
out for itself. An accompanying officer or minder is always at hand. 
The result of this press management...is that we have had no real press 
coverage. In the interests of ‘national security’ or any phrase they wish 
to use, our governments have decided to neuter the press in wartime. 
(1993, p. 340)
Yet the military approach to controlling the media in the Gulf War, 
with its mix of public relations carrot and authoritarian stick, showed 
that the problem is not so much the extent and nature of reporting 
restrictions; the focus on these alone excuses journalists and deflects 
the blame onto their military minders. The problem is how journalists 
responded to propaganda from what they might see as their ‘own side’ as 
well as a host of other failures: their unwillingness to challenge reporting 
restrictions; their readiness to betray their own colleagues for minor 
advantage; their enjoyment of the razzmatazz of the military briefings; 
their susceptibility to disinformation and dissemblage; and their failure 
to corroborate source information against alternative material. And 
while they complained or expressed regrets about all this after the war, 
the US military planners were already thinking ahead and planning the 
next stage of development: the embed system that they first tried out in 
Bosnia after the Dayton Accords in 1995 and fine tuned by the time it 
was rolled out for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. As the next chapter will 
show, it was a propaganda triumph.
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Goodbye Vietnam Syndrome: The 
Embed System in Afghanistan and Iraq
We need to tell the factual story – good or bad – before others seed the 
media with disinformation and distortions. 
Public Affairs Guidance, US Department of Defense1 
The embedded reporter system did not originate, as some commentators 
think, in the planning stages of the war in Iraq in 2003; it was conceived 
in the final stages of the Bosnian War and international efforts to broker 
a peace deal via the Dayton Accords of 1995. In its leading role with 
the United Nations Protection Force in the Balkans, the US military had 
clear ideas about their objectives and of how the media might help meet 
them. The General commanding the American sector in Bosnia, William 
L. Nash, had three objectives in respect to dealing with the media: to gain 
public support in America for the conduct of the operation; to maintain 
the morale of the troops; and to use the media to promote compliance 
with the Dayton Accords among the former warring factions (Nash, 1998, 
pp. 132–33). To these ends, his military planners developed a system of 
‘embedded media’, purportedly a less restrictive version of the pooling 
system that operated in the Gulf War. Reporters (about 40 of them) 
would accompany troops on the ground for two weeks and get ‘a more 
nuanced picture of our activities by allowing them virtually free access 
to the soldiers and commanders.’ This of course required a revamp of the 
Joint Information Bureau system to ensure tighter coordination between 
all levels of command and avoid embarrassing and unnecessary conflicts 
of interest (ibid, p. 132). 
A significant component of the Nash approach, one not seen in the 
Gulf War, was the idea of allowing journalists to be present with the 
troops on the ground, which would demonstrate the ‘transparency of 
our operations and the firmness of our purpose.’ Offering the example of 
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Linda Patillo, of ABC News, who witnessed a confrontation between a 
US Army Colonel and a Bosnian Serb Commander in the Spring of 1996, 
Nash was delighted with the public relations derived from the story that 
Patillo sent back. He said that it portrayed,
...a ‘real life situation’ in which armed conflict could have broken out at 
any minute. [It] showed the preparedness of [our] forces, their resolve 
to do their duty, and the colonel’s...professionalism and calm nature 
in the execution of his duty. What a great story to show the American 
people! (ibid, p. 133)
Nash concludes that,
it is essential that the military and the media engage before they 
need to do so. It is something that requires a break from traditional 
thinking and a recognition that good policy and good execution 
usually result in good stories...Don’t sweat the spin. Work the issues 
wisely. (ibid, p. 135) 
Nash does not explain how this new approach would fit into a system 
of information management – censorship and propaganda – but the 
potential was certainly implied and it was to be tried and tested in 
earnest during the US military’s next major operations, in Afghanistan 
in 2001 but most especially in Iraq in 2003. As Pentagon public affairs 
official, Bryan Whitman, later admitted, much advance thought and 
discussion went into its implementation in the Iraq War. ‘We did public 
affairs planning like we would do for any other form of war planning’ he 
writes, ‘We war-gamed it’ (Whitman, 2004, p. 207). 
afghanistan and iraq
What the Pentagon ‘war-gamed’ was a refinement of the embed system 
tried out in Bosnia, combined with the daily media briefings familiar 
during the Gulf War. In their introduction to a volume of interviews 
with embedded reporters in Iraq, from the US and abroad, Katovsky and 
Carlson (2004) argue that the system promised journalists ‘the coziest 
lovefest with the military since World War II’ (p. viii). The procedures 
and ground rules that governed embedded reporting in Afghanistan and 
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Iraq were not far removed from those that applied to the media pools 
in the Gulf War but the challenge they presented to independence and 
objectivity seemed to be much more focused and controversial. The role 
of media briefings, where the military offer ‘context’ and ‘background’ 
to ongoing operations, is also critical here because when embedded 
reporters shrug their shoulders and admit that, of course they only offer 
part of the picture of war, they seem to forget the briefings and how those 
operate to fill in the blanks on the propaganda canvas. In the sections that 
follow, therefore, I argue that the twin system of embedded reporting and 
media briefing used in Afghanistan and Iraq was a propaganda triumph 
for the US and its coalition partners and a professional humiliation for 
the journalists who opted into it.
The embed system: procedures and ground rules
Section 2 of the US Department of Defence’s Public Affairs Guidance 
(PAG) states that embedded media personnel ‘will live, work and travel 
as part of the units with which they are embedded to facilitate maximum 
in-depth coverage of US forces in combat and related operations’ (See 
Appendix 5). In a similar vein, the British Ministry of Defence Green 
Book states that: 
The purpose of embedding correspondents with units and formation 
headquarters is to enable the media to gain a deeper understanding of 
the operation in which they are involved, particularly through access 
to personnel and commanders. They will be afforded all possible 
briefings and other facilities, including the opportunity to accompany 
British troops during war-fighting operations. Their individual 
requirements will be met wherever possible. In return, they are likely 
to be subject to some military orders and training, both for their own 
safety and that of the unit. (Paragraph 22; see Appendix 6)
These military orders, what the Pentagon’s PAG refers to as ‘ground 
rules’ (Section 4, paragraphs F and G) include categories of releasable 
and restricted information. Releasable information relates to approxi-
mations only of such things as unit strength and the types of ordnance 
at its disposal; ‘friendly casualty figures’; and participation in a given 
operation by allied forces. Information that is not releasable, because 
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it may ‘jeopardize operations or endanger lives’, relates to specifics, in 
other words ‘specific numbers’ regarding troops and units below corps 
level; geographical location of units; names of unit installations; future 
operations; and ‘photography showing level of security at military 
installations or encampments’. Breach of the ground rules of embedded 
reporting could result in loss of accreditation or, to put it in the rather more 
ominous language of Section 4 of the PAG, ‘the immediate termination 
of the embed and removal from the AOR [Area of Responsibility].’ It is 
interesting to note that the phrase used in the preceding Section 3 of the 
PAG (‘Procedures’) is ‘termination of the embed opportunity’. 
The PAG rules and procedures are expressed largely in functional, 
military jargon but the very last line in the last section of the guidelines, 
Section 7 dealing with ‘Miscellaneous/Coordinating Instructions’, hints 
at the hidden public relations/propaganda agenda behind the embed 
system: ‘Use of lipstick and helmet-mounted cameras on combat sorties 
is approved and encouraged to the greatest extent possible’ (Paragraph 
7C). The impulse to have the war depicted in soft focus was not a whim 
of the military planners. It fitted into a broader propaganda strategy, 
played out on TV networks at home in the US, to ‘Hollywoodize’ the 
personal experience of the ordinary US soldier in ‘war on terror’ wars 
like Afghanistan and Iraq.2
Reporters who declined to sign up to the embed system were 
accredited as ‘unilaterals’ to use the military jargon or, as they called 
themselves, ‘independent journalists’. Without the relative protection 
of a military unit, their job could be a good deal more difficult and 
dangerous. Some journalists and media personnel, like ITN’s Terry 
Lloyd and his interpreter Hussein Osman, lost their lives going it alone as 
independent reporters; others risked arrest and loss of accreditation. Luis 
Castro of Radiotelevision Portuguesa and his colleagues were arrested, 
detained and suffered physical abuse and intimidation at the hands of 
an American military unit for 2 days before being released and ordered 
out of Iraq. ‘My men are trained like dogs!’ the officer commanding told 
Castro by way of an explanation. ‘They know only to attack!’3
The embed system and objectivity 
The most obvious question to ask of a system that brings the journalist 
into such close encounters with the military is: how can he or she be really 
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objective or even impartial, especially when viewing an operation from 
the single vantage point of a military position or, as happened, when the 
military unit fired on and killed unarmed civilians, or carried out abuses 
against civilians? Alex Thomson (2010) readily admits that embedded 
reporting only produces a partial picture of the wider conflict: ‘Of course 
it is biased. And so are filming trips with the Taliban for that matter. It 
is the nature of the beast’ (p. 21). He does, however, concede that some 
journalists take their ‘embed opportunity’ too far:
You’re always embedded with people to a lesser or greater extent. The 
difficult thing is how far it lets your brain get embedded...and how far 
you become a [public relations officer] for what’s going on, which is 
essentially a game that the Pentagon and perhaps even more so the 
MoD clearly want people to play and it’s depressing the number of 
journalists who are willing to go along with that.4
As seen from this and the following examples, responses from journalists 
who reported as embeds from Afghanistan and Iraq were divided 
between those who protested loudly their integrity and objectivity and 
those who admitted openly that although they were only able to offer a 
partial view of the conflict it was either that or not bother reporting at all. 
There is no doubt that the intimacy and immediacy of the system 
blinded many journalists to its vices. Jim Axelrod, of CBS Evening News, 
confessed that covering the Iraq War as an embedded reporter was ‘the 
great, pure, authentic experience of my career. I suspect it may be the 
purest thing I’ll ever do. I was in the enchanted forest’ (Katovsky and 
Carlson, p.  23). Stuart Ramsey, who reported from Afghanistan as an 
embed for Sky News, thinks that ‘you can embed but you must remain 
honest and impartial. To do that, you must draw on your knowledge and 
deal with the rules of the embed’ (2010, p. 30). However, John Burns of 
the New York Times draws a distinction between neutrality and fairness 
when reporting as an embed: 
In this profession, we are not paid to be neutral. We are paid to be 
fair, and they are completely different things. [...] Yes, we should be 
absolutely ruthless as to fact. We should not approach a story with 
some sort of ideological template that we impose on it. We should let 
the facts lead us to conclusions, but if the conclusions seem clear then 
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we should not avoid those on the basis of an idea we are supposed 
to be neutral. Because if that were the case, they might as well hire a 
stenographer, and a stenographer would be a lot cheaper than I am. 
(Katovksy and Carlson, p. 161) 
One of the least discussed issues in this debate is the potential for 
the embedded journalist to participate in military operations. ‘I was 
a non-combatant’, said Chantal Escoto, ‘military reporter’ for the Leaf 
Chronicle in the US, ‘but I told [the troops] I’d be ready to pick up a gun 
if I had to’ (Katovsky and Carlson, 2004, p. 131). That would be in breach 
of the Geneva Conventions and although Section 4, Paragraph C of the 
Pentagon’s ground rules prohibits reporters from carrying firearms of 
their own, there were incidents in Iraq when journalists found themselves 
aiding troops in combat situations. The BBC’s Clive Myrie, attached to 
a British Army unit in Iraq, told a BBC documentary how he found 
himself passing flares from soldier to soldier during a firefight with Iraqi 
troops before stopping to think about what he was doing.5 
The military briefings 
As in the Gulf War, daily military briefings were a defining feature of 
media coverage of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq – and just as con-
troversial. These were designed by military planners to provide context 
for embedded reporting on the ground or, to put it in more critical 
terms, to shape the daily news agenda, restrict information and release 
disinformation in the interests of propaganda or Psyops, psychological 
operations (see, for example, Miller, 2004b; Paterson 2014). 
Conducted from a purpose-built media centre in Doha, Qatar, the 
so-called ‘Freedom Briefings’ offered the 700 journalists what the military 
described as ‘information’ but what a BBC documentary, ‘War Spin’, 
called ‘maximum imagery, minimum insight’.6 The official spokesmen, 
General Vincent Brooks for the US military and Group Captain Al 
Lockwood for the British Army, were the front men charged with 
providing the information and controlling the questions at the briefings 
as well as granting interviews. It was very clear from the start of the war 
that regardless of the coalition, the media briefings were being run by the 
American military for consumption on the major US TV networks such 
as CNN and NBC. Journalists with these networks were given the front 
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row seats and first call on asking questions. The media of the coalition 
partners, including Britain, were second and so on down the hierarchy to 
media organisations from non-aligned and neutral countries. Journalists 
with Middle East outlets such as Al Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV, were 
given short shrift by Brooks and other briefing officers whenever they 
asked awkward and difficult questions, which was most of the time. 
However, there were ground rules that applied to all the journalists who 
attended the briefings: questions were rationed out, follow-ups were 
discouraged and the briefers rarely provided full answers to questions.7 
Journalist and media critic, Michael Wolff, interrupted a briefing by 
Brooks to express the disquiet felt by many of the 700 journalists there 
about the amount and quality of information. ‘My final question after 
which I was not allowed to ask anymore questions’, he told the BBC, ‘was 
the question every reporter was asking, not just every day but literally 
every minute, which was why should we stay? What’s the value to us 
for what we learn at this million-dollar press centre?’ Brooks replied 
that it was Wolff ’s choice whether he wanted to be there or not. For the 
military’s part, ‘We want to provide information that’s truthful from 
the operational headquarters that is running this war’. Wolff was then 
barred from asking any further questions and, in a heated confronta-
tion afterwards with Pentagon advisor, Jim Wilkinson, he was advised to 
‘fuck off and go home.’8 Thinking back on his experience of the briefings, 
Wolff thought that, 
The profoundly interesting thing about Doha is that nothing happened 
[and that] even when you’re not getting information from the guy 
who has the information to give, you’re still getting information by the 
very fact that he’s not giving it to you. (Katovksy and Carlson, 2004, 
pp. 41–42)
On the British side, Al Lockwood and his colleagues worked off a list 
of daily official lines that usually accentuated the positive or worked 
to disarm difficult questions. They even posted in their office a list of 
topics to be avoided or handled with extreme care, what they termed 
‘poo traps’; these included the use of depleted uranium, bombing 
accuracy and civilian casualties. When difficult incidents could not be 
avoided, such as the Coalition bombing of a civilian area in Baghdad 
on 28 March 2003, that killed 36 innocent people, the strategy was to 
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first deny responsibility and then deflect the blame onto the enemy. In 
this instance, Brooks told reporters that it may have been a faulty Iraqi 
air defence missile or it could have been a deliberate act by the Iraqis 
to undermine public support for the Coalition internationally.9 Both 
possibilities were thought by experts to be highly unlikely but they were 
effective as spin to manage the controversy until the story slipped down 
the news agenda. 
However, the big stick of media control and manipulation in this 
operation was wielded behind the scenes by the ‘special advisers’, not least 
Jim Wilkinson for the US government and Home Office civil servant, 
Simon Wren, for 10 Downing Street. For most of the war, they worked 
well together to coordinate the official line from day to day, providing 
consistent background or off-the-record information. However, in the 
early stages the British were critical of how the American military was 
dealing with the non-American media and with their manipulation 
of stories such as the rescue of American soldier, Jessica Lynch, into 
something akin to a Hollywood action movie courtesy of Pentagon-
supplied footage. According to the BBC, Simon Wren went so far as to 
pen a confidential memo to Tony Blair, expressing his misgivings about 
the situation and the need to put it right.10 These tensions aside, the ‘good 
cop/bad cop’ approach to the briefings worked effectively to co-opt the 
media in the wider propaganda war, whether the media liked to admit 
it or not. 
The wider propaganda war
If the first casualty of war is truth, then the second is understanding. 
Oliver Boyd-Barrett (2004) goes beyond ground-level debates about 
the embed system to look at its long-term effect – a story of war that is 
almost exclusively that of the victors: 
Western reporting of the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) 
were stories told by Western correspondents reporting from Western 
positions speaking to (mainly approved) Western political and 
military sources, mainly about Western military personnel, strategies, 
successes and, less often, failures, and backed with comments from 
(often vetted) Western military ‘experts’. (pp. 29–30)
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The irony is that in their anxiety to filter out ‘unreliable’ or ‘unverifiable’ 
information from outside the system, journalists from the western, 
corporate media seemed blissfully unaware of their ‘dependence on 
government or military sources of their own side for...safe information, 
disinformation or lies’ (ibid, p. 32; emphasis in the original). For Vaughan 
Smith, this has far reaching consequences beyond professional and 
academic debates about ethics. ‘News management or spin’, he writes, 
‘creates cumulative damage to us all by undermining our trust in the 
institutions that engage in it and subverting the quality of our conduct 
more widely in society. We are paying for these wars with more than 
blood and treasure’ (2010, p. 47). 
Debates about the pros and cons of embedded reporting, therefore, 
should not hide the essential point of the system in the first place: the 
military’s need to control the media and co-opt them into the propaganda 
campaign driving the war effort in Afghanistan or Iraq. Only a few 
journalists seemed to be aware of this or at least admit it publicly. Jeremy 
Bowen, for example, writes that the ‘best way to get ahead in the media 
battle is to control access to the war [...] Winning the information war 
is no longer incidental; it is a top military priority’ (2006, pp. 111–12); 
while Oliver Burkeman describes the embed system as ‘an astounding 
PR success for the Pentagon’ (Allen and Zelizer, 2004, p. 6). 
Some of the academic literature also considers the implications of 
embedded reporting in the wider framework of military information 
management and propaganda (see, for example, Boyd-Barrett, 2004; 
Keeble, 2004; Miller 2004a & 2004b; Paterson, 2014; Tumber and Palmer, 
2004); and even the dark arts of psychological operations (Miller 2004b 
and Paterson, 2014). For example, Chris Paterson reveals that during 
the 1990s, CNN and National Public Radio (NPR) in the US offered 
internships to PsyOps officers, who used them not merely to observe 
and get to know the media better as a public relations exercise ahead 
of a future conflict, but to learn how to disrupt news flows to strategic 
advantage; a determinedly more subversive objective (2014, pp. 36–37). 
Once again, the system of control, censorship and propaganda that 
produced such a stunning success for the military in Iraq marked yet 
another milestone in the evolutionary road from the days of the Vietnam 
Syndrome and open hostility to the presence of the media in the war 
zone. To put this in some perspective, the chapter concludes with a look 
at NATO’s media operation during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, when the 
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mechanisms of control and spin went wrong in the first phase of the 
campaign because of institutional and political division. 
bombing serbia, 199911
The military intervention in the Kosovo conflict of 1999, when Serbia was 
seen to be carrying out a policy of ethnic cleansing as a means of denying 
Kosovan independence, was largely led by NATO from its headquarters 
in Brussels. In the early stages of the operation, involving air strikes 
against the Serbian military and political infrastructure, NATO planes 
committed up to thirteen so-called ‘blunders’. These were accidental 
bombings of civilians, including a Serbian passenger train on 12 April 
and a convoy of Albanian refugees heading out of Kosovo to Albania 
two days later on 14 April. NATO’s unconvincing presentation of these 
incidents, particularly the bombing of the refugee convoy, opened up an 
information vacuum and offered spaces in prime time television news 
where, away from the briefing rooms, journalists could ask awkward 
questions about what they were being told. 
Much of the uncertainty in the immediate wake of the bombing lay 
in the fact that NATO in Brussels was taking its cue from the Pentagon 
in Washington, where NATO Commander Wesley Clarke briefed 
aggressively against the Serbs only to retract it when some facts began 
to emerge. The organisation took another five days to finally present a 
definitive account of the circumstances surrounding the convoy attack 
and during that time, and quite independently of the Brussels media 
pool, news presenters and correspondents assessed the contradictory 
evidence with the sort of scepticism and open-mindedness seriously 
lacking during the Gulf War in 1991 and in Operation Desert Fox, the 
bombing of Iraq in 1998. ‘The question remains’, said a Channel Four 
News reporter, ‘what were NATO planes doing in the area and why did 
they decide to attack these convoys, which included tractors and cars?’ 
(14 April 1999). Later that evening, BBC Newsnight’s probe opened 
with this cautionary gambit: ‘You won’t find any starker examples of Dr 
Johnson’s adage that truth is the first casualty of war than today’s deaths in 
Kosovo’ (emphasis added). Correspondent, James Robbins, considered 
NATO’s case but cautioned that ‘NATO has missed military targets and 
hit civilians before and tonight in Brussels the Alliance spokesman, 
Jamie Shea, was much more guarded in his response’ (emphasis added). 
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The next day, 15 April, NATO admitted that in fact there had been two 
vehicle convoys hit in different locations in the Djackovice area and that 
one of those, a refugee convoy may have been hit by NATO planes. The 
NATO line was that if this was the case it was regrettable but that the 
bomb was dropped ‘in good faith’. The ironic Guardian headline the next 
morning quoted the military briefer: ‘When the pilot attacked, they were 
military vehicles. If they turned out to be tractors, that is a different issue’ 
(16 April 1999). However, the trickle of information and lack of hard 
evidence only served to sow more confusion among the news media 
about what exactly happened and what NATO was doing. As BBC news 
anchor, Anna Ford, remarked: ‘There’s still a lot of information that 
doesn’t add up here. It sounds rather fishy!’ According to her correspon-
dent in Serbia the blunder and its fall out constituted ‘a serious blow to 
NATO. Its credibility and its effectiveness are being questioned’ (18.00, 
15 April 1999). Channel Four News reported that ‘NATO is on the back 
foot tonight’ and that ‘NATO’s line has changed repeatedly.’ While ‘the 
Serbs have allowed foreign cameras rare access to otherwise dark corners 
of Kosovo...NATO has so far chosen not to show military video of exactly 
what happened during its attack’ (15 April 1999). So, why the absence 
of video evidence? That would surely vindicate NATO’s claims that the 
Serbs bombed the convoys among other civilian targets in the area and 
that NATO planes only targeted and hit military vehicles and positions? 
In an interview on Channel Four News, James Foley, spokesman for the 
US State Department, accused the western media of not demanding 
access from the Serbs to Kosovo and the ‘horrific images of the poor 
victims’. The news anchor Jon Snow responded: ‘Well you see the thing 
which is perplexing us is that the western alliance is not giving western 
media access to images either’ in spite of its much vaunted and sophisti-
cated aerial surveillance technologies (15 April 1999; emphasis added). 
Midway through the operation, in May, the Spanish newspaper. El 
Mundo, published what was purported to be an internal NATO report 
lamenting the poor state of NATO battle readiness when it came to 
launching its media and public relations campaign (Goff, 2000, p. 18). 
Shea claimed that the document was ‘not without value’ but nonetheless 
denied it was official or that its unauthorised release had anything to 
do with him or anyone in his office. He did however concede that there 
were problems. He explained, for example, that just as the operation got 
underway he had to send half his staff to Washington for NATO’s 50th 
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anniversary summit and so was ‘really flying by the seat of my pants for 
the first four or six weeks’. The lesson, he said, was ‘that we have to have a 
big [media] organisation, even if we don’t need it, from day one. It’s better 
to have it and not need it than not have it and be found wanting’.12 NATO’s 
press relations budget for the Serbia/Kosovo operation was between 50 
and 60 million Belgian francs, at the very most about GB£882,252. Shea 
revealed that rather than bidding for a supplementary public relations 
budget he ‘raided the existing budget.’ Most of the money went towards 
equipping a centre adequate to the needs of the international media 
presence in Brussels for the duration of the air campaign. This was what 
he had been ‘begging for years for [and] which had suddenly become 
instantaneously and miraculously available during the air operation. So 
necessity was the mother of procurement if not invention.’13 
There was suspicion in some quarters that the NATO press office 
in Brussels laboured too much under the weight of media expectation 
in the 24-hour news cycle, a danger long recognised in other official 
quarters and by many journalists. As far back as 1996, William Perry, 
then US Secretary of Defense, spoke in the abstract about the pressure 
for the instant response to media queries: 
The pressure...is to say something... . If you simply say, ‘I don’t know 
what the facts are. We’re going to have to take a couple of days to find 
out,’ that’s not very satisfying. Therefore the continual pressure is, 
‘Well, what do you think it is, what do you believe has happened? If 
that’s happened what do you think you ought to do?’ You can resist 
those but you resist them with great difficulty. (1996, p. 125) 
And looking back at the Kosovo conflict, Channel Four News corre-
spondent, Alex Thomson, referred to ‘a kind of culture of information 
intimidation’ whereby NATO was ‘caught up in this desperate need to 
furnish this media beast with information at top speed’. He suggested 
that, ‘They don’t have to give daily briefings if they don’t want to – give a 
weekly briefing! I mean they make the rules!’14 Jake Lynch of Sky News 
was aware of ‘a lot of acrimony behind the scenes [due to] the fact that 
Jamie Shea was not given the information’ about the exact circum-
stances of the convoy bombing. Yet even at that, and this is from a purely 
NATO perspective, Shea ‘inadvertently gave us more information than 
he should have done’.15 Shea saw it differently. Far from being denied 
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information by the Pentagon at such a crucial juncture, he was the one 
who held it up in the first instance because he thought it inadequate and 
in the long run detrimental to NATO credibility:
Either we put all the facts on the table and say everything we know and 
answer all the questions and tell the journalists that we have come clean 
or we don’t say anything. But I didn’t want this [situation] of giving 
one explanation on Day One and giving an alternative explanation on 
Day Two and looking silly. Partial explanations are often worse than 
nothing.16
He also revealed that Pentagon spokesman, Ken Bacon, stepped in 
behind him and added some punch to his position: 
I’m very grateful to Ken who said, ‘Look, we’ve made this commitment 
to journalists to own up even if it is going to be embarrassing to us 
and we can’t renege on that’. He used a phrase, which I’ve used often 
myself: ‘If we are not honest in admitting our failures, they won’t 
believe us when we claim successes.’17 
The military, said Shea, were concerned with getting on with the 
campaign, not expending time and resources to an investigation for the 
media:
But eventually...I think we got the message through that this was so 
important in terms of NATO’s public image and credibility, it was as 
important explaining this as getting on with fighting the conflict itself. 
And towards the end that was understood. The trouble is that in any 
organisation you often need a failure to turn a situation around...And 
it woke people up to the reality of conflict...that this was a real conflict 
with real consequences and that therefore we had to adjust.18
The adjustment came during the PR crisis over the refugee convoy 
bombing. Alistair Campbell, press secretary to Prime Minister Blair, 
stepped in to urge a revamp of NATO’s PR operation, an intervention 
Shea thought was decisive. ‘There was a blockage there’, he admitted, ‘and 
sometimes in organisations you need people with clout to overcome those 
blockages. When prime ministers thump the tub they get things done 
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much faster than when Jamie P. Shea, the NATO spokesman, thumps the 
tub’.19 Any intervention by Campbell into controversial issues or events 
was bound to become a story in itself in the British media. Indeed, Jake 
Lynch noted that Campbell’s influence extended much further and 
deeper than simply supporting Shea’s efforts with human and material 
resources. It shaped the whole presentation of information and material, 
which was to ‘sort of ration out small nuggets of information and wrap 
around that as much material as you can in order to project the kind of 
story you want to project’. In other words, ‘It had been very effectively 
“New Labourised” in that they thought stories. They decided from day 
one to try and control the agenda and did a reasonable job of it’.20
It is true that a good majority of British and American journalists 
accepted the fundamental rationale for bombing Serbia and Kosovo 
in spite of the rather dubious legal grounds on which the bombing 
campaign was carried out. There was a liberal, humanitarian consensus 
abroad that squeezed out radical dissent (Chandler, 2000; Chomsky, 
1999). It was also the case that most journalists at the briefings were 
too willing to be fed information and digest it as transparent accounts 
of events on the ground rather than as selective and self-serving pre-
sentations of those events. Mark Laity, however, who left his job with 
the BBC after the Kosovo conflict to work as a media adviser at NATO, 
took a clear and unapologetic stance on the dependence of journalists 
on military sources, the briefings and the information they released. ‘If 
you don’t trust the military’, he said, ‘and they’re the ones dropping the 
bombs, who are you going to trust? Who are you going to talk to? What 
you want to do is you want to talk to the operators, the players, the doers, 
that’s NATO. You don’t go and speak to a bloody academic do you?’ He 
rejected the criticisms of his performance during the briefings and on 
air, pointing out that he was one of the few journalists who badgered the 
briefers about the circumstances of the convoy incident – about whether 
there was not one but actually two separate attacks on two separate 
convoys. ‘So in a sense it was me who tied them up into knots’, he argued, 
‘not the hostile journalists who were committed. It was the uncommitted 
journalists who tied them up into knots by asking them knowledge-
able questions and in fact it was the ones who actually knew what they 
were talking about that tied them up into knots, not the ones who were 
making tendentious political points’. He insisted that:
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The challenge for journalists is not to get all worked up because 
somebody has spun you; the challenge is to spot the spin and take 
it out. And given the choice between no information which is to a 
degree what we were getting earlier on and spun information what 
we were getting later, give me spun information every time [...] I’ve 
got the facts and in there there’s layers and layers of priorities and 
prejudices and I’ve got to take them apart and say that’s the key fact. 
And if I don’t spot it then more fool me and good luck to them. It’s a 
game. So spun information: they spun a lot but to my way of thinking 
they did not lie in between. They got things wrong but they were not 
deliberately lying. Sure, individuals might have but corporately I do 
not believe NATO were.21 
One of the ‘committed’ journalists Laity had in mind here was Robert 
Fisk whose dismissal of Laity and most of his colleagues at the NATO 
briefings was withering: ‘Most of [them] were sheep.  Baaaa Baaaaa! 
That’s all it was’.22 Jamie Shea was, perhaps not surprisingly, compli-
mentary of the journalists in the NATO media pool whom he described 
as his ‘customers’ and defended them against critics such as Fisk:
[He] accuses the press at NATO of slavishly following the Shea line 
whereas in reverse the charge I would put to him is that in order to 
distance himself from that he’s totally dismissive of everything we 
did. It’s an opposite form of extremism. I’ve got more time for a lot of 
[journalists] who were basically in the middle, that listened to us but 
came to their own balanced, professional judgement on things. But 
Fisk seems to have an excess of moral perfectionism.23
This was an extraordinary slight on a journalist of such experience and 
knowledge but typical of the attacks made against him when he showed 
up on one occasion at the briefings to ask questions about the real extent 
of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Kosovo; and, more specifically, the relationship 
between NATO bombing and the exodus of Kosovar-Albanians across 
the border into Albania. His attack on the majority of journalists present 
that day no doubt fed their resentment and ill-feeling but the crux for 
him was his integrity as a journalist and he would not see his reporting 
of Kosovo as ‘extremist’ or as a crusade for ‘moral perfectionism’. He 
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suggested, instead, that insults and intimidation from ‘the bad guys’ is 
the price the good journalist has to pay for telling the truth:
[If] you cannot write with passion, if you cannot say, ‘This was a 
civilian target, NATO said it was military, it is not, it is a hospital, I’ve 
been there, I’ve seen it’, etcetera. If you can’t do that, you go home. 
There’s no point in being there. And if the price of that is to be abused 
by NATO or whatever then that’s the price you have to pay. Then...
you have to take on the bad guys, I’m afraid. You have to do it! If these 
people are going to intimidate you into writing like Reuters, which is 
their intention, then you must leave your job! You’re finished!24
And while ‘uncommitted’ and ‘knowledgeable’ journalists such as Mark 
Laity asked questions when NATO was on the back foot about the detail 
and circumstances of the refugee convoy incident, they were content to 
sit back and graze after the organisation got its act together and, as Jake 
Lynch puts it, got ‘New Labourised’. Jamie Shea takes this as a compliment 
to the way in which NATO recovered the public relations initiative in its 
presentation of the bombing of Serbia:
I’ll never forget one of my final briefings...at the end of May when we 
had another one of these incidents, number 13, when Nato struck a 
block of flats in a little town on the Montenegran border. [...] I didn’t 
wait for journalists to ask me for the information, I came straight out 
with it because I had all the information without having to wait for 
five days and no journalists asked me a question, not one! Whereas a 
couple of months earlier Djakovice had become the single dominant 
issue. It was almost by that time treated as what the French call a fait 
divert, a passing little story of no great significance. We made more of 
it than the press did at the end. It was almost a reversal of roles.25
The majority of journalists present at the briefings may have cringed to 
hear Shea say that and he very definitely got the measure of them in 
the latter stages of the media operation. And despite the initial tensions 
between the Pentagon and NATO, the late Richard Holbrooke, driver 
of the Dayton Accords in the Balkans, described American media 
coverage of Kosovo as ‘extraordinary and exemplary’ (Palm Beach Post, 
9 May 1999).26 
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Richard Keeble (1999) and Philip Hammond (1999, 2000) were very 
critical of British media reporting of NATO’s operation in Serbia and 
Kosovo. Hammond argued that the coverage was ‘highly conformist’ 
(1999, p.  63); and that ‘one casualty of the Kosovo war was British 
journalism, although some sources maintain it was already long dead. In 
its place we have propaganda’ (ibid, p. 67). Edward Herman and David 
Petersen (2000) have cast a similar, critical eye on the role of the US 
media, particularly CNN, in actively selling the conflict to the American 
public. In the first edition of this book and elsewhere I argued that in the 
case of the British news media at any rate, there was real media coun-
terweight to NATO spin; not from the media pool in Brussels but from 
some of the journalists on the ground in Kosovo and more especially in 
the news rooms back in London. Indeed, I took issue with Keeble and 
Hammond’s withering assessment and argued that while TV journalism 
in Britain might have been ailing, it certainly was not dead (McLaughlin, 
2002a, pp. 121–22; see also McLaughlin 2002b). However, I would revise 
my argument here and suggest that the skeptical reporting in evidence 
during the Kosovo crisis was more a result of a poorly planned, ad hoc 
approach to media management on NATO’s part. When considered in 
the context of the history of the relationship between the war correspon-
dent and the military, from Crimea to Iraq, resistance to spin control 
during the crisis was at the very most anomalous rather than indicative 
of a new, critical disposition among the mainstream media.
concluding remarks
What the historical review in this section of the book tells us is how 
military thinking about the management and control of the media at 
wartime has evolved since the Crimean war. From an instinct to simply 
censor journalists and deny them access to the warzone, western 
militaries have learned over a century and a half of conflict that incorpo-
rating reporters into the war effort, relying on their professionalism and 
patriotism, and giving them the right information and the right pictures 
(on military terms of course) is a much more effective form of control 
than an attitude of outright hostility. And it is effective precisely because 
of the media’s readiness in every instance to conform, to accept the 
restrictions and only ask questions, if at all, when it is too late. The system 
of embedded reporting and tightly controlled briefings used in the Iraq 
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War of 2003 marked a high point for the military and a low point for the 
war correspondent. Only the military appear to be learning lessons of 
the last conflict with their approach to media management constantly 
re-evaluated and revised. Britain’s Ministry of Defence happily admits 
that its Green Book (2013) ‘is the result of continuing dialogue between 
the MoD and media organisations and representatives and takes account 
of past and present operations.’ Those organisations and representatives 
include the BBC, ITN, SKY News, the Press Association, the Newspaper 
Society and the National Union of Journalists. Yet after every major war 
since Crimea, journalists have spent considerable column inches and air 
time agonising over the way in which they were cowed and controlled 
by the military and the implications of this for freedom of the press 
and democracy: too late then of course to put things right and take a 
principled stand. Some observers may suggest that the reluctance to 
challenge the system is simply a matter of pragmatism on the part of 
the media, a conscious deal with the devil in order to get the story and 
the pictures of war as fast and as efficiently as possible. But for others 
it is nothing less than co-option into the propaganda war and it works 
because it is ideologically inscribed into the professional assumptions of 
the majority of embedded war reporters. To borrow from Slavoj Zizek 
(2012), their loud protests that they report objectively, independently 
and freely masks the very absence of freedom in the system. 
This brings us to the next part of this book and another important 
factor that we need to assess when considering the role of the war cor-
respondent today: the ideological frameworks that they use to explain 
international conflict. Chapter 8 looks at the Cold War framework 
that had its origins not in the post-Second World War era as dominant 
histories suggest but in the Russian revolution of 1917 and persisted 
as a dominant interpretation up until 1991, with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Chapter 9 goes on to propose that the reporting of 9/11 
and America’s declared ‘war on terror’, as well as, most recently, the 
increasingly hostile reporting of Vladimir Putin’s Russia, represents not 
so much a paradigm shift as a paradigm repair. It is back to the Cold War, 
the most successful system of thought control and political repression in 
the name of freedom since the hegemony of the Roman Empire. 
Part III





Reporting the Cold War  
and the New World Order
Propaganda is to a democracy what the bludgeon is to a totalitarian 
state. 
Noam Chomsky1
From the Roman empires of ancient history to the European empires 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, through to the American 
and Soviet empires of the twentieth century, propaganda has been key 
to the manipulation of domestic public opinion and behaviour. The 
construction of the virtuous self and the projection of the enemy image, 
an abject other by which the virtuous self can be measured and amplified, 
is of course an ideological project that finds its origins in the institutions 
of the state; but its validation and its endless reproduction depend on a 
nexus of social and cultural institutions that include family, education, 
religion and the media – what Louis Althusser (1971) has described as 
‘ideological state apparatuses’. So far, this book has examined how the 
war correspondent as individual has negotiated his or her way around 
the vagaries of professional practice (risk, the requirements of objectivity, 
the speed and impact of media technologies) and institutional control 
(military censorship) to report modern warfare. This final section focuses 
on the role the war correspondent might play in the reproduction of 
dominant or pervasive propaganda frameworks, particularly where those 
amplify a set of deeply ingrained cultural assumptions and values that 
may seem entirely natural and given. This chapter examines the media’s 
role in sustaining the Cold War framework of the twentieth century and 
the crisis they faced when that framework appeared to collapse with the 
East European Revolutions (1989) and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(1991). The next chapter will go on to explore the rhetoric of the war on 
terror that followed the terrorist attacks on America in 2001, 9/11, and 
the war correspondent
162
the growing western hostility towards Russia, and ask if they mark not 
a replacement of the Cold War framework but its gradual repair as an 
ideological paradigm for explaining international conflict. 
the cold war and the enemy image 
The certainty for journalism throughout the Cold war was the bipolar 
world of East and West, Communism and capitalism, because it provided 
a framework of interpretation – a way of seeing the world and of reporting 
international relations – that conformed to predictable patterns and 
narrative outcomes. Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of ‘master patterns’ is useful 
here, by which he means ‘an infinite number of individual patterns 
directly applicable to specific situations’ (1971, p.  192). The problem, 
Bourdieu argues, is that while such master patterns help us to sustain 
thought, they may also take the place of thought. While they should 
help us to master reality with minimum effort, ‘they may also encourage 
those who rely on them not to bother to refer to reality’ at all (ibid.). 
This is a crucial point when we come to consider the role of the western 
media during the Cold War. They constructed their Cold War imagery 
both through and within one such ‘master pattern’ or interpretative 
framework. If we accept this, we have to make a distinction between 
the actual framework, the ‘deep structures’ of thought and action, and 
the instrumental ‘enemy image’ which served to rationalise it. It would 
be wrong to argue that they are one and the same. The Cold War was 
characterised by alternating periods of hostility and détente and these 
determined the functional utility of the enemy image. But periods of 
détente did not signify crisis in the fundamental ideological framework. 
That remained constant throughout the conflict.
The western news media presented the Cold war as a standoff between 
two superpowers with sole responsibility for danger or trouble lying 
squarely with the Soviet Union, ‘the evil empire’. As George Gerbner 
argues, the enemy image, ‘has deep institutional sources and broad 
social consequences. It projects the fears of a system by dramatising 
and exaggerating the dangers that seem to lurk around every corner. It 
works to unify its subjects and mobilises them for action’ (1991, p. 31). 
At its worst, the framework restricted thought and action. It was as much 
part of what Edward Thompson (1982) called ‘the deep structure of the 
Cold War’ as the nuclear arms race, because it helped dehumanise the 
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‘other side’ out of existence. The sources of the Cold War enemy image 
are rooted in the West’s response to the October Revolution in 1917. 
Walter Lippman and Charles Mertz carried out a content analysis of 
The New York Times’ coverage of the revolution and found it hostile and 
propagandist. For The New York Times, they wrote, the Bolsheviks were 
‘both cadaver and world-wide menace’ (Chomsky, 1989, p.  26). Most 
journalists, and their newspapers, were ignorant of the causes and cir-
cumstances of the revolution and revolutionary politics, and they failed 
to report developments with any depth of analysis or insight; some 
were compromised by their involvement in the subversive activities 
of western intelligence agencies. Whilst the majority of European and 
American newspapers were reporting, mostly from outside Russia, that 
the Bolsheviks were doomed to fail and were without popular support, 
Arthur Ransome of the London Daily News wrote that: ‘It is folly to deny 
the actual fact that the Bolsheviks do hold a majority of the politically 
active population’ (Knightley, 2004, p. 133). The New York Times was the 
worst offender. In a period of two years following the October revolution, 
the paper reported four times that Lenin and Trotsky had made plans 
to flee Russia, three times that they had actually fled the country; three 
times that Lenin had been imprisoned; once that he was about to retire; 
and once that he had been assassinated (ibid.).
The Revolution’s first great test was the allied intervention 1918, 
known in mainstream, western historiography as the Russian Civil War. 
Western reporting of the intervention was heavily censored and only 
reports sympathetic to its aims were allowed. Most dispatches, whether 
about Bolshevik thinking and strategy, or the course of the intervention, 
relied on sources close to western governments or exiled Russian 
groups hostile to the revolution. Arthur Ransome eventually disowned 
such sources, especially the British secret services, to report on a much 
more objective level that the allied attitude to the revolution was wrong 
and that it only bred Bolshevik suspicions about the real intention of 
the allies (ibid., p. 135). With few exceptions, coverage relied on anti-
Bolshevik hysteria based on rumours and black propaganda. Reporting 
fell into the same pattern of falsehood and exaggeration that emerged 
in coverage of the First World War and the Russian Revolution. Defeats 
of the western alliance were reported as victories while low morale and 
poor discipline in the allied armies were not reported at all. The Red 
Army on the other hand was reported to be near collapse and defeat 
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even as it was in fact rolling back the allied intervention (ibid., p. 142). 
Only a few journalists such as the radical American reporter, John Reed, 
and Morgan Philips Price of the Manchester Guardian, distinguished 
themselves with comprehensive and intelligent coverage. Philips Price 
reported events at the centre of Bolshevik power, providing insights into 
how the Russian revolution was faring in face of the western intervention. 
His reports were structured not around rumour and propaganda but 
first hand observations and interviews with the leadership (ibid., p. 139). 
Both journalists served their readers with first hand, immediate and 
non-judgemental accounts of a revolution in the making (see Philips 
Price, 1997; Reed, 1926). 
The enemy image extended beyond factual media forms. Popular 
fiction in books, on television and in the cinema promoted images of 
the superpowers in simplistic binary opposition of good and evil: Uncle 
Sam versus Ivan the Terrible, the Eagle versus the Bear (an image used 
in a Pentagon video on the arms race), the Promised Land versus the 
Evil Empire. In the Soviet Union the images were reversed. The West 
represented the kind of economic and social inequalities that the 
Revolution sought to overthrow. The shortcomings of the Revolution 
were minimised with persistent reference to capitalist exploitation and 
western imperialism. Throughout the New Cold War of the 1980s, each 
side was commonly depicted peering at the other over the Berlin Wall 
with fear and suspicion (McNair, 1988; Dennis et al., 1991). While such 
portrayals were prevalent throughout the Cold War, they had a universal 
utility that could be applied to any external threat for the containment 
of the domestic populace (Chomsky, 1989, p. 28; see also Gitlin, 1980; 
Parenti, 1993). 
The most negative and virulent images prevailed over relatively short 
periods of crisis in US–Russian/Soviet relations. A longer, historical 
perspective on how each side defined the other points to a more dynamic 
process of political and cultural conflict and struggle on all fronts of 
the Cold War. While the New Cold War saw the picture at its blackest 
extreme, other periods of détente witnessed mixed images and shifting 
perceptions. The propaganda was successful in concealing a history of 
more ‘normalised’ relations between the US and Russia as competing 
‘great powers’, periods when they engaged in much more open economic, 
political and cultural exchange. Everette Dennis et al. (1991) work within 
a broad historical and comparative framework to examine changes in 
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how the US and Russia/Soviet Union saw each other from the nineteenth 
century. For example, while condemning the inequalities of American 
capitalism, Leninist journalism would also praise its productive forces, its 
technological advances and its great engineering feats (Zassoursky, 1991; 
Mickiewicz, 1991). Among the US media, images of stupid and violent 
Russians would mix with stories of Soviet–American cooperation and 
friendship, especially during the Second World War when the alliance 
with the Soviet Union was so crucial (Gerbner, 1991; Lukosiunas, 1991; 
Richter, 1991; Zassoursky, 1991). The next section shows how the enemy 
image informed media coverage of the most crucial and persistent theme 
of the Cold War: arms control and the nuclear debate.
Reporting nuclear disarmament and the peace movement
Several research studies show how it was possible to understand the 
nuclear debate in the media on a number of levels: as a propaganda 
battle between the superpowers (Glasgow University Media Group, 
1985; McNair, 1988; Hallin and Mancini, 1989), or between Conser-
vatives and Labour in the 1983 and 1987 general elections in Britain 
(McNair, 1988). We can also look at the contribution to the debate from 
the peace movement and how it was reported within the broad cold 
war propaganda framework (Aubrey et al., 1982; Glasgow University 
Media Group, 1985; McNair, 1988). To measure the parameters of the 
framework, it might be useful first to offer an example of how the nuclear 
debate was not reported. 
At the height of the New Cold War and the anti-Cruise missile demon-
strations in the West, the New Left Review published Exterminism and 
Cold War. Edited by historian Edward Thompson (1982), this interna-
tional collection of essays set out a socialist critique of the nuclear arms 
race and addressed the problem from four points of enquiry. 
1. ‘the social nature and basis of [...] “exterminism” – the apparent 
drive of industrial civilisation towards its own self-destruction in the 
post-war arms race’; 
2. ‘the respective roles and responsibilities of the two (superpowers)’;
3. ‘the relative importance of the distinct major theatres of the Cold 
War – the Far East, Europe, and the Third World’;
the war correspondent
166
4. and ‘the whole nexus of problems posed by the quest for a realistic 
way out of the looming dangers of “Exterminism and Cold War”’ 
(p. xi)
The mainstream media, by contrast, offered the narrowest possible 
interpretation. They reported that the nuclear weapon was a defensive 
deterrent against the Soviet threat of invasion, domination, or even 
nuclear annihilation. Andrew Wilson, defence correspondent with the 
Observer, noted the culture of fascination with nuclear weapons and 
weapons technology among defence correspondents in general. As with 
all lobby correspondents, journalists on the defence beat came into 
regular contact with officials in the ‘defence community’ and in many 
instances forged lasting friendships. They became immersed in a defence 
culture that, as Wilson argues, ‘provided the essential framework within 
which to pursue peace-time planning for operations involving the death 
of millions’ (1982, p. 37). 
Coverage of the nuclear debate was underwritten by strict adherence 
to the rules of a crude numbers game (Glasgow University Media Group, 
1985; McNair, 1988). The debate became so abstract and quantitative 
that it distracted from an underlying, qualitative concept of ‘first use’ or 
the ‘preemptive strike’. This assumed that a limited nuclear war could 
be fought and won by such ‘overwhelming force’ that the enemy would 
never have a chance to retaliate. As long as the public understood that 
the goal of arms control was to ensure ‘nuclear parity’ between East and 
West – each side having a rough equivalence of nuclear weapons – they 
would not think too much about what the weapons were designed for or 
about the capability of a particular missile over and above its counterpart 
on the other side. Unless of course there was an alternative source of 
information and argument, such as the peace movement. 
The peace movement in Britain was a broad umbrella grouping of 
intellectuals, politicians, the Greenham Common women, and the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), most of whom were 
labelled as ‘extremist’ or ‘unpatriotic’. Other religious or establishment 
figures were labelled ‘naive’ and ‘idealistic’, or ‘hysterical’ and ‘mad’ 
(Sabey, 1982, p. 55). A television news reporter described them as ‘at best 
misguided, at worst dangerous and subversive’ (McNair, 1988, p. 178). 
Ministry of Defence propaganda linked the peace movement to the 
extreme left and claimed that the CND was directly funded by the Soviet 
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Union with the aim of undermining western security policy. Indeed, to 
express any kind of opposition and dissent against the ‘nuclear deterrent’ 
was to go against the interests of ‘national security’. For example, in order 
to discredit a big disarmament protest in October 1981, sections of the 
media framed it as a domestic security threat in that it would tie up 
scarce police resources and leave Britain vulnerable to attack not from 
the Soviet Union but the Irish Republican Army (IRA). As a News of 
the World columnist complained: ‘ at a time when the risk of IRA attack 
is high, why allow people like the CND to hold a massive demonstra-
tion? Yesterday’s march tied up more than 1,000 policemen. No wonder 
the bombers keep getting away with it’. The Sunday Telegraph reported 
that, ‘Thousands of police, including helicopter patrols, kept watch 
amid fears that the demonstration could provide cover for another IRA 
bomb outrage’ (Sabey, 1982, p. 60). Similar labeling was applied to the 
much more narrowly based, middle-class, middle-aged nuclear freeze 
movement in the USA (Entman and Rojecki, 1993; Gitlin, 1980).
Another significant feature of coverage at this time was the prevailing 
structures of access in the media. These were such that voices supporting 
the official view were able to dominate media coverage and define the 
issues from their perspective. Although alternative viewpoints did filter 
through, these were usually framed negatively. Whereas spokesper-
sons for the official perspective were interviewed at length and without 
serious inquiry, representatives of the peace movement were subjected to 
close scrutiny and repeated interruptions.
Official propaganda also extended to public relations stunts by 
senior politicians which attracted significant media coverage (Glasgow 
University Media Group, 1985; McNair, 1988) One notable example 
was Easter 1983 when the then Secretary of Defence Michael Heseltine 
staged a visit to the Berlin Wall as peace marches took place all over 
Britain. The intent was clear: to draw a counterpoint between the West’s 
defence of freedom and the peace movement’s attempt to undermine 
the means of maintaining that defence, the nuclear deterrent. At around 
the same period, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared that the 
women holding hands around the military base in Greenham Common 
would be far better off holding hands around the Berlin Wall. McNair 
points to another tactic that the British government adopted with 
considerable success: that was to simply ignore the peace movement in 
the hope that the media would lose interest. A demonstration in 1984, 
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against the Trident nuclear submarine system at Barrow-in-Furness, 
was attended by 20,000 people yet ITN only gave it a summary item 
lasting a few seconds; the BBC did not report it all (1988, p. 179). The 
Glasgow University Media Group concluded that the implicit, damning 
assumption underpinning news coverage of the peace movement was, ‘It 
won’t change anything’ (Glasgow University Media Group, 1985, p. 234).
The next section examines what happened from 1985 when Mikhail 
Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union, heralding a new era of 
perestroika and glasnost, a programme of economic and social reform 
that began to impact upon the image of the enemy. The ‘enemy’ began to 
influence and shape its image to its own advantage by using western-style 
news management strategies such as timing stories for maximum media 
exposure or creating ‘exclusive’ or ‘controversial’ media events.
The impact of glasnost and perestroika on the enemy image
Perestroika, or ‘reconstruction’, referred to the idea that the problems 
with the Soviet economy, the gap for example between supply and 
demand, could only be solved by a radical rethink of economic policy. 
Glasnost, or ‘openness’, refers to a new period of liberalism in Soviet life 
and culture in which criticism and debate were allowed as long as they 
were constructive, and as long as people suggested better alternatives for 
making the revolution work for the betterment of all the people. Glasnost 
was the means by which the public could be mobilised into supporting 
the programme of reforms proposed under perestroika, and projecting 
a more positive image to the world was a vital part of the task. Not least 
among these changes was the transformation of the Soviet leader from Evil 
Emperor to Nice Guy. In the image-conscious West, Mikhail Gorbachev 
achieved ‘superstar’ status. Compared to his predecessors, he was young, 
photogenic, and charismatic. But, as he toured the capitals of the West to 
popular acclaim, he became a propaganda liability for the West. Take, for 
example, his performance vis à vis Ronald Reagan during the Moscow 
Superpower Summit in May 1988. One of the highlights of the summit 
in this respect was his joint walkabout with Ronald Reagan around Red 
Square. Here is how BBC News and ITN compared the two men: 
Newscaster: ‘Mr Gorbachev saw the chance to win a few hearts and 
grabbed it with both hands (TAKES A CHILD IN HIS ARMS). All 
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Mr Reagan managed was a handshake. Like before, and more so here 
in Moscow, Mr Gorbachev is tending to out-stage Mr Reagan. He’s 
a lot quicker with the repartee although Mr Reagan still scores the 
odd point’ (REAGAN PUTS AN ARM ROUND GORBACHEV’S 
SHOULDER). (Newsnight, 31 May 1988)
Reporter: ‘For all the world it looked like the two superpower leaders 
were campaigning together on a joint ticket, Mr Gorbachev producing 
a small boy from the crowd and bearing him aloft for a handshake with 
the President in true American election style. Mr Reagan appeared 
so taken with the moment that he threw his arm around the Soviet 
leader’s shoulders.’ (ITN, 17.45, 31 May 1988)
On the last day of the Summit, Gorbachev held a long news conference, 
speaking to the western media on all issues, sometimes without notes; 
and even stopping to reorganise the seating arrangements in order to 
surmount problems with the simultaneous-translation facility. The 
event contrasted with a poorly attended news conference at the US 
Embassy, where Ronald Reagan appeared to struggle with the issues 
and was criticised for selecting favoured US journalists for questions. 
The comparison was highlighted in some sections of the British news 
media. In Gorbachev, the BBC observed ‘a man in control: quick-witted, 
dynamic, formidable’ (Newsnight, BBC2, 22.30, 1 June 1988). ITN 
described his performance as ‘an extraordinary tour de force without a 
note’ (ITN, 13.00, 1 June 1988). The Guardian reported that ‘Gorbachev 
was masterful and...Reagan was genially feeble, even by his own 
modest standards’. The Independent judged Reagan’s conference ‘deeply 
embarrassing’ and ‘a flop’, although a more sympathetic account in The 
Times concluded that his ‘rambling answers, inconclusive sentences, 
hesitations, and apparent difficulty in grasping the point of many 
questions’ were due to fatigue.2 Gorbachev’s popularity and credibility 
rating in Europe was rising as Reagan’s was flagging: the US leadership 
role was under symbolic assault. This was especially significant at a time 
when NATO planners were arguing for ‘modernisation’ of the alliance’s 
nuclear forces in western Europe to defend against the Soviet threat.
The Soviets also showed they had learned some useful lessons in 
western style news management. When in Moscow for the superpower 
summit, President Reagan was scheduled to meet dissidents at the US 
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Embassy. But the Kremlin announced a major news conference with 
the famous dissident, Andrei Sakharov, to take place a few days later, 
on 3 June 1988. At the same time, they set up an interview for the 
western news media with controversial Soviet politician, Boris Yeltsin. 
That evening, the main news bulletins were dominated by the dramatic 
attack Yeltsin made on conservative members of the Politburo. It was 
reported as an exciting, sensational departure from the normal conduct 
of Soviet politics, and as a story in its own right. Yeltsin, unknown 
to western publics at the time, came across as a colourful personality 
with an interesting story to tell. His ‘struggle for the people against the 
system’ engrossed journalists and ‘experts’ on the Soviet Union alike. 
In marked contrast, Reagan’s meeting with Soviet dissidents was only 
mentioned in a general round-up of the main summit events of the day 
and seemed rather routine set against the dramatic news of Sakharov’s 
press conference. 
The west could legitimise its stance on nuclear weapons, and its 
response to the peace movement, as long as the Cold War prevailed but 
change to détente undermined the tactic considerably. The solution was 
to project ‘evil’ and ‘instability’ from unseen metaphysical forces to what 
was visible. Gorbachev was a ‘nice guy’, yes, and the Soviet people no 
doubt wanted peace and friendship with the West but the West had to 
be careful. The Soviet empire was not quite evil any longer but it had a 
long way to go before it could be trusted on western principles of human 
rights. It was also undergoing unprecedented social and economic 
reforms with glasnost and perestroika. That brought its own instabili-
ties, hence the oft-quoted truism that an empire is at its most dangerous 
when it is reforming itself from within. Once again, the Moscow Summit 
provides an illustration of how this rhetoric worked. It was originally 
arranged to mark the ratification of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces 
Treaty, concluded in Washington the previous year to reduce and 
eventually eradicate their stocks of intermediate or medium-range 
nuclear forces. The next logical step was further progress in talks for 
a long-range, strategic arms treaty (START), which, if agreed, would 
have profound implications for superpower relations and the entire basis 
of the Cold War. However, talks in Geneva had ground to a halt over 
America’s refusal to include its sea-launched missiles in the negotiations. 
For the US, talk about START was out. So what did the media report? At 
events like superpower summits, disputes over complex issues in arms 
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control could be eclipsed by other distracting themes. For example, the 
impasse over START at the Moscow Summit was explained with wider 
reference to human rights, and to the future of Gorbachev and his 
reform proposals.
In advance of the Moscow summit, the US news management strategy 
was to tap into the powerful ideological connotations that the concept 
of human rights carried and which easily filtered through to routine 
Cold War news. Thus, Ronald Reagan set the US agenda for the meeting 
when he stopped over in Helsinki to give a speech commemorating the 
Helsinki Accords of 1975. Although human rights protocols formed only 
a part of the Accords, Reagan focused on them exclusively. He accused 
the Soviet Union of failing to live up to them since signing.
On the basis of his speech, and his plan for an unofficial meeting 
with Soviet dissidents in Moscow, the western news media dubbed 
the occasion, The Human Rights Summit, before it had even started. 
‘Human rights is his theme’, said the BBC headline (BBC, 13.00, 27 
May 1988); ‘President Reagan...has put human rights at the top of the 
agenda’, announced ITN (13.00, 27 May 1988). Reagan was successful 
in framing the human rights theme with wider issues. BBC reported his 
view that ‘international security cannot be separated from human rights’ 
(18.00, 27 May 1988). In contrast, the Soviet position was reported as a 
negative, ritual response to the preferred US agenda, not as an equally 
valid contending viewpoint. Channel 4 News reported that the Soviets 
could only ‘respond predictably’ with ‘ritual denunciations of the speech’ 
(Channel 4 News, 27 May 1988). Accounts of internal Soviet affairs were 
framed in a similar way. For example, some reports on glasnost and 
perestroika focused on their destabilising influence over Soviet politics 
and their impact on western assumptions about Soviet society. This in 
turn undermined the certainty and predictability of East–West relations 
and the Cold War system. As one reporter put it, ‘It was simpler for 
NATO when the Bear was always growling. The question now is how 
should the West react?’ (Newsnight, 31 May 1988).
Ever alert to deception from any quarter, western think tanks and 
media pundits fulfilled their designated role as watchdogs for national 
security. Zassoursky refers to timely publications like The Soviet 
Propaganda Machine and Mesmerized By The Bear: The Soviet Strategy 
of Deception. (Zassoursky, 1991, p.  18). Caspar Weinberger, a ‘Cold 
Warrior’ with regular access to British television news, told Channel 4 
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News that the Soviets were simply using new tactics, public relations, 
for their old strategy of ‘world domination’ and that it was important for 
the West to ‘keep [its] guard up’ (Channel 4 News, 2 June 1988); there 
was no suggestion here that the West might also use public relations 
for its own strategy of world domination. On a similar note, The New 
York Times columnist, A. M. Rosenthal, urged US leaders to be cautious 
about Gorbachev, ‘a man who is still the dictator of the most powerful 
totalitarian nation in the world’ (Chang, 1991, p.  70). These were the 
principal western justifications for its non-response to Soviet initiatives 
on arms control.
This very negative enemy image was not always down to the western 
media alone. In some cases, the Soviet Union was its ‘own worst enemy’ 
when it came to putting its case across to western publics. McNair (1998) 
considers some of the constraints faced by western correspondents 
when reporting from the Soviet Union during the New Cold War and, 
conversely, the failure or inability of the Soviet authorities to shape or 
influence western news coverage of Cold War issues. This helped shape 
‘enemy images’ of the Soviet Union as much as the West’s own political 
and cultural prejudices. The Korean Airlines incident in 1983 is a good 
example of this. Soviet fighter planes shot down a Korean civilian airliner 
over a sensitive and restricted area of Soviet airspace, believing it to be 
a US spy plane. Two hundred and sixty nine passengers and crew were 
killed provoking outrage in the West. According to the US, it was proof of 
Soviet policy to shoot down any aircraft that strayed into Soviet airspace 
without first asking questions. The Soviets stuck to their spy plane theory 
but in the early, crucial stages of the controversy, they played to the wrong 
audience in the wrong way. They seemed more concerned with presenting 
their version to their own people rather than competing with the US in 
persuading western publics that they had a credible defence. Thus, US 
propaganda played unopposed to more sceptical European opinion until 
it finally began to collapse under the weight of its own contradictions 
and in face of more convincing evidence from Soviet and independent 
sources. By then, however, it was of academic interest; the western media 
had lost interest in the story (McNair, 1988, p. 80ff & p. 95ff).
So despite the new insights into Soviet life and culture that the policy of 
glasnost offered the West, and despite the new spirit of East–West détente, 
the ideological fundamentals of the Cold War system and its interpretive 
framework remained firmly in place for most of the Gorbachev era. 
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What few anticipated, however, was that the relative liberalism that 
glasnost allowed in the Soviet Union created the conditions for popular 
protest in the countries of Eastern Europe. In 1989, the people of Poland, 
East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary took to the streets to 
demand more freedom and more democracy, building an unstoppable 
momentum that climaxed on 9 November with the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the most abiding, visual symbol of the Cold War. The British media 
were quick to celebrate these events as marking the end of the Cold War 
but were to take longer to realise the long-term implications of the crisis. 
the east european revolutions 1989:  
a crisis in journalistic framework
1989: the year of revolution in Eastern Europe. At least, that was the 
story television told us. The emergence of a competitive democratic 
opposition was very newsworthy for countries so long governed by the 
one-party state. A month after the June elections in Poland, triumphant 
Solidarity deputies took their seats and, ‘Suddenly there was an outburst 
of democracy!’ (BBC1, 13.00, 13 November 1989). John Simpson 
reported from the Spartacus Cafe in Budapest: ‘the information centre 
for the brand new opposition parties [where] “You can’t afford to miss 
a single day’s newspapers at the moment!” someone said, “It’s like a new 
country every day!”’ (BBC, 21.00, 10 July 1989).3 When the East German 
government promised ‘free, universal, and multiparty’ elections, the 
news focused on the newly legalised opposition group, New Forum. 
This ‘cutting-edge of democracy’ was not so much a political party as a 
pressure group of politically interested professionals (Channel 4 News, 
9 November 1989). Their chaotic, ad hoc news conferences provided 
a spectacle of western democracy, of ‘normal politics’ (BBC, 21.00, 9 
November 1989). 
The principal theme of the East European revolutions was ‘people 
power’, which echoed the fall of the Marcos regime in the Philippines 
and implied that ‘the people’ could achieve anything if they took to the 
streets en masse and in peaceful protest. The BBC reported the opening 
of the Berlin Wall as a government ‘giving way to the parliament of the 
streets’. Even the security forces were ‘forced to retreat in the face of 
people power’ (BBC1, 21.00, 10 November 1989). On BBC’s Newsnight 
programme, live from Berlin, newscaster Peter Snow welcomed his 
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reporter ‘who’s walking into the studio with a large brick in her hand’. 
It was a piece of the Berlin Wall. After years of western neurosis about 
what it represented, Snow laid hands on it, priest-like, and exclaimed to 
his gathered studio guests, ‘I don’t think this Wall’s going to last as long 
as Hadrian’s Wall! It looks pretty flimsy, doesn’t it?’ (10 November 1989). 
The first few scenes in the drama of the Romanian revolution at the 
end of that year seemed to fit the ‘people power’ theme with ease: the 
Romanian people filmed toppling Nicolai Ceaușescu, invading his palace 
and throwing its contents onto the streets. When they took over state 
television and formed a new government live on air, the images recalled 
the days of New Forum in East Berlin, or Civic Forum in Prague. Of all 
the scenes from the East European revolutions, this seemed the closest to 
anarchy, to real ‘people power’ as opposed to the media confection. But 
when that power was extended to the summary trial and execution of 
the Ceaușescus, the shaky black and white video images of their bodies 
suggested something much more sinister and calculated. Looking back 
on the ‘revolutions’ and the whole sweep of events in Eastern Europe 
throughout the 1990s, Alex Thomson accepts that themes of ‘people 
power’ and ‘freedom and democracy’ were less than adequate for 
explaining these fast moving events:
Romania was the great lie there. What happened in Romania? Was 
it the fall of Ceaușescu? Was it the collapse of Communism? Well of 
course it was all of those things but in fact...what we’re actually seeing 
wasn’t a revolution, it wasn’t an upsurge of the people like the Velvet 
Revolution in Czechoslovakia a few weeks before. It was actually more 
like an in-house coup. So the Romanian example is quite a good one 
to bring in, in the sense that the overall, rather glib, simple conclusion 
that yes it’s the fall of Communism, yes it’s the fall of Eastern Europe, 
yes it’s the fall of the Warsaw Pact, may cover you but it won’t fully 
explain what’s going on.4 
The events in East Germany and throughout Eastern Europe in 1989 
apparently marked the collapse of the Cold War. Old certainties and 
assumptions – economic, political or military – became null and void. 
The question remained, then, whether western public discourse would 
meet the challenge of interpreting revolutionary change (Halliday et al, 
1992; McLaughlin, 1993, 1999). John Simpson, one of the few reporters 
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to cover all the East European revolutions, thought that this placed an 
onus of responsibility on the reporter when trying to make sense of such 
events:
(When) the Berlin Wall came down and then the revolution in 
Czechoslovakia and then...in Romania...it makes you look at it very 
carefully because you know that there’ll be controversy about these 
things for the rest of your life, so therefore you want to be absolutely 
certain of what you think the truth is and the reality is because people 
will be arguing about it for a long time and asking about it. But I just 
knew that that was a time when you knew history was being made. [...] 
I’m just profoundly glad, grateful that I was able to be there.5
Admiral William Crowe, cold warrior and chair of the US Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, summed up the loss of Cold War certainty and its implications for 
US national security interests: ‘This is a time of very uncertain strategic 
transition. The future’s not what it used to be.’6 Indeed, the West’s response 
to the end of the Cold War was hardly revolutionary or epoch-making. 
Many of the institutions and organisations set up to manage the conflict 
are still in existence – the UN, NATO, the European Union – and they 
have come under considerable strain in the face of continuing economic 
problems and an array of global crises. The news presenter, Jeremy 
Paxman, remarked that it took ‘something of a leap of imagination to 
realise that there are some people – politicians, industrialists and, above 
all, generals – who’ve been watching the scenes in Berlin with a feeling 
other than joy in their hearts because the events of the last few days raise 
enormous potential questions’ (BBC2, Newsnight, 10 November 1989). 
He might have added western journalists to his list of suspects because 
it was clear that there was no persistent, ideological framework of inter-
pretation to replace the Cold War paradigm for reporting world events. 
John Simpson has argued that even in the midst of uncertainty, the role 
of television journalism was simply to ‘reflect reality’:
1989, like 1956 and 1968, was a year when the entire world changed 
direction and we’re still living through the consequences of that: wars, 
upheavals, the collapse of old systems and old certainties. And until 
new certainties replace them, the real world will be a place of violence 
and conflict and our television screens will have to reflect that.7
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The east European ‘ revolutions’ were, as Noam Chomsky might say, 
‘the right story’ of freedom and democracy in 1989. There was also a 
‘wrong story’ of freedom and democracy that year and the international 
news media ignored it: an outburst of ‘people power’ and democracy 
in Brazil and Chile in clear defiance of the USA just as it prepared to 
run roughshod over Panama. Elections in Chile on 14 December and 
in Brazil on 17 December 1989 confounded the legacy of fascism and 
totalitarianism that had plagued the countries of South America for over 
a century but which the USA fostered and supported in pursuit of its 
political and economic interests. There was no live media coverage of 
these events or media celebrations and ecstatic front-page headlines. As 
Lawrence Weschler argues, this had serious implications for our under-
standing of connected events on both continents: 
(Our) media’s failure adequately to cover developments...in Chile 
and Brazil badly skews our understanding of what is happening in 
the world in general and in Eastern Europe in particular. This is true 
not only retrospectively – Eastern Europe is not the only place in the 
world these days trying to struggle out from under decades of often 
violent and terribly constricting superpower domination – but also 
prospectively: the sorts of economic dilemmas eastern Europeans 
seem likely to face in the decades ahead as they attempt the transition 
to a wide-open free market – an acute polarisation of wealth, the 
inescapable consequences of their crushing national debts, the 
surrender of their national sovereignty over key economic decisions 
to such monitoring organisations as the International Monetary Fund 
– are precisely the sort that Latin Americans have been struggling 
with for several decades. Indeed, these two sets of concerns...were very 
much at the forefront of the campaigns in Chile and Brazil the past 
several months, though, again, they went largely unreported in the 
American media (1990, p. 26).
Interpreting the significance of the revolutions
The attempt by journalists to interpret the significance of the East 
European revolutions, and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991, should be put into the context of a wider intellectual debate, both 
on and between the right and left. On the right, Francis Fukuyama (1989, 
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1992) predicted even before the revolutions, in the summer of 1989, the 
‘end of history’, that is the triumph of liberal democracy, ‘the final form 
of human government (that) could not be improved on’ (1992, p.  xi). 
Even as the fall of the Berlin Wall seemed to vindicate his thesis, other 
commentators, even on the right, took it to be a flawed and premature 
analysis to say the least. The international relations analyst, Samuel P. 
Huntington (1993, 1996, 2011) proposed that while the apparent end 
of the Cold War may have marked the end of ideological conflict, this 
would be replaced by cultural conflict, what he called ‘the clash of civili-
zations’ that could only be contained by ‘the remaking of world order’ on 
a multipolar rather than a bipolar axis. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the response on the left to events was 
somewhat more defensive or defeatist. In Britain, traditional Marxist 
intellectuals such as Eric Hobsbawm and Martin Jacques finally admitted 
the end of communism as a system of political-economic management. 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain, Chris 
Myant, went even further to declare the Bolshevik Revolution ‘a mistake 
of truly historic proportions’, with disastrous consequences throughout 
the twentieth century, such as the second world war, the Holocaust 
and the Vietnam War (cited in Callinicos, 1991, p.  12). Other, less 
orthodox Marxist thinkers, such as Alex Callinicos (Trotskyism) and 
Noam Chomsky (anarchism), insisted on decoupling Marxism from the 
ideological baggage of Leninism and Stalinism and using it instead as 
an analytical tool for making sense of the end of communism. The East 
European revolutions and the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed free 
rein to western imperialist impulses, most immediately in the Middle 
East with the Gulf War. ‘What was taking shape’ argued Callinicos, ‘was 
not a new world order but a more dangerous version of the old’ (1991, 
p. 82; see also Chomsky, 1992b). 
For journalists, the story of the east European Revolutions seemed at 
first to fit the thesis proposed by Fukuyama: people and nations breaking 
free from communist tyranny to embrace the freedom and democracy 
of the west. Yet in 1993, as Poland and Hungary voted in their general 
elections to preserve some form of socialism, the Guardian slipped back 
into Cold War hysteria with the headline: ‘Red Tide Sweeps Eastern 
Europe’ (21 September 1993); while the Daily Telegraph was to remark 
that ‘the economic consequences of western victory in the Cold War have 
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brought chaos, not a new order, to Eastern Europe’ (Sunday Telegraph, 19 
December 1993). 
This concept of a new order, a ‘New World Order’ to be precise, was 
a convenient propaganda cover for global policing in the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold war and the western news media played an 
important role in its projection. Indeed, the dominant news framework 
was as much an ideological construct as the Cold War itself. So long 
as the conduct and pattern of international relations and international 
crises seemed to conform to the dominant assumptions underpinning 
the Cold war – on all fronts and in all battlegrounds – then the Cold 
War news paradigm was a successful means of puzzle-solving, of making 
sense of international conflict. And while images of the Soviet Union 
altered according to the intensity of hostilities, or in response to the 
propaganda strategies of either side, the Cold War framework remained 
intact. Even during détente, the superpowers were still perceived as no 
more than ‘Friendly Enemies’ (Hallin and Mancini, 1989). Once the 
Cold war system slid into crisis and collapsed, then so did its explanatory 
framework. It was no longer adequate for intellectual analysis or 
for journalistic reportage but academics, politicians and journalists 
seemed to find if only for a brief spell an ideal replacement: ‘The New 
World Order’.
news in the post-cold war era
The ‘New World Order’ signified a conceptual world-view in the 
post-Cold War era. Yet it was a highly problematical intellectual 
framework and journalists who adopted it found that it failed to explain 
the global crises and conflicts that took place in the 1990s. In a special 
feature for the Independent on Sunday, Cal McCrystal argued that, 
‘Despite the end of the Cold War and promises of a “New World Order”, 
we are continually reminded that war remains a bad habit’ with around 
30 ‘substantial’ conflicts around the globe.8 In fact, only a few years after 
the Wall, journalists were already thinking in terms of a ‘New World 
Disorder’ that, as Hugo Young wrote, ‘touches its presumptive masters 
as well as its undoubted victims’.9 The Observer commented on ‘A world 
crying out for order’, arguing that the idea of ‘the New World Order was 
not just over optimistic: it was stupidly misleading. Order was always the 
last thing that was going to be achieved’.10 Certainly, from the perspective 
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of the so-called ‘developing world’, the post-Cold War era was a disaster. 
Panama, Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti were just some examples of what 
western peacekeeping and peace-enforcement did for the powerless in 
the name of global law and order. For those countries, little or nothing 
changed (Chomsky, 1993 & 1994; Mowlana et al 1992; Peters, 1992). 
The notion of a ‘New World Disorder’ has also been cited as reason for 
the big powers to exercise their military muscle and boost their defence 
budgets. This was the most dominant of the two broad worldviews to 
emerge from media debate about the post-Cold War order. It emphasised 
the need for the West to keep its existing security structures intact, ‘to 
keep its guard up’. In an uncertain world, instability was the new enemy 
and it came in a variety of forms. For example, Newsnight pointed out the 
dangers of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of a ‘Middle Eastern 
despot’ or a ‘deranged Soviet colonel’ (BBC2, 8 November 1991). There 
was also the ‘war on drugs’, nationalism in the former Soviet republics 
and the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. 
There was an alternative view of a transformed security, economic and 
political order in the world based on the Helsinki process and tied in with 
the United Nations. The existing military alliances would atrophy and no 
one power would assume the task of global policing. This was pushed by 
the Soviets in the run up to German unification in 1990 but it was never 
taken seriously by western governments for whom the preservation of 
the status quo – a US-led Atlantic Alliance – was paramount. And it 
was never taken very seriously by television news media that continued 
to approach security issues from the dominant perspective. On the eve 
of the Malta Summit, December 1989, Gorbachev and Bush made their 
way to Malta with contrasting opening gambits that provided the news 
media with the desired imagery. Gorbachev stopped off for an almost 
messianic state visit to Italy where he was pictured swamped by huge 
crowds of adoring fans in Rome and Milan, but his PR master-stroke was 
stepping onto the hallowed anti-Communist ground of the Vatican for an 
‘historic’ reconciliation with the Pope. George Bush sent out a different 
message. As he landed on the US aircraft carrier, the USS Forrestal, in the 
Mediterranean, fighter planes were taking off from a base in the Pacific 
to help quash another attempted insurrection in the Philippines. The 
point was not lost on the British news media:
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[FOOTAGE OF PLANES TAKING OFF FROM AND LANDING ON 
THE USS FORRESTAL]
Reporter: On the eve of the Malta Summit, a display of American military 
might. Just hours after ordering his pilots to support government 
troops in the Philippines, George Bush reviewed US air-power in the 
Mediterranean...America’s action in the Philippines was the first major 
military intervention ordered by President Bush and has bolstered his 
reputation as a decision-maker. It follows criticism that he failed to 
help the recent coup attempt against Panama’s General Noriega and 
that he’s responded weakly to upheavals in Eastern Europe. Now, just 
before his meeting with Mr Gorbachev, Mr Bush has a new, bolder 
image (ITN, 22.00, 1 December 1989; emphases added).
This has the ring of a washing-powder advertisement. Bush is presented 
as the ‘greenhorn’ President still overwhelmed by his new respon-
sibility as US leader and in need of a new image as a bold, hands-on 
decision maker. Yet, Noam Chomsky chronicles Bush’s past record as 
a national security apparatchik in successive administrations since the 
1970s, culminating in his post as director of the CIA, and shows that he 
had little to learn about projecting US power around the world (1992b, 
p. 59–61). Far from needing ‘a new, bolder image’, Bush was very much an 
‘old brand’ US President. Still, it was a useful public relations strategy and 
a persistent one as media coverage of recent US interventions showed. 
Two weeks after the Malta Summit, Bush was trying out his new, bolder 
image again: invading Panama, capturing its leader, General Manuel 
Noriega, an old ally, and installing his new man with a quick oath of 
allegiance to God and America. As Noam Chomsky has demonstrated, 
the US media response to the operation itself was very favourable, 
whatever their complaints about being corralled away from the action 
(1992a). In Britain, a Newsnight report on the operation began, ‘So the 
George Bush “wimp factor” disappeared with one big bang in Panama’ 
(20 December 1989). This after all was the USA’s ‘backyard’ and the 
US media pulled out all the stops to: manufacture the crisis; caricature 
and demonise General Noriega; and deflect public attention away from 
civilian casualties and the real geo-political objectives of the operation 
(Chomsky, 1992a, p. 144ff). 
Forty-five years of Cold War propaganda and ideology was not simply 
put back in the box by glasnost and perestroika. When it came to reporting 
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the Soviet Union’s response to the invasion some familiar propaganda 
reflexes helped absorb the impact of international condemnation. For 
example, a BBC journalist recalled Gorbachev’s state visit to Cuba earlier 
that year. ‘The reformist Gorbachev and old-style Communist Fidel 
Castro have little in common these days’, he said. ‘At least they didn’t 
until the US invasion of Panama. The reaction by both has been a leap 
back to Cold War rhetoric’ (BBC1, 21.00, 20 December 1989). Yet this 
and other reports did not seem to see the bigger picture, which was that 
the Soviet Union and Cuba were but just two voices among the United 
Nations’ clamour to condemn the invasion. 
If the US invasion of Panama marked a false Spring for the New World 
Order, the Gulf Crisis of 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, seemed to 
demonstrate an unprecedented degree of international opposition, 
marshaled and led by the UN. But it soon became apparent that the 
real power emanated from the White House. Far from criticising the 
US leadership role in the crisis at the expense of the UN, the British 
media largely endorsed it as proof positive that the US was in an ideal 
position to direct the New World Order. As US warships headed for the 
Gulf not to ‘free Kuwait’ at that stage but to ‘defend Saudi Arabia’, ITN 
noted that ‘America is once again adopting the role of policeman of the 
world’ (ITN, 22.00, 8 August 1990). But in the first stages of the crisis, it 
was reported that the option of ‘Taking on a war-machine as enormous 
as Iraq has already, in effect, been ruled out by the defence ministries 
of the western world’, and that ‘Foreign Office sources indicate that any 
military action is now out of the question’ (BBC1, 21.00, 2 August 1990). 
A report on Channel 4 News concluded that despite western involvement 
in the Iran–Iraq war, ‘Any new conflict would be unwinnable’ (2 August 
1990). Nonetheless, news items were very clear that a solution could only 
come from the West led by the US. The BBC’s John Simpson thought it 
‘impossible to think that there could be an Arab solution...but if there’s to 
be a solution rather than a compromise it’ll come mostly from the West’ 
(BBC1, 21.00, 8 August 1990). 
By the end of November, the US was talking of ‘freeing Kuwait’ even 
if that meant all out war. To this end it launched a propaganda campaign 
to forge a military alliance of western and Arab powers, and overcome 
divisions in western public opinion over the doubling of its forces in the 
Gulf (MacArthur, 1992). There was much criticism of the way the US 
hijacked the UN to forge his western–Arab coalition against Saddam 
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Hussein in the early stages of the crisis but history shows such criticism 
to be misplaced. Bush simply revived the original and principal purpose 
of the United Nations: as an agency of enforcement with a hierarchy of 
leadership and very clear parameters of conduct in the global arena. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt set out the blue-print in 1943 when he 
determined that ‘there should be four policemen in the world – the US, 
Great Britain, Russia, and China...The rest of the world would disarm...
As soon as any of the other nations was caught arming they would be 
threatened first with quarantine and if quarantine did not work they 
would be bombed’.11 It was a model of the ‘New World Order’ that did not 
translate very well into the grand, idealistic rhetoric of the UN Charter 
but it was clearly invoked through George Bush’s ideas in a speech on 
the Gulf crisis. He promised that by the time the US dealt with Saddam 
Hussein they:
[...] will have taught a dangerous dictator and any tyrant tempted to 
follow in his footsteps that the US has a new credibility, and that what 
we say goes, and that there is no place for lawless aggression in the 
Persian Gulf and in this New World Order that we seek to create. And 
we mean it! And [Saddam Hussein] will understand that when the 
day is done!12
When Bush announced the beginning of war, he invoked the New World 
Order again, this time with the racist undertones that informed much 
of his bellicose rhetoric against Saddam Hussein. ‘We have before us’, he 
said, ‘the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations 
a New World Order, a world where the rule of law, not the law of the 
jungle, governs the conduct of nations’ (17 January 1991; emphasis 
added). Some weeks later, the British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, 
endorsed the rhetoric when he told an audience that, ‘In the late 20th 
century nations must be able to conduct affairs by a code more worthy of 
rational human beings than the law of the jungle’.13 
Commenting on US media coverage of the Gulf crisis, Edward Said 
told a BBC documentary that ‘the central media failing (was) an unques-
tioning acceptance of American power’, and argued that ‘public rhetoric 
[was] simply undeterred, uncomplicated by any considerations of detail, 
realism, or cause and effect’ in respect to the crisis at hand. The news 
media simply fulfilled their designated role as they had done so well in 
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their coverage of Vietnam, Grenada and Panama. When the crisis in 
the Gulf finally gave way to war, Said was just finishing his new work, 
Culture and Imperialism, and he remembered looking again at what he 
had written:
Here was a new chapter of the imperial story, with the [US] now at 
the centre of the world stage instead of France and Britain. And as 
culture in the form of various narratives of western ascendancy had 
shaped the nineteenth century imperial dynamic, so it was the media 
that now played the same role.14
Eqbal Ahmad (1992) reflected on how the twentieth century has been 
‘most remarkable for its simultaneous capacity to promise hope and 
deliver disappointments’, and has ended as it began with ‘renewed hopes 
of a just and peaceable world order...being overwhelmed by politicians 
and warriors whose political minds remain rooted in the past’ (p. 7). He 
warned that, ‘We are being lied to; and we must not be deceived. What we 
are actually witnessing is a display of imperialism relieved of the limits 
imposed by superpower rivalry and nuclear deterrence (ibid. p. 10).
The UN sanctions against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait, shown to 
been so effective in November 1990, were suddenly no longer effective 
in January 1991.15 Diplomacy and negotiations via the UN became 
‘unhelpful’. And, in a breathtaking display of Orwellian doublethink, 
Bush’s military build-up in the Gulf was read as ‘going the extra mile for 
peace’; his bellicose rhetoric an example of ‘extraordinary diplomacy’. A 
worldwide coalition stood behind the world’s only superpower against 
a pariah state whose leader could not see reason. War had become 
‘inevitable’ (Philo and McLaughlin, 1995). As the bombs fell on Baghdad, 
some journalists appreciated the wider geo-political implications of this 
for US military power in the world. David Dimbleby remarked to the US 
Ambassador to Britain that such a display of military power ‘suggests 
that America’s ability to react militarily has really become quite extraor-
dinary, despite all the critics beforehand who said it will never work out 
like that’ (BBC1, 10.00, 18 January 1991). There appeared to be nothing 
in any of this of a US decline resulting from ‘imperial overstretch’ 
(Kennedy, 1989). After the war, Bush declared to the nation: ‘It’s a proud 
day for America and, by God, we’ve kicked Vietnam syndrome once and 
for all!’16 At a US army victory cabaret, a senior officer told the troops 
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that the Iraqis ‘never had a chance’. Their whole problem, he thought, 
was their complete ignorance of US military power, ‘the lethality, the 
speed and the vigour of execution that resided in our equipment and in 
our leadership’. The snag for the US? ‘We knew we were good – we didn’t 
know how good’.17
Somalia 1993: Operation Restore Oil
Bush’s successor, President Bill Clinton, also suffered a credibility 
gap when he eased into office in 1993. The election campaign smears 
concerning his past still lingered in the public mind and as he prepared 
to take office from Bush, the crisis in Somalia provided his first major 
test of leadership.  Throughout 1992, television images from Somalia 
of thousands of starving people in the midst of civil war had brought 
home to the West the legacy of Cold War, superpower rivalry in the 
so-called ‘Third World’. The superpowers had gone but much of their 
firepower remained in the hands of rival factions who fought to fill the 
power vacuum. The images also served as an uncomfortable reminder 
to all that the concept of a New World Order was conditional only upon 
the furtherance of western interests. The out-going President Bush and 
President-elect, Clinton, announced their intention to send in the troops 
to help the aid agencies distribute food around the country without 
hindrance or intimidation from the various armed factions. Thus 
Operation Restore Hope was presented as a mission of mercy rather than 
an old-fashioned, geo-political, Cold War style invasion. And it would 
do the image of either President no harm at all. 
Yet, according to a Los Angeles Times report, there was another 
aspect to the story that the media in the US, and it seems in Britain, 
did not include in their coverage: oil. It was oil which motivated the US 
to launch such a large-scale military operation at a time when it shied 
away from intervention in comparable crises elsewhere. In what might 
have been better named ‘Operation Restore Oil’, The Los Angeles Times 
obtained documents that revealed that ‘nearly two-thirds of Somalia 
was allocated to the American oil giants Conoco, Amoco, Chevron and 
Phillips in the final years before Somalia’s pro-US President Siad Barre 
was overthrown [...] in January 1991’. This land had the potential to 
‘yield significant amounts of oil and natural gas if the US-led military 
mission can restore peace to (Somalia). There was also evidence that 
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the oil company Conoco closely cooperated with the US forces in their 
‘humanitarian effort’ and even leased one of its properties in Mogadishu 
to serve as a temporary US embassy. The Los Angeles Times revealed that 
the close ties between the US military and the oil companies had ‘left 
many Somalis and foreign development experts deeply troubled...leading 
many to liken the...operation to a miniature version of Operation Desert 
Storm’.18 I looked at several samples of British television news coverage 
of the story but found no references to links with oil or any other major 
western interests. However, coverage certainly bore similarities with that 
of Panama and the Gulf War. 
The major US media were alerted in advance to the exact place on 
a beach near the Somali capital, Mogadishu, where the huge military 
landing would take place on 9 December, 1992. The day before, the 
BBC reported that it would be ‘an invasion by arrangement, not a dawn 
raid’ and called it ‘a humanitarian mission but with muscle’ (21.00, 8 
December 1992). And the News At Ten predicted that ‘the gunmen 
will find out what they’re really up against, with the eyes of the world 
watching’ (ITN, 8 December 1992). As in coverage of the Panama and 
the Gulf War, the show of military might and technology seemed to 
freeze the critical impulses of the news media in Britain as they launched 
into the story with gung-ho headlines such as ‘Hundreds of American 
marines storm Mogadishu’ (BBC1, 13.00, 9 December 1992), forgetting, 
it seemed, that this was supposed to be a ‘humanitarian’ mission of 
mercy, not The Sands of Iwo Jima. This ITN report captures perfectly the 
tone and mood of coverage in the first critical hours of the operation:
[NEWS FOOTAGE OF US LANDING)
Reporter: D-Day in Somalia. Outlined against the moonlit Indian 
Ocean, the spearhead force hit the beaches. Giant hovercraft disgorged 
the American marines of Team Tiger...Out at sea, the warships...
Overhead, wave upon wave of helicopters thundered in carrying yet 
more troops to secure the airport and the docks. The UN peacekeepers 
who’ve been holding the fort here just looked on as this huge operation 
unfolded around them (12.30, 9 December 1992).
A marines’ commander told reporters that, ‘Our objective here is to 
come in and display maximum force, to let everyone know that we 
mean business’. How the warring parties in Somalia received this is 
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unknown but the commander certainly impressed ITN who reported 
that ‘The Somalis have been left in no doubt that these US marines mean 
business’ (12.30, 9 December 1992), and on how ‘The Americans show 
who’s in charge in Somalia’ (22.00, 9 December 1992). But within a year, 
the Americans were still in Somalia and they looked anything but ‘in 
charge’. It was at this point that the narrative abruptly changed, from one 
of US leadership and military clout to one of United Nations failure and 
incompetence. The crucial point of departure came on 12 June 1993, 
when 23 Pakistani soldiers were killed in a gun-battle with the forces of 
Somali ‘warlord’, General Aideed. UN forces responded with an assault 
on Aideed’s headquarters on 12 June. BBC headlines declared how:
United Nations forces attack the Somali capital in retaliation for the 
killing of 23 Pakistani peacekeepers. Four arms dumps are destroyed, 
200 prisoners taken in an attempt to disarm criminal elements (21.50, 
12 June 1993).
The reporter summed it up as ‘all part of the UN’s latest efforts to bring 
peace to Somalia’ and described it as ‘a military success, albeit against a 
much weaker enemy’. He concluded that ‘the real test for the UN now is 
to win the hearts and minds of the Somali people while keeping up this 
hard line approach’ (ibid.). The next day, 13 June, the tone of coverage 
changed when Pakistani troops shot dead 20 unarmed Somali protesters. 
BBC News reported that ‘Anger among Somalis over the actions of the 
United Nations is rapidly turning to fury [and]...is losing the UN the 
sympathy it cannot do without’ (BBC1, 18.20, 13 June 1993; emphasis 
added). ITN showed pictures of wounded civilians being treated in a 
makeshift operating theatre and reported how ‘Somali people are finding 
it harder and harder to understand the purpose of a humanitarian mission 
which has turned into a military offensive. [...] Peacekeeping in Somalia 
has taken on a new and deadly meaning’ (ITN, 23.15, 13 June 1993). 
Another BBC item showed US helicopter guns-ships targeting missiles 
at mortar batteries in Mogadishu. The reporter said it was part of ‘the 
UN policy of destroying weapons here’, but reported that ‘they’re doing 
it during the day and over busy streets filled with innocent civilians’. He 
remarked that ‘For many Somalis, hatred for the UN now overwhelms 
any animosity against General Aideed’. The item refers to Aideed’s 
comparison of the UN’s deeds with those of a dictator and concludes 
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that, ‘The sight of French soldiers...planting explosives to destroy a radio 
station that broadcasts against the United Nations does lend force to the 
comparison’ (21.00, 14 June 1993; emphasis added). 
Television news pictures of the Battle of Mogadishu, on 3 and 4 October 
1993, with the bodies of US Rangers being dragged by a mob through the 
streets, signaled the end of US resolve to stay the course in Somalia. As 
the last US troops withdrew on 25 March 1994, ITN broadcast a strongly 
worded report from Bill Neely that they were getting out ‘before good 
intentions paved the road to hell’. He recalled that, ‘When US troops 
came, there was no government – there is no government now’, and that 
‘what began with a near farcical night-landing under TV lights soon 
degenerated into an undeclared war’. The US commander told ITN how 
he prayed that ‘the Somali people would raise themselves out of this 
turmoil and anarchy and to build some kind of society based on love 
instead of...the gun’. Neely exploded the commander’s pious sentiments 
with the bombshell that ‘the US has just given weapons worth £20 million 
to the Somali police to subdue the clans that America could not subdue’ 
(22.00, 25 March 1994). 
The picture of Somalia that came across in the news media, then, was 
of a country in chaos, its people starving and ruled by warring factions. 
Its only hope, it seemed, was western aid and military intervention. The 
country had become a test-bed for the imposition of the ‘new world order’ 
President Bush promised during the Gulf Crisis in 1990. However, there 
were other countries in Africa that experienced total disorder and civil 
war but which did not figure in western plans for this ‘New World Order’; 
in contrast with Somalia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone were conspicuous by 
the absence of global policing. During his two terms in office, President 
Clinton chose to bomb Iraq twice and threaten North Korea over its 
alleged nuclear weapons programme and its apparent reluctance to allow 
inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. These foreign 
policy options were designed to help to project his image as a ‘new, 
bolder’ US president and again the news media were ready to oblige. 
For example, when Clinton ordered the first bombing raids on Iraq in 
January 1993, a BBC reporter noted that ‘passing the torch from Bush 
to Clinton is a time when both men want to show they are not going 
to be pushed about, so there’s a certain amount of domestic and world 
public relations involved in all this’ (BBC1, 21.00, 13 January 1993).19 
A second strike followed in June 1993, this time on the grounds that 
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Iraq had plotted to assassinate ex-President George Bush. Suspects had 
been arrested and their trial was still in progress in Kuwait when the US 
decided its own investigation was proof enough to justify another Cruise 
missile bombardment of Baghdad. The US President told the world that, 
‘From the first days of our revolution, America’s security has depended 
on the clarity of this message: don’t tread on us!’ While he justified the 
bombing as self-defence under the terms of Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
he warned Iraq not to do likewise. And he emphatically denied that the 
bombing had anything to do with image. ITN’s newscaster took this up 
with his Washington correspondent:
Newscaster: Any suggestion that he might have done it to sharpen up 
his image?
Reporter: Well, he was asked that question today and as you might 
expect specifically denied it. But officials are not denying that it 
does give him a boost in those areas where he’s seen to be weakest. 
He’s not seen as being a decisive leader or as being a strong military 
commander. But there was no dithering, no public agonising about 
this and his statement, ‘Don’t tread on us’, was seen as a very strong, 
almost Reaganesque warning. (ITN, 22.00, 28 June 1993) 
The BBC reported on Clinton’s visit two weeks later to South Korea 
or, to be more precise, on his day ‘in and around the demilitarised 
zone’ dressed in military fatigues and threatening North Korea with 
‘annihilation’. The contradiction of military posturing in a demilitarised 
zone was apparently lost on the reporter but he was quick to see it was 
‘clearly designed to sharpen (Clinton’s) military image’ (BBC1, 22.05, 11 
July 1993). 
concluding remarks
The rhetoric of a New World Order, therefore, did not stand the test of 
time, logic or US foreign policy goals. For their part, journalists reporting 
on wars and conflicts in the Balkans or in parts of Africa, for example, 
struggled to find a new framework for interpreting, explaining and 
reporting conflict around the world. The big themes of East versus West, 
and Totalitarianism versus Freedom and Democracy did not seem to do 
adequate justice to explanations of ‘genocide’ (Rwanda, 1994) or ‘ethnic 
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cleansing’ (Croatia, Bosnia, or Kosovo). Perhaps this ideological deficit 
explains more than any other factor the tendency for some journalists 
to seek refuge in ethical or moral attachment to humanitarian causes 
but the terrorist attacks on America on 11 September 2001 heralded a 
framework with contours of interpretation and image that once again 
spoke of a bipolar world of conflict. The next chapter looks at how 
war correspondents and the media they work for have tried (or not) to 
negotiate the restrictions and restraints of this framework of interpreta-
tion as it has evolved from one of global war on terrorism to the return 
of the evil empire: Russia. 
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Reporting the ‘War on Terror’ and  
the Return of the Evil Empire
We must remember that in time of war what is said on the enemy’s 
side of the front is always propaganda, and what is said on our side 
of the front is truth and righteousness, the cause of humanity and a 
crusade for peace.
Walter Lippmann, 19671
This chapter is not a review of the literature that exists on the role of the 
media in reporting and representation of 9/11, and the so-called war on 
terror that followed it; nor is it an in depth analysis of the reporting of 
what have been called the 9/11 wars, that is, Afghanistan and Iraq, fought 
as part of America’s war on terror (see, for example, Carruthers, 2011; 
Lewis, 2005; Schecter, 2003). Time and resources do not allow for either. 
Its purpose instead is to develop the thesis proposed in the previous 
chapter and look at the outlines of the war on terror as a media paradigm 
for reporting international conflict since 9/11, looking in particular at 
media responses to the bombing attacks on Madrid in 2004 and London 
in 2005 in critical comparison with their coverage of America’s ‘Shock 
and Awe’ bombing of Baghdad in 2003. It will then look at the reporting 
of the Crimea crisis in 2014 and suggest the possibility that, notwith-
standing the hysterical western response to the threat posed by Islamic 
State (IS), itself fed in part by IS propaganda, we may be looking at 
the emergence of a paradigm less complex and more sustainable and 
predictable than the war on terror: a new cold war with a new Evil 
Empire, Vladimir Putin’s Russia. 
reporting the war on terror
The terrorist attacks on America on 11 September 2001 horrified the 
world and commanded global media attention. Images of the passenger 
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planes crashing into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New 
York City were endlessly replayed on television and displayed frame by 
frame in newspaper photo supplements. In Britain, BBC News described 
the image of the second plane hitting the south tower as ‘The face of 
war in the twenty-first century!’ Newspaper front pages across the world 
the next day were dominated by dramatic photographs of the burning 
towers; but they differed in their interpretations of what the event 
represented. Most saw it in obvious terms, as an attack on America: ‘U.S. 
Attacked’ (The New York Times) ‘War On America’ (Daily Telegraph); 
‘When War Came To America’ (The Times); ‘A Declaration Of War’ 
(Guardian); ‘Act of War’ (The New York Post and USA Today). In Britain, 
The Sun described it as ‘A Day That Changed The World’, while The 
Daily Mirror went so far as to call it a ‘War On the World’. With a slight 
millenarian twist, we also had ‘Doomsday America’ (The Independent) 
and ‘Apocalypse’ (The Daily Mail). 
In an emergency address to a joint session of the US Congress on 
20 September, President George W. Bush, mobilised the nation for 
war against those responsible for the attacks – a sinister worldwide 
terrorist organisation called Al Qaeda led by an obscure Saudi Arabian 
construction engineer, Osama bin Laden. This was the moment when 
Bush first publicly used the phrase ‘war on terror’ to define America’s 
response to the attacks, marking a shift in tactics from its response to 
previous terrorist attacks on American interests abroad; such as the 
bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (limited 
military operation against Al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan) and the 
assault on the USS Cole in 2000 (intelligence investigation). This new 
response, this new ‘war on terror’, would start with an aerial bombing 
campaign against Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan but there 
would be no definitive end until the objective of destroying terror groups 
all over the world was realised. But Bush was to add a new dimension 
that suggested something resembling the old Cold War division of 
the world: ‘[We] will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to 
terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: 
Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.’ Bush and the neo-
conservative ideologues that dominated thinking in his administration 
were to take the rhetoric to Dr Strangelove-levels in a series of speeches 
and public statements over the following months. On 29 October 2001, 
three weeks into ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan, Richard 
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Perle, Chairman of the US Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, 
declared there would be: 
No stages! This is total war. We are fighting a variety of enemies. There 
are lots of them out there [...] If we just let our vision of the world go 
forth, and we embrace it entirely, and we don’t try to piece together 
clever diplomacy but just wage total war, our children will sing great 
songs about us years from now.2
And in his State of the Union address to the US Congress on 29 January 
2002, Bush divided the world between ‘America [and] our friends and 
allies’ and ‘regimes that sponsor terror [and] constitute an axis of evil, 
arming to threaten the peace of the world.’
It is easy in hindsight to dismiss all this as the wild imaginings of a 
lunatic political fringe but there are three important points to note. The 
first is that it was part of a carefully calibrated propaganda campaign 
designed to re-energise and project American power in the Middle East 
and beyond. The second is that an array of other states happily adopted 
the war on terror to legitimate their use of overwhelming force against 
internal threats or nationalist insurgencies (Russia in Chechnya or Israel 
in the Occupied Territories and Gaza, for example). And the third is that 
large sections of the western corporate media believed it with little in the 
way of critical examination. For example, in an interview on 2 December 
2001, for NBC’s Meet the Press, US Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld lent credence to ‘constant discussion’ in the British press about 
Osama bin Laden hiding out in a fantastical ‘Secret Cave’ somewhere in 
the mountains of Afghanistan. Referring to a comic-book graphic lifted 
from The Times of London, anchorman Tim Russert’s excitement was 
evident:
Russert: Many Americans have a perception that it’s a little hole dug 
out of the side of a mountain...
Rumsfeld: Oh no!
Russert: [CUT TO GRAPHIC] This is it! This is a fortress! A complex 
– multi-tiered. Bedrooms and offices on the top as you can see 
[HELPFUL LABELS ADDED]. Secret exits on the sides and at the 
bottom cut deep to avoid thermal detection. A ventilation system (!) 
to allow people to breathe and carry on. Entrances large enough to 
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drive through trucks and even tanks! Even computer systems and 
telephone systems! It’s a very sophisticated operation!
Rumsfeld: Oh you bet! This is serious business and there’s not one of 
those – there are many of those!
Versions of the graphic from The Times also found their way into other 
elite newspapers such as the New York Times and the London Independent 
at a time when Operation Anaconda, to hunt down bin Laden and his 
followers, was showing no signs of success. It turned out in the end that 
the perception of many Americans, as Russert put it, was correct – that 
the caves used by bin Laden and his followers were in fact more akin to ‘a 
little hole dug out of the side of mountain’. In an interview for America’s 
Public Broadcast Service, a US Special Forces sergeant, who was 
involved in the operation, revealed that ‘they weren’t these crazy mazes 
or labyrinths of caves that they described. Most of them were natural 
caves. Some were supported with some pieces of wood [and were] maybe 
about the size of a 10-foot by 24-foot room, at the largest. They weren’t 
real big.’3
Documentary filmmaker Adam Curtis casts a critical eye on the ‘war 
on terror’, propaganda framework. In ‘The Rise of the Politics of Fear’, 
the final part of a three-part series, The Power of Nightmares (2004), he 
argues that it was a revival of the Cold War conception of a world divided 
along bi-polar oppositions of good and evil. Only this new war was being 
fought against a phantom enemy rather than a nation state in the style 
of the old Soviet Union. Along with other critics such as Jason Burke 
(2004), Curtis rejects the conception of Al Qaeda as worldwide terrorist 
organisation, tightly controlled and funded at the centre by one man, its 
leader Osama bin Laden. These more considered and informed critiques 
insist that Al Qaeda, as its literal translation suggests, is more of a world 
view, a set of ideas around which to inspire a diverse range of political 
and/or militant, Islamic groups from Africa, the Middle East and Asia. 
Furthermore, the argument goes, their existence in many cases stands as 
a legacy of the West’s alliance with and funding of the resistance to the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. 
Some commentators have looked at the media coverage of 9/11 in 
more depth and defined the attacks as the ultimate ‘propaganda of the 
deed’, a spectacle of violence and destruction designed to instil terror 
in a global media audience (Kellner, 2005, pp. 25–75); and to redefine 
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the dominant political discourse (Croft, 2006, pp. 37–83; Moeller, 2004, 
pp.  59–76). Others such as Liebes and Kampf (2004, pp.  77–95) have 
argued further that the ‘automatic, universal adoption of the genre of 
breaking news – that is, live marathonic broadcasting during, and in the 
wake of, a multi-victim attack – facilitates the upgrading of terrorists 
to superstars’ (p. 81). This theory, that the mainstream corporate media 
in the west serve as unwitting propaganda proxies for terrorist organ-
isations, has long been debated in academia but it is a difficult one to 
prove conclusively. It also assumes that acts of terror like 9/11 seen live 
on television, or the set-piece TV interview with a terrorist representa-
tive, automatically translate into definitional power for that actor. Yet 
the power to define what constitutes terrorism and the terrorist clearly 
does not lie with those labelled as terrorists. The Bush administration’s 
propaganda response to 9/11, its rhetoric of a ‘war on terror’, was backed 
by the projection of overwhelming military force in Afghanistan and 
Iraq; and by excessive security measures at home and abroad. This has 
been equally effective in instilling fear, paranoia and suspicion in the 
minds of those it claims to protect; and provoking violent retaliation 
from those it attacks. In both rhetoric and action, the war on terror has 
been itself a form of terrorism but it is difficult to find any recognition 
of this in media accounts of various wars and terrorist attacks. This is 
the key point I want to demonstrate here by comparing the reporting 
of the bombings of Madrid and London, in 2004 and 2005 respectively, 
with that of the ‘Shock and Awe’ bombing of Baghdad in 2003, the 
curtain raiser to the US invasion.4 It demonstrates the success of the war 
on terror as a propaganda framework, one that not only limits under-
standing and compassion but that is closed to the possibility of seeing a 
linkage between the terrorist attacks on Madrid and London with what 
had been happening in Afghanistan since 2001 and Iraq since 2003.
Madrid and London
In Madrid, on the morning of 11 March 2004, 13 satchels, each 
containing ten kilograms (or 22 pounds) of explosives, were left on four 
packed commuter trains. Ten of them detonated, taking the lives of 191 
commuters and injuring over 1,800 others. In London, on the morning 
of 7 July 2005, suicide bombers carrying rucksacks containing between 
two and five kilograms of explosives, a total of up to 20 kilograms of 
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explosives (or 44 pounds), took the lives of 52 commuters and injured 
over 700 in explosions on three tube trains and a city bus. These were 
horrifying attacks on innocent people, bringing the war on terror to 
Europe for the first time. Of course, Madrid and London had experienced 
terrorist attacks before, at the hands of the Basque-separatist Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (ETA) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) respectively. But 
the scale of these attacks and the deliberate targeting of civilians seemed 
to be of a new and terrifying dimension; and they appeared to vindicate 
the repeated warnings of security agencies throughout the continent that 
such attacks were inevitable. 
All but one of the newspapers in the sample, the Daily Star, gave the 
Madrid bombings their front-page lead. The Times and The Independent 
headlined it ‘Massacre in Madrid’, while The Sun led with, ‘Slaughter 
of the Innocents’. The Daily Mail, Daily Express, and the Guardian all 
led with the question of who carried out the attacks. In the days that 
followed, the question turned into a bitter controversy in Spain and 
overshadowed the public need for a show of grief and national solidarity. 
There was a suspicion that the party of government, the Popular Party 
led by Prime Minister José María Aznar, was deflecting blame from the 
main suspects, an Al-Qaeda affiliate from Northern Africa, onto the 
Basque separatist group, ETA. It was seen by many as a vote-winning 
tactic ahead of the general election in Spain on 14 March, a needless one 
in fact because the party was comfortably ahead in the opinion polls. It 
was to ultimately backfire in election defeat. British newspapers were 
divided in their approach to the question. The Mail and Express led with 
a focus on the Al Qaeda angle, but nonetheless posed it as a question:
‘Could it be Al Qaeda?’ (Mail)
‘Rail bomb kills 190... Was it Bin Laden?’ (Express)
The Telegraph and the Guardian, on the other hand, presented it as a toss 
up between the two possibilities:
‘192 die as bombs hit commuter trains in Madrid. ETA or al-Qa’eda?’ 
(Telegraph)
‘Massacre in Madrid: ETA or Al-Qaida?’ (Guardian)
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The Daily Mirror was the only paper to take a firm and certain line 
at least in the immediate aftermath of the bombings. Its first edition 
led with reference to a claim of responsibility from the North African 
affiliate: ‘Al-Qaeda: It was us. Terror Faction Claims Madrid bombs.’ But 
its third edition that day opened up the alternative possibility, that it 
was ETA. In an article on page twelve, headed ‘Carnage Will Bring ETA 
Reign To An End’, the paper’s ‘Terrorism Expert’, Simon Reeve, declared 
that the attacks bore ‘all the hallmarks of the Basque separatist group 
ETA, and appear to be the death-throes of the terrorist organisation.’ In 
a clue to the source of his analysis, Reeve concluded that the ‘bombings 
will encourage the Spanish government to launch a renewed “war on 
terror” against ETA and due to the public’s revulsion at the massacre, the 
group is unlikely to survive the carnage of Madrid.’
Few of the newspapers gave front-page space to graphic description of 
the impact of the explosion on the Madrid commuter trains. The Inde-
pendent’s sub-headline stated that: ‘Stations Littered With Body Parts 
After Butchery On A Brutal Scale Leaves Body Parts On The Platforms, 
Corpses In Shredded Wreckage.’ The Mail captioned a photograph of 
some of the victims: ‘Carnage on the commuter line: Horror etched on 
their faces, victims of yesterday’s Madrid railway bombings are treated 
beside wrecked carriages.’ In a special photo feature on page 12 of the 
paper’s third edition – ‘An atrocity that touches us all’ – a reporter 
described in graphic, first-hand terms the scene at Madrid’s Atocha 
station: 
I saw a baby torn to bits. The trains were all destroyed, with headless 
corpses. This is so savage you can’t even describe it. In shock and 
disbelief, many in tears, the people of Madrid struggle to come to 
terms with the horror. Pictures of the devastation tell their own story. 
Europe’s worst terrorist atrocity since Lockerbie has left almost 200 
dead, more than 1,400 wounded, a city numbed.
The Times reported an account from a commuter who was on board one 
of the trains: 
‘There was a flash at the end of the carriage in front of me. A terrific 
blast hit us. We were thrown to the floor and then there was another 
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loud bang. I don’t know what happened next because I must have 
passed out.’ 
When she came to she saw a man whose entire face had been burnt 
away. ‘Everywhere I turned there was blood,’ she said. ‘The windows 
were smashed and there was moaning and crying but I couldn’t see 
where it was coming from.’
The headlines in the inside pages of the some of the other newspapers, 
many of them direct statements from survivors and eyewitnesses, 
provided a stark picture of the horror, panic and pain on board the trains 
in the wake of the bombings:
Bloodbath in rush hour: ‘Mobiles were still ringing as they carted 
bodies away. I saw a baby that had been blown to bits.’ (Daily Star)
‘It was butchery on a brutal scale. This catastrophe goes beyond the 
imaginable’, said Juan Redondo, a Madrid fire inspector, as scores 
of wounded sat on pavements outside the central Atocha station, 
weeping helplessly at the devastation. (Express)
As well as giving readers an impression of the immediate horror of 
the attacks, the British press sought to provide some insight into 
the motivations of those responsible. Since there was no certainty at 
that point about who it might have been, that was always going to be 
a challenge. If the security consultants and terrorism experts of the 
world had no hard information, then they could only operate within 
the realms of speculation; and if they were limited to just that, then the 
only safe haven lay in the calm waters of wide-sweeping generalisation. 
What else can a security consultant do when cold-called by a journalist 
in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist outrage? In an article for The 
Independent – ‘Bombers prepared to inflict more shock and harm to grab 
attention’ – Brussels correspondent, Stephen Castle, spoke to a range 
of diplomats and security experts in the city, many of whom provided 
insights that were more obvious than expert. For example: 
Despite the huge resources devoted to fighting the ‘war on terror’, 
bombers are still getting through and causing enormous loss of life by 
hitting soft targets. ‘Terrorists are becoming more indiscriminate and 
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they are having a wider impact on communities,’ said Tim Dunne, a 
Canadian military analyst and author of a study on terrorism. 
‘It looks as if terrorists are becoming more ambitious in their aims. 
They want to do more damage, inflict more harm and cause more 
shock – to grab the attention of their public and force governments 
to react.’
One diplomat who has specialised in terror issues said: ‘September 
11 has set the bar for mass killings and for the shock that could come 
from them. What we have been worried about is that 9/11 would start 
a new type of attack: how much horror can you get out of targeting 
large numbers?’ (Emphases added)
Amid the obvious horror of the bombings, the accounts of heroic 
popular defiance and solidarity; and the editorial rhetoric of freedom 
and democracy, of no surrender and law and order, a few newspapers 
brought the threat closer to home:
Security officials ask: Could it happen in Britain? (Times)
Britons warned: We may be next! (Express)
After Madrid, Britain is next says Al Qaeda (Mail)
Critics at the time, mostly on the left, had good reason to cast a cold eye 
on the national security alerts and scares that western governments had 
been issuing on a regular basis since 9/11. This was because they had 
so far come to nothing and, in Britain, seemed to have more to do with 
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s determination to ‘stand shoulder to shoulder’ 
with America in its war on terror. Yet just over a year after Madrid, the 
city of London experienced its own 9/11. On 7 July 2005, the day after 
the city won the bid to host the 2012 Olympics, a coordinated series of 
bombing attacks on commuter targets killed 52 innocent commuters and 
injured over 700. The front-page headlines reflected the sense of fear that 
they caused throughout the country:
Terror Comes To London (Independent)
Al Qa’eda Brings Terror To The Heart Of London (Telegraph)
London’s Day of Terror (Guardian)
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But also they also provoked the popular press into a defiant stance 
steeped in the mythical defiance and heroism of Londoners during the 
Blitz, more than 50 years earlier in the Second World War:
Bastards. Al Qaida Suicide Bombers Blitz London (Star)
We Britons Will Never Be Defeated (Express)
Bloodied But Not Unbowed (Mirror)
Other newspapers offered a more nuanced sense of the public response 
to what had happened to the city in the previous 24 hours: 
From Olympic jubilation to bafflement and horror: First the shock 
and then a strange, quiet kind of chaos took over London streets 
(Guardian)
A London morning that began tinged with joy and incredulity at 
victory in securing the Olympic Games was plunged into horrified 
disbelief as explosives tore through the underground arteries of the 
city, bringing death and dismay where, a few hours earlier, there had 
been celebration (Times)
As with their coverage of Madrid, there were plenty of headlines in the 
British papers to sum up the horrific scale and impact of the bombings:
Carnage on our streets (Star)
56 Minutes of Hell (Sun)
Panic, shoving, fear of fire and bonding below ground (Times)
We’re going to die! We’re going to die! Cries pierce choking air as 
survivors flee twisted wreckage of Tube (Mirror)
Aldgate: Stunned silence, darkness, panic, then calm (Guardian)
Copious space was also afforded to editorial and public pronouncements 
of horror, shock, condemnation and defiance. Yet apart from expressions 
of solidarity with the people of Madrid, there was very little in this 
sample of British newspapers to suggest any kind of linkage between 
what had happened to London and Madrid and what had befallen the 
people of Afghanistan and Iraq since 9/11. Of the 151 items in this 
newspaper sample, only two of them made the connection. Both of them 
were comment pieces for newspapers on opposite ends of the political 
the war correspondent
200
spectrum: from Andrew Alexander in the conservative Daily Mail and 
from Robert Fisk in the liberal Independent. In his column headed 
‘Revenge was only to be expected’, Alexander wrote that:
Now we know what it must be like to live in Baghdad. Now we see 
some of the consequences of our decision to let ourselves be hauled 
along in the wake of the Americans in a bogus cause, steeped in lies 
and deceit from start to finish and which has had consequences for 
Iraq – and now for us – which were both predictable and predicted.
We should fear that Tony Blair, flourishing phrases about ‘defeating 
terrorism’, will once more follow the George Bush line: we must not 
give in, we must see things through. Having dug ourselves into a hole, 
we must dig deeper. Our revenge, unmistakable.
And in his piece for The Independent – ‘The reality of this barbaric 
bombing’ – Robert Fisk had this to say:
[It’s] no use Mr Blair telling us yesterday that they will never succeed 
in destroying ‘what we hold dear’. ‘They’ are not trying to destroy 
‘what we hold dear’. They are trying to get public opinion to force Blair 
to withdraw from Iraq, from his alliance with the United States, and 
from his adherence to Bush’s policies in the Middle East. [...]
It is easy for Tony Blair to call yesterday’s bombings ‘barbaric’. Of 
course they were but what were the civilian deaths of the Anglo-
American invasion of Iraq – the children torn apart by cluster bombs, 
the countless innocent Iraqis gunned down at American military 
checkpoints? When they die, it is ‘collateral damage’; when ‘we’ die, it 
is ‘barbaric terrorism’.
As devastating as the attacks on Madrid and London seemed, they paled 
in comparison with the bombing Baghdad and Iraq withstood in 2003 at 
the hands of a western alliance determined to destroy Saddam Hussein’s 
weapons of mass destruction, which did not exist, and also end his 
alliance with Al Qaeda, which also did not exist. 
baghdad and iraq
From 21 March to early April 2003, the combined air forces of America, 
Britain and other western and Middle East allies, conducted 29,200 
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air strikes in Iraq.5 This was described as the Shock and Awe phase of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom but Shock and Awe was not merely a neat 
propaganda moniker for media consumption. It was a component part 
of a US military doctrine called ‘rapid dominance’ devised in 1996 by 
American military planners Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade of the 
National Defense University. Its key aim was to:
[Affect] the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary 
to fight or respond to our strategic policy ends through imposing a 
regime of Shock and Awe [...] against an adversary on an immediate 
or sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to carry on [and to] seize 
control of the environment and paralyze or so overload an adversary’s 
perceptions and understanding of events that the enemy would 
be incapable of resistance at the tactical and strategic levels. (1996, 
pp. 24–25)
While this may make rational sense in the context of a conventional 
battleground, it has very different connotations when applied against 
large population centres such as Baghdad. 
In this period of three weeks, America and its allies dropped 19, 948 
so-called precision weapons on Iraq – of which between 20 and 25 per 
cent missed their targets – and another 9,251 conventional bombs and 
missiles. The munitions these weapons delivered included firebombs, 
cluster bombs and white phosphorous. In both composition and effect, 
the firebombs used were the same as napalm, a weapon widely used by 
the US during the Vietnam War and subsequently banned for use against 
civilian populations by the UN Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons. The use of cluster bombs and white phosphorous against 
civilians is banned by the Geneva Conventions of War. Coalition forces 
also deployed armour-piercing weapons containing Depleted Uranium, 
a toxic contaminant that medical experts have linked to extraordinary 
levels of birth defects and child mortality in the Iraqi population.6 It 
is difficult to obtain precise figures for the civilian casualties of this 
onslaught but Iraq Body Count estimates a total civilian death toll of 
6,716. The total number of civilian deaths at the hands of coalition forces 
from 2003 to 2011 and the withdrawal of US troops is estimated to be 
15,132, or 13 per cent of all violent civilian deaths during the Iraq War.7 
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The devastation that Shock and Awe inflicted on Baghdad and other 
major cities and towns in Iraq, including the high civilian casualty rates 
and the destruction to vital civilian infrastructure such as power plants, 
and water and sewage systems, was not the ‘collateral damage of war’ 
as apologists might insist. By its own definition as a military doctrine, 
Shock and Awe was a deliberate campaign of terror designed to weaken 
the country for a land invasion. It was also illegal and it was opposed by 
large sections of public opinion in the west. Yet very few in the western 
media seemed to see it like that. 
Unlike the Gulf War 1991, which had almost unanimous public and 
political support, the bombing and invasion of Iraq in 2003 divided world 
opinion and was deeply controversial from beginning to end, not least 
because of its violent impact on the Iraqi population and its very dubious 
aims and objectives. British newspaper coverage certainly reflected these 
divisions but in the curious way that characterised British politics at the 
time. The most critical coverage came from the liberal left newspapers 
that were normally supportive of the Labour government of the day – 
the Guardian, The Independent and the Daily Mirror – while the right 
wing press gave it full and largely unwavering support. The contrast is 
illustrated at its most stark extreme by the front pages of the Daily Mirror 
and The Sun over the first two days of the Shock and Awe campaign, 21 
and 22 March:
The World Watched in Shock and Awe (Sun)
1000 Bombs in One Night (Sun)
Shocking and Awful – America’s Shameful ‘Shock and Awe’ Attack on 
Baghdad last night (Mirror)
Mass Destruction (Mirror) 
The Daily Star saw the opportunity for tasteless humour with the 
‘Bangdad 2’ (21 March); but the rest of the newspapers led with headlines 
and photographs that left readers in no doubt as to the scale and enormity 
of what Shock and Awe represented:
Firestorm (Mail)
The Sky Falls In on Baghdad (Mail)
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Bombs And Cruise Missiles Bring Death And Destruction to Baghdad 
In Biggest Blitz Of The City In 12 Years. Shocked and Awed (Express)
Blitz Sets Baghdad Ablaze (Telegraph)
Carrier Launches ‘Cataclysmic Bomb’ Campaign (Telegraph)
The Blitzing of Baghdad (Times)
A Modern Day Blitzkrieg (Guardian) 
Bubbles of Fire Tore Into the Sky Above Baghdad (Independent)
However, much of the uncritical coverage of Shock and Awe adopted 
the official, western propaganda line that the bombing was aimed not 
at the people of Iraq but at Saddam Hussein and his brutal regime. The 
Daily Mail themed its whole coverage as ‘War on Saddam’, and the other 
pro-war newspapers consistently reported with a nod to the official line:
War Planes Target Saddam’s House in Blitz on Baghdad (Telegraph)
Iraqi Tyrant Dead or Wounded. Son is Killed (Star)
Saddam’s Home and Palaces Hit as The Iraqi Capital Comes Under 
Intense Fire From Cruise Missile Attack on the First Full Day of 
Hostilities (Express)
But there was no focus in the pro-war papers on the impact that Shock 
and Awe might have on the people of Baghdad and Iraq; there were no 
stories of heroic acts or speeches of defiance; no tributes to the Iraqi 
emergency services; and no reporting of the horror, panic and fear that 
the people were experiencing under this sustained and overwhelming 
assault. In other words, the very basic human angle that defines their 
coverage of most terrorist attacks against civilian targets was absent in 
their treatment of Shock and Awe. This might be explained or excused 
in part by the impossibility or difficulty western reporters would have 
in trying to report the bombings from the point of view of Baghdad’s 
citizens. However, I would argue that it is made all the more impossible 
or difficult when the story is told within the unreal world of the war on 
terror, a world divided in two between gods and monsters, friends and 
enemies, and good and evil; and where, as Robert Fisk argued in the 
aftermath of the London bombings, attacks on ‘us’ constitute terrorism 
but attacks on ‘them’ are explained away with the almost meaningless 
label, ‘collateral damage’. 
In many ways, the war on terror paradigm has been as leaky as the 
new world order paradigm that preceded it in the 1990s. There is no 
the war correspondent
204
doubt that militant Islam still represents a threat to western interests and 
civilian populations – witness the various attacks in 2015, including that 
on Paris. And the paradigm does offer up certain patterns of thought 
reminiscent of the Cold War: the splitting of the world into blocs of ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’; the projection of threat and fear; and the policing of public 
opinion and behaviour by regimes of censorship and surveillance. What 
is required for a more structured and permanent paradigm of inter-
pretation like that of the old cold war, one that will produce consistent 
and apparently rational solutions for thought and action, is a global, 
inter-state conflict. This would involve a predictable game in which the 
players adhere to an agreed set of rules and preferable outcomes. There 
would be brinkmanship and crises for sure but these would be contained 
or resolved by a set of built-in safety mechanisms, including deterrence, 
diplomacy and hotlines. Each side would have a clearly defined sphere of 
global influence in which it would be allowed to do what it pleases without 
interference from the enemy. There would be espionage, sanctions and 
spy-swaps; and there would be set-piece summits, rhetorical confronta-
tion and even periods of détente and cooperation. 
the return of the evil empire
There are signs amid the apparent chaos and confusion of terror 
and disorder in the world today of certain nostalgia for the relative 
certainties and predictability that a new, cold war order like this might 
offer. All that is needed is a suitable enemy and there have been a few 
candidates, the most obvious among them being Russia, China and Iran. 
While occasional tensions with the latter two countries over territorial 
ambitions in the case of China and nuclear power in the case of Iran, 
these have only offered the west pieces in the Cold War jigsaw puzzle. 
Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula during the Ukrainian 
crisis in 2014, on the other hand, appeared to offer the complete set. 
The Crimea crisis in brief
The crisis over Crimea emerged in February 2014 against the backdrop 
of political instability in Ukraine. Growing protests on the streets of 
the capital, Kiev, forced from office the Russian-friendly but corrupt 
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President, Victor Yanukovych, which resulted in turn in the resignation 
of the government. The formation of a new, more nationalist and 
right-wing administration was viewed with suspicion and growing 
anxiety among the country’s ethnic Russian minority, especially in the 
Crimea, a region that was originally part of Russia but ‘gifted’ to Ukraine 
in 1954, during the Soviet era. It was also viewed with some conster-
nation in Moscow, whose interests in the Crimea were significant. The 
region’s capital, Sevastopol, was the base for Russia’s Black Sea fleet and 
a garrison of 25,000 troops. As tensions in the region mounted over the 
following weeks, with confrontations in the capital between pro-Russian 
and pro-Ukrainian demonstrators, Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin, 
appeared to lend tacit support for a return of the region to Russian 
jurisdiction by way of a referendum. On 2 March, a small force of 
Russian troops, without military identification or insignia, entered the 
region and took control of its two principal airports, a development 
that turned the situation into an international crisis. However, it quickly 
became apparent that the response from the US, Britain, NATO and 
the European Union was going to be limited to threats of economic 
and diplomatic sanctions. On 16 March, the people of Crimea voted in 
a referendum and returned a 95.5 per cent vote in favour of a return 
to Russian jurisdiction, a result received in the west with suspicion and 
derision. On 17 March, a triumphant President Putin welcomed the 
result in parliament and moved immediately to sign it into law. 
The following case study analysis of how British newspapers reported 
the crisis is based on a sample period from 23 February, just after the fall 
of the Ukrainian government, to 20 March 2014 inclusive, taking in the 
immediate aftermath of the Crimean referendum. The search of the Nexis 
database used the key words ‘Putin’ and ‘Crimea’, and generated a sample 
of 541 news and editorial items. The analysis reveals the construction of 
the classic Cold War enemy image as personified by Russian President, 
Vladimir Putin, and the outline formation of a new, Cold War paradigm 
for reporting and explaining the crisis. 
The Putin lexicon: a new enemy
The language used to depict the Russian leader and his actions and 
policies during the crisis produced a profile that if based on a clinical 
examination might justify a split diagnosis of a condition ranging from 
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paranoid-schizophrenia to psychopathy. I will offer a flavour of it here 
but for a complete list of words and phrases see Appendix 7 and Appendix 
8. The weight of content lies with the so-called elite newspapers – 
especially The Times and the Guardian, for whom international stories 
sit high in their news agendas. With the exception of The Daily Mail 
and Mail on Sunday, coverage in the popular press – the Sun, the Daily 
Mirror and the Daily Star – was minimal and produced little other than 
very bad headline puns on the name of the Russian leader: for example, 
‘Vlad’s troops go Russian in!’ (The Sun, 2 March); ‘The Vladfather’ (Sun 
17 March); and ‘Putin our place’ (Daily Mirror, 19 March). 
Among the elite newspapers, the most negative and subjective portrait 
by a long way was that of the Guardian, an ironic finding indeed when 
one considers that this was the newspaper of the great Morgan Philips 
Price, whose reporting of the Russian Revolution in 1917, and the 
ensuing allied intervention the following year, distinguished him from 
the majority of western journalists too ready to toe the propaganda 
line. The Guardian characterised the Russian president throughout the 
sample period as a ‘pugnacious’, ‘triumphant’ but ‘frustrated’ leader with a 
‘nostalgia for Soviet times’; he was a cross between an ‘unrepentant Cold 
War warrior’ and a ‘pre-1917 imperial nationalist’; a ‘KGB professional’ 
prone to ‘zero-sum thinking’, ‘flights of apparent fancy’, ‘bombast’, 
‘bile’ and ‘paranoia’. The ‘irredentist adventure’ in the Crimea was ‘a 
carve-up’ and a ‘land grab’ by a man at the head of an ‘expansionist’, ‘de 
facto dictatorship’. The Guardian’s sister paper, the Observer (Sunday), 
described Putin as ‘unpleasant’ and ‘ruthless man’ who demonstrated 
‘calm calculation’ in his handling of the wider crisis in the Ukraine. 
For the Daily Telegraph, Putin was a ‘steely’, ‘determined’, ‘strong man’; 
‘exerting power in the shadows’ and advancing his cause in Crimea using 
‘a covert network of influence’; his ‘paranoia’ and ‘macho politics’, as 
well as his ‘territorial aggression’, explained the motivations for his ‘land 
grab’, or ‘annexation’, of the Crimean peninsula. Putin was described 
in The Times as ‘Vlad the invader’, ‘chairman of the world’s unofficial 
Autocrat’s Club’ and a ‘master of the dark arts’; he was an ‘aggressive’ and 
‘enraged’ politician in the pursuit of ‘power games’ and ‘brinkmanship’. 
The Sunday Times described him as a man of ‘ruthless clarity of purpose’ 
and ‘permanent rage’, ready to promote his policies by way of ‘bribery’, 
‘bluff ’ and ‘threat’. The Daily Mail saw him as a ‘bogey man’ and a 
‘puppet master’ whose public demeanour was ‘defiant’, ‘aggressive’ and 
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‘emotional’; it, too, described the return of Crimea to Russia as a ‘land 
grab’, an ‘annexation’ and, alluding to Hitler’s annexation of Austria in 
1938, a ‘Russian anschluss’.8 The Sun depicted him as a ‘tyrant’ and ‘classic 
Bond villain’ engaged in a ‘titanic game of bluff ’ in the Crimea; while the 
Daily Mirror referred to him as a ‘hard man’ and the new ‘Rasputin’. 
Among the elite newspapers, The Independent was the most sober in 
its assessment of Putin, describing him as a ‘confident’, ‘business-like’ if 
somewhat ‘prickly’ leader in his dealings with the media. The paper’s 
strongest characterisation of his actions was to describe them, at best, 
as empty ‘sabre-rattling’; at worst, as post-Soviet ‘revanchism’; its sister 
paper, The Independent on Sunday, depicted him as a man of ‘calm 
calculation’ if somewhat ‘unpleasant’ and ‘ruthless’ by nature. Mary 
Dejevsky, columnist and chief editorial writer for the paper, has long 
experience of reporting on Russia, going back to her time as Moscow 
correspondent for The Times during the Soviet era. In an interview for 
this book,9 she explained the various misconceptions about Putin that 
seemed to drive this negative media coverage, ‘some of them deliberate 
and some of them not’:
The non-deliberate misconception is that he somehow imposed 
himself on Russia and that he’s not by any manner or means dem-
ocratically elected. [...] Nonetheless, Putin had huge amounts of 
support even before the annexation of Crimea. And to my mind, Putin 
is the legitimate President of Russia because he’s managed somehow 
to sense, like any good politician, where the centre of Russian opinion 
is at any particular point and he adjusts accordingly. So I think for all 
sorts of reasons he’s legitimate so to denounce him as illegitimate, a 
dictator, an autocrat, or whatever, that that’s actually wrong.
Another misconception is to see him as a dictator or latter-day Tsar, 
which is to over-estimate his real power in the country. As Dejevsky 
explains:
[While] Putin is strong personally, his power is very strong in the 
Kremlin, in the country at large he’s actually a weak leader because 
it’s very difficult for anybody in the Kremlin to have all the levers of 
power at his disposal. This great idea that Putin can sit in the Kremlin 
and snap his fingers and...people all turn around and do exactly as 
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he says – that is completely wrong. Russian power is extraordinarily 
fragmented – there are a lot of regional interests, a huge amount of 
corruption. One of Putin’s biggest problems ever since he became 
leader, and it’s only a little less now I would say, is that his writ doesn’t 
rule across Russia.
The surprisingly negative sometimes extreme image of the Russian 
leader in the Guardian might be explained, she suspects, by a recent 
change of editorial personnel in the paper, with the more sympathetic, 
left-of-centre Jonathan Steele giving way to Luke Harding, whose recent, 
negative experience of reporting post-Soviet Russia may be driving the 
paper’s more hard-line stance. 
Of course, the composite portrait of Putin in the British press that I 
have presented here does not amount to a psychological or clinical profile 
based on scientific method and evidence; although that did not stop the 
US-based website, Psychology Today, lending Putin’s enemy image some 
spurious legitimacy. In a piece entitled, ‘The Danger that Lurks Inside 
Vladimir Putin’s Brain’, Professor Ian H. Robertson of Trinity College 
Dublin concluded that ‘contempt is key to Putin’s troubling psychological 
profile’. Posted on 17 March 2014, the day after the referendum, Robertson 
explained that Putin’s contempt for international leaders, institutions 
and the rule of law is rooted in his ‘Marxist-Leninist worldview’, which 
treats such things as ‘instruments of capitalist or bourgeois oppression’; 
and in a national or political culture ‘where the ends justified the means.’ 
Without a shred of clinical evidence, Robertson declared that ‘there can 
be little doubt that [Putin’s] brain has been neurologically or physically 
changed so much that he firmly and genuinely believes that without him, 
Russia is doomed’. In his closing section, sub-headed, ‘How to handle a 
man like Putin’, the professor offers a prognosis using language more 
typical of a neoconservative ideologue than a professional psychologist:
I have little doubt that Putin feels personally humiliated by the fall 
of the Soviet Union and its empire and that, fuelled by power and 
with a blindness to risk, he will work ever harder to make good that 
humiliation through further dangerous adventures. He will be all the 
more driven by his feeling of personal and national superiority to the 
contemptibly weak, decadent and cowardly western powers – as he 
probably sees them.
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So how should the West respond? Psychologically speaking, the very 
worst response would be appeasement because this will simply fuel 
his contempt and strengthen the justification for his position. Strong 
consequences have to follow from his contempt for international law 
and treaties. This will cost the West dearly, economically speaking, but 
the longer-term costs of appeasement will make the costs of strong, 
early action appear trivial in retrospect.10 (Emphases added)
What this kind of pop psychology and media coverage represents is a 
symphony of hysteria in the service of propaganda. In past conflicts, such 
as the Gulf War 1991 and the Iraq War 2003, similar language to describe 
the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, as a ‘monster’ and a ‘new Hitler’, 
functioned as the drumbeats of war, softening domestic publics for the 
‘inevitable’ conflict to come (see, for example, Philo and McLaughlin, 
1995; Miller, 2004; Tumber and Palmer, 2004). The caricature of Putin 
as psychopath during the Crimea crisis, on the other hand, appeared 
to serve two different purposes. The first was to deflect from western 
responsibility for helping to provoke the crisis in the first place; and 
the second, intentionally or by default, was to distract from western 
impotence in the face of a military force they were not ready or willing 
to confront. This was apparent in the editorial and opinion pages of the 
newspapers examined in this case study.
Return of the Evil Empire and a new Cold War?
Beyond the extreme characterisations of the Russian leader, there was 
a clear difference of opinion within and between the newspapers about 
what the crisis actually represented in the context of wider, international 
relations. Some headlines made explicit reference to the possibility or 
danger that developments could lead to a new Cold War order:
Russia and NATO face off over Ukraine (Daily Telegraph, 27 February)
The crisis in Crimea could lead the world into a second Cold War 
(Observer, 2 March)
Europe’s peace at risk in new Cold war (The Daily Mail, 3 March)
And so the Cold War starts again (The Sunday Times, 16 March)
Crimea ‘could spark a new Cold War’ (Daily Express, 19 March)
the war correspondent
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Others added classic Cold War enemy imagery into the mix. A Sunday 
Telegraph analysis of the economic implications of the crisis was headed, 
‘Don’t mess with the Bear’ (9 March). While NATO could observe only 
limited Russian troop movements near the border with Ukraine, The 
Daily Mail, reported otherwise. Never a newspaper to allow rumour or 
baseless information to get in the way of a good scare story, it picked 
up a grossly exaggerated warning from ‘a senior security chief in Kiev’, 
that the Russian army was about to invade, and headlined it as fact: ‘Red 
Army masses on Ukraine border’ (13 March).
As the crisis mounted, culminating in the referendum and the return 
of Crimea to Russian jurisdiction, other newspaper items pinned 
responsibility for ensuing international tensions on Russia and Putin 
alone. In the wake of the 95.5 per cent ‘Yes’ vote, the Guardian’s editorial 
was headed, ‘Mr Putin and the threat of a new Cold War’ (17 March); 
while The Times reported on Putin’s triumphant speech in parliament, 
declaring the return of Russia to its rightful place on the world stage, 
with the headline, ‘Strutting Putin stokes a new Cold War as Crimea 
returns to the fold’ (The Times, 19 March).
Some editorial content provided a measure of perspective and warned 
against western over-reaction, not all of it exclusive to the liberal press. In 
The Daily Mail, for example, Steven Glover questioned the doublethink 
at the heart of western rhetoric. ‘Aren’t we guilty of hypocrisy?’ he asked:
When Russia was too weak for its complaints to be taken seriously, 
Britain and America bombed its regional ally Serbia in 1999, and then 
confiscated the Serbian enclave of Kosovo (which, by the by, remains 
a basket case bankrolled by the West). Why was that right and moral, 
whereas the return of Crimea to Russia with the approval of most of 
its population is wicked? I suggest that when it suits us we do what 
we think we can get away with, but that when the Russians act on the 
same principle we accuse them of violating moral norms and interna-
tional law. (‘Yes, Putin is a bully but aren’t we guilty of moral hypocrisy 
on Crimea?’ 20 March) 
Three column pieces in particular appeared in the Guardian, offering 
critical counterpoint to the newspaper’s negative news coverage. In a 
guest column headed, ‘This is no Cold War II’ (1 March), historian Tarik 
Cyril Amar argued that ‘talk of a return to the Cold War [in the West] is 
reporting the ‘war on terror’ and the return of the evil empire
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wide of the mark. Putin is not aggressive because he feels unchallenged 
by a flabby west. Since the end of the Soviet Union, the European Union 
and NATO have enlarged at the impressive clip of roughly one new 
member every two years.’ On that basis, he argued, the ongoing crisis 
in Ukraine, encouraged by the west, was from Putin’s point of view ‘a 
massive political defeat’. 
In separate articles, senior Guardian journalists, Jonathan Steele and 
Seamus Milne highlighted the hype and hypocrisy at the heart of the 
west’s response. With long experience reporting on Russian affairs, Steele 
pointed readers to NATO’s role in provoking the crisis in Ukraine and 
the Crimea: 
The fact that NATO insists on getting engaged reveals the elephant in 
the room: underlying the crisis in Crimea and Russia’s fierce resistance 
to potential changes is NATO’s undisguised ambition to continue two 
decades of expansion into what used to be called ‘post-Soviet space’. At 
the back of Pentagon minds, no doubt, is the dream that a US navy will 
one day replace the Russian Black Sea fleet in the Crimean ports. (‘Not 
too late for wisdom’, 3 March; emphases added)
On 6 March, Seamus Milne opened his column with the remark that: 
‘Diplomatic pronouncements are renowned for hypocrisy and double 
standards. But western denunciations of Russian intervention in Crimea 
have reached new depths of self-parody.’ With a swipe at the rhetoric 
of US Secretary John Kerry and his loud insistence that countries like 
Russia cannot just invade other countries on ‘a trumped up pretext’, 
Milne commented:
That the states which launched the greatest act of unprovoked 
aggression in modern history on a trumped-up pretext – against Iraq, 
in an illegal war now estimated to have killed 500,000, along with 
the invasion of Afghanistan, bloody regime change in Libya, and the 
killing of thousands in drone attacks on Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, 
all without UN authorisation – should make such claims is beyond 




In a column for The Independent, Mary Dejevsky highlighted the 
dangers of thinking about the crisis within a Cold War framework, ‘one 
of the greatest, and least recognised (of which is) misreading Russia.’ She 
explained that:
Already a Western consensus has gained hold, according to which 
Vladimir Putin has spent his 14 years in power just waiting for the 
chance to rebuild the Soviet empire, and here he is now, gleefully 
seizing it with both bloodied hands.
[...] But what if building a new Russian empire is not actually 
what Putin is about? Western leaders, egged on especially by those 
European countries that were scarred, and no wonder, by their bitter 
experience of Soviet domination, have created a Cold War bogey of 
Putin and Putin’s Russia that is lodged in their collective brain. Putin’s 
every move and every utterance is slotted into that logic and judged in 
that frame. The result is a predisposition to take literally what might 
not be meant literally, and all too often to discount what Putin and his 
officials actually say. (‘This aggression is more a cry to be heard than 
an attempt to invade a sovereign nation’, 7 March)
This knee-jerk foreign policy response to Russia’s actions seems to forget 
that the country today is very different in size and reach than when it 
was the hegemonic power of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. For 
a start, it is much smaller and less powerful; but, more importantly, it is 
only now coming to terms with the new geopolitics of the post-Soviet era 
and negotiating to secure its borders with its neighbours to the south (for 
example, the Transcaucuses and Central Asia). For that reason alone, 
Dejevsky rejects ‘the idea that Putin is an expansionist. It seems to me 
that [he] is much more concerned with Russia’s security inside its post 
Cold War borders and I think the West has completely ignored that.’11
concluding remarks
Whether or not this new Cold War framework hardens or not into 
something more coherent and persistent will depend on the future 
direction of Russia’s relationship with the west, on changes of leadership 
in Russia and the US, and whether that in turn leads to a softening or 
hardening of foreign policy stances. But if there is to be a real and existing 
reporting the ‘war on terror’ and the return of the evil empire
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new Cold War, then the kind of reporting we have seen in respect to 
Russia in the Crimean crisis does not promise great hope for a balanced, 
nuanced understanding of this most important international power 
play. The reporting of terrorism and terrorist attacks, of diplomatic 
crises, of inconvenient friends and unreliable enemies, must surely go 
beyond hysterical reaction, the projection of irrational fear and, as Mary 
Dejevsky puts it, deliberate and non-deliberate misconception. That, of 
course, will depend not just on the disposition, knowledge and under-
standing of the individual war or foreign correspondents but also on the 




‘Telling Truth to Power’ – the Ultimate 
Role of the War Correspondent?
This book has presented a critical, historically grounded analysis of the 
role of the war correspondent. It has highlighted the risks, the problems 
and the failures that have defined the role but it has also given credit 
where that is due and acknowledged the inspirational example of cor-
respondents such as William Howard Russell, Morgan Philips Price, 
Martha Gellhorn, Wilfred Burchett, John Pilger and Robert Fisk. Their 
work seems to bear testament to the ideal beloved of all journalists and 
writers, of ‘telling truth to power’. But as Arundhati Roy has argued, 
‘Power owns the truth [and] knows the truth just as well if not better 
than the powerless know the truth’ (2004, p. 68). In view of everything 
that has gone before in this book, I think she is right.
Telling truth to power does not change or lessen the risks and dangers 
that accompany the journalist in the war zone. And as we have seen, 
the risks are not equal; the level of special training, protection and insti-
tutional support journalists receive depends on the size and wealth of 
their media employer. It may be difficult to address such inequality at 
a structural level but it could at least be ameliorated by way of a central 
fund supported by the major international media and run by journalist 
organisations such as the International Press Institute (IPI) or the 
Committee for the Projection of Journalists (CPJ). There are other more 
avoidable, contentious risks that have troubled war reporters and various 
representative organisations. The CPJ has long campaigned to end the 
culture of impunity that surrounds the deliberate targeting and killing 
of journalists by various militaries. The essential difference between 
the regular armies of the USA or Israel, for example, and paramilitary 
organisations such as IS, is the degree to which they are bound by the 
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obligations of democratic legitimacy and accountability. In cases where 
there is substantial evidence that state combatants have killed or injured 
journalists, there should be independent judicial inquiry, not ‘internal 
investigations’ that rarely lead to prosecution, trial or conviction. 
Telling truth to power depends on having a strong and direct voice 
that will be heard. Yet the constraints of objectivity and impartiality 
often dampen rather than amplify the voice of the war correspon-
dent. In any case, the possibility of being objective and impartial in 
the warzone, in the face of horror and atrocity, varies according to 
the nature of the conflict, the level of public consensus or controversy 
abroad, or the extent of military censorship and restrictions in place. In 
other words, it is unlikely that the Journalism of Attachment that Martin 
Bell advocated during the Bosnian civil war would ever be possible or 
likely in the reporting of controversial conflicts such as Israel–Palestine 
or in the highly-organised wars we have seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Nonetheless, Bell was brave enough to cast off the metaphorical helmet 
and flak jacket to express what he thought, and felt as a human being 
before being a war correspondent, and incurred the wrath of those who 
preferred that he would be silent. The journalist may not be privy to 
all of the truth all of the time in such situations, but we might expect 
that he or she will be honest. Indeed, Chapter 3 of this book closed by 
asking how the western media can presume to report with impartiality 
an overwhelmingly asymmetrical conflict such as Israel–Palestine. 
Some might think it a naive question but I would suggest that the level 
of public ignorance and misunderstanding of that long running, bloody 
conflict, as so powerfully demonstrated by Greg Philo and Mike Berry 
(2004 and 2011), is down in part to the media’s failure to properly explain 
the asymmetries of the conflict in terms of history, military force and 
capability, political and diplomatic power and, most disturbing of all, 
civilian casualties, especially among children. If being objective and 
impartial makes explanation and context impossible or impractical in 
such cases then that is to effectively elide part of the truth.
As the advance of media technologies continues apace, telling truth 
to power should be easier and more impactful than ever before yet these 
technologies present the war reporter with a double-edged sword. The 
speed of communication is compressed into much shorter periods of time 
so that, while the difference between sending and receiving news of war 
by pony dispatch and telegraph in the nineteenth century was a matter 
the war correspondent
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of days, the difference between sending and receiving via satellite-cable 
in the late twentieth century and social media in the twenty-first is a 
matter of hours and seconds respectively. The opportunities this presents 
for reporting conflict with new urgency and immediacy are obvious 
but that in turn pressurises journalistic routines of fact checking and 
verification. Just like the telegraph, the social media may revolutionise 
the reporting of war but they may also empower the individual citizen 
to take a more direct, immediate and interactive part in the story of war 
in unpredictable and not always desirable ways. And as we have seen, 
combatant states and terrorist organisations have been just as wise to the 
immense propaganda potential of social media. The distance between 
speaking the truth and hearing the truth amid so much online noise may 
be virtually unbridgeable. 
Part II of this book put into the long historical perspective of 160 
years the relationship between the war correspondent and the military, 
a relationship that offers the journalist the most direct and obvious 
opportunity for telling truth to power. But the strategies and tactics that 
the military have developed to control and restrict reporting are designed 
not to answer to the truth but to deflect or even silence it, to create a 
control culture in which the majority of journalists conform to the 
restrictions in return for military lies, disinformation and propaganda. 
In this sense, the relationship has changed very little in the last century 
and a half. The military learn the lessons of the last war and then plan 
better ways to control the media in time for the next war, more often 
than not with a high degree of media cooperation. Most war correspon-
dents seem to forget the lessons in time for the next war, reserving regret 
and protest for their post-retirement memoirs. Independent journalists, 
the so-called ‘unilaterals’, can range beyond the confines of the army 
personnel carrier or the media briefing centre and seek out alternative 
stories and sources of information. They can fill in the information 
gaps, get to the hidden stories of war or expose the manipulation and 
propaganda that often frame the official briefing. This exposes them to 
considerably more risk than their embedded colleagues and while we 
might ask legitimate questions about their effectiveness we cannot doubt 
their honesty, their integrity and their courage. 
Telling truth to power is also subject to ideological constraint – to 
those political and cultural assumptions that socialise and discipline the 
journalist to make certain choices, to prefer one interpretative frame 
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over another. The book closed with an examination of two ideological 
frameworks that have been used to explain complex conflicts and crises, 
‘Cold War’ and ‘war on terror’, the seductive power to which war cor-
respondents are as susceptible as any other intellectual tribe. After 
all, it seems easier, more convenient, to tell stories of a global conflict 
between military and economic superpowers, or a worldwide alliance 
against terrorism and extremism, than to explain much more complex 
and uncertain realities. These narratives serve as a form of propaganda 
as effective as formal censorship, because they reduce our understanding 
to the lowest common denominators of friends and enemies, monsters 
and terrorists, heroes and psychopaths. In the wake of 9/11, the concept 
of a war on terror dominated public debate about conflict and security, 
constructing a regime of fear, self-censorship and passive consent in 
public life that has had its effect on media and journalism. But just as 
in the Cold War, with the peace and anti-nuclear movements, the war 
on terror has also met with a significant and heartening level of public 
resistance to the point where it has recently been dropped from official 
discourse (Burke, 2015, p. 169). We should not be complacent, though, 
because we are already seeing a possible replacement as the west enters 
into a new Cold War with Russia. If the reporting of the Crimean crisis 
of 2014 is anything to go by, there is little hope that truth will trump the 
fear and hysteria whipped up to control our responses and, as Herman 
and Chomsky (1988) would put it, ‘manufacture’ our consent.
The point I am making here, then, is that if we want to identify 
the ultimate role of the war correspondent, something practical and 
achievable, then the romantic notion of ‘telling truth to power’ falls 
rather short of the mark in most respects. The great war correspondents 
I have mentioned in this chapter have shown that the best the journalist 
can do in a time of war is not so much tell truth to power but spell out 






International Press Institute: 
Recommendations to News 
Organisations for Improving 
Journalists’ Safety
a. ‘Preservation of human life and safety is paramount. Staff and 
freelancers should be made aware that unwarranted risks in pursuit 
of a story are unacceptable and must be strongly discouraged. 
Assignments to war zones or hostile environments must be voluntary 
and should only involve experienced newsgathering practitioners.’
b. ‘All staff and freelancers asked to work in hostile environments must 
have access to appropriate safety training and retraining. Employers 
are encouraged to make this mandatory.’
c. ‘Employers must provide efficient safety equipment to all staff and 
freelancers assigned to hazardous locations, including personal-issue 
Kevlar vests or jackets, protective headgear and properly protected 
vehicles, if necessary.’
d. ‘All staff and freelancers should be afforded personal insurance 
while working in hostile areas, including coverage against death and 
personal injury.’
e. ‘Employers should provide and encourage the use of voluntary and 
confidential counselling for staff and freelancers returning from 
hostile areas, or after the coverage of distressing events. (This is likely 
to require some training of media managers in the recognition of the 
symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder).’
f. ‘Media companies and their representatives are neutral observers; 
they don’t carry firearms in the course of their work.’
g. ‘Media groups should work together to establish a data bank of safety 
information, including the exchange of up-to-date safety assessments 
of hostile and dangerous areas.’ 




The ‘Surviving Hostile Regions’  
Course for War Correspondents
AKE was the first company in the UK to design and deliver a course 
specifically for journalists.
Length: Courses are one to five days. The length and content of the 
courses are specifically tailored to type of business, area of operation and 
support available.
Cost of course: US$1,400.
Number of participants: Around 500 journalists have attended the 
course.
Staff: The course is taught by former British Special Air Service (SAS) 
personnel.
The three principles of the course: the awareness, anticipation, avoidance 
of unnecessary danger.
Types of courses: specialist training, team building, security, medical.
Specialist training includes a course called Surviving Hostile Regions. 
This course trains journalists for surviving hostile regions and 
environments: weather, disease and war.
The Surviving Hostile Regions syllabus:
• weapons and effects
• casualty assessment

























The company’s website allows participants to register online and purchase 
equipment such as individual trauma belt packs and medical-team belt 
kits.
It is located in Hereford, UK, but also offers courses in the United States.
Company website: www.akegroup.com.
(Source: Report 1.01, International Press Institute, Vienna, 2001)
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Appendix 3
British Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
Green Book Guidelines for the British 
Media Reporting the Gulf War, 1991
Restricted subjects (at the discretion of the Joint Information Bureau, 
Riyahd):
a. Composition of the force and the locations of ships, units and aircraft.
b. Details of military movements.
c. Operational orders.




h. Tactical details, e.g. defensive positions, camouflage methods, weapon 
capabilities or deployments.
i. Names or numbers of ships, aircraft, or military units.
j. Names of individual service men.
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Appendix 4 
US Military Ground Rules for Media 
Reporting of the Gulf War, 1991
The following information was restricted because its release could 
‘jeopardize operations and endanger lives’:
a. ‘Specific numerical information on troop strength’.
b. ‘Details of future military plans, operations or strikes, including 
postponed or cancelled operations’.
c. ‘Information, photography or imagery that would reveal specific 
location of military forces or show the level of security at military 
bases or encampments’.
d. ‘Rules of engagement details’.
e. ‘Information on intelligence collection activities, including targets, 
methods, and results’.
f. ‘Specific information on friendly force troop movements tactical 
deployments, and dispositions that would jeopardize operational 
security or lives’.
g. ‘Identification of mission aircraft points of origin’.
h. ‘Information on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of enemy 
camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct or indirect fire, 
intelligence collection, or security measures’.
i. ‘Specific identifying information on missing or downed aircraft or 
ships while search and rescue operations are planned or underway’.
j. Special operations forces’ methods, unique equipment or tactics’.
k. ‘Specific operating methods and tactics’.
l. ‘Information on operational or support vulnerabilities that could 
be used against US forces such as details of major battle damage or 
major personnel losses’.
(Source: Hughes, 1992, p. 460ff) 
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Appendix 5
US Department of Defense (DoD) 
Public Affairs Guidance (2003)  
for Embedded Reporters
DoD Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media During Possible 





‘We need to tell the factual story – good or bad – before others seed 
the media with disinformation and distortions. […] To accomplish 
this, we will embed media with our units. These embedded media will 
live, work and travel as part of the units with which they are embedded 




‘Violation of the ground rules may result in the immediate termination 
of the embed and removal from the AOR [Area of Responsibility].’
4.F. Categories of ‘releasable’ information:
4.f.1. Approximate friendly force strength figures.
4.f.2.  Approximate friendly casualty figures. Embedded media 
may within OPSEC (Operational Security) limits confirm 
unit casualties they have witnessed. 
4.f.3.  Confirmed figures of enemy personnel detained or 
captured.




4.f.5.  Information and location of military targets may be 
released when it no longer warrants security protection.
4.f.6.  Generic description of origin of air operations such as 
‘land-based’.
4.f.7.  Date, time, or location of previous conventional military 
mission, as well as mission results, are releasable only if 
described in general terms. 
4.f.8.  Types of ordnance expended if described in general terms.
4.f.9.  Number of aerial combat or reconnaissance missions or 
sorties flown in CentCom’s area of operation.
4.f.10.  Type of forces involved.
4.f.11.  Allied participation by type of operation.
4.f.12.  Operational code names.
4.f.13.  Names and home towns of US military units.
4.f.14.  Service members’ names and home towns with the 
individuals’ consent.
4.G.  Categories of information that are not releasable since their 
publication or broadcast could jeopardize operations and 
endanger lives. 
4.g.1.  Specific number of troops in units below corps/MEF 
[Marine Expeditionary Force] level.
4.g.2. Specific number of aircraft in units at or below the air 
expeditionary wing level.
4.g.3.  Specific numbers regarding other equipment or critical 
supplies.
4.g.4.  Specific numbers of ships in units below the carrier battle 
group level.
4.g.5.  Names of military installations or specific geographic 
locations of military units in the CentCom [AOR] unless 
specifically released by the [DoD] or authorized by the 
CentCom Commander. 
4.g.6.  Information regarding future operations.
4.g.7.  Information regarding force protection measures [...] 
except those that are readily apparent. 
4.g.8.  Photography showing level of security at military installa-
tions or encampments.
4.g.9.  Rules of engagement.
4.g.10.  Information on intelligence collection activities.
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4.g.11.  Extra precautions in reporting will be required at the 
commencement of hostilities to maximize operational 
surprise. 
4.g.12.  During an operation, specific information on friendly force 
troop movements, tactical deployments, and dispositions 
that would jeopardize operational security or lives. 
Information on on-going engagements will not be released 
unless authorized for release by on-scene commander.
4.g.13.  Information on special operations units.
4.g.14. Information on effectiveness of enemy electronic warfare.
4.g.15.  Information identified postponed or cancelled operations.
4.g.16.  Information on missing or downed aircraft or missing 
vehicles while search and rescue operations are being 
planned or underway. 
4.g.17.  Information on effectiveness of enemy camouflage, cover, 
deception, targeting, direct or indirect fire, intelligence 
collection, or security measures.
4.g.18.  No photographs or other visual media showing an enemy 
prisoner of war or detainee’s recognizable face, nametag, 
or other identifying feature or item may be taken.
4.g.19.  Still or video imagery of custody operations [...].
4.H.  Procedures and policies applying to coverage of wounded, 
injured, and ill personnel.
5. Immunizations and personal protective gear.
6. Security.
7. Miscellaneous/Coordinating instructions. 
(Source: US Department of Defense, 2003)
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Appendix 6
British Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
Green Book, 2013: Working 
Arrangements with the Media for Use 
Through the Full Spectrum of Conflict
Section 22. The embed system: 
The purpose of embedding correspondents with units and formation 
headquarters is to enable the media to gain a deeper understanding of 
the operation in which they are involved, particularly through access to 
personnel and commanders. They will be afforded all possible briefings 
and other facilities, including the opportunity to accompany British 
troops during war-fighting operations. Their individual requirements 
will be met wherever possible. In return, they are likely to be subject to 
some military orders and training, both for their own safety and that of 
the unit.
Section 29. Briefing release caveats: MOD and military spokesmen will 
offer these briefings at various levels under one of the following terms. The 
conditions of any briefing will be stated in advance:
• Attributable: The information is for use and can be quoted in full. 
It will be either “directly attributable” (where the spokesman can 
be identified by name), or “indirectly attributable” (where the 
person providing the information cannot be identified by name 
but can normally be described as “a MOD official”, “a UK military 
spokesman”, etc).
• Unattributable: The information may be used but may not 
be attributed to a named source, either an individual or the 
organisation involved. Hence, for example, “military sources”, or 




• Background: the information is given to aid greater understanding. 
It will be stated at the time whether it may be used but, if used, may 
not be attributed in any way, except as though from a journalist’s 
own knowledge. 
• Not for Use: The information may not be published and is given 
only to aid greater understanding. The term “off the record”, is 
sometimes misinterpreted, misunderstood and misused. It should 
not be employed.
(Source: Joint Service Publication 580, Version 8, 31 January 2013)
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Appendix 7
British Newspaper Descriptions of 
President Putin During the Crimea 
Crisis, 21 February–20 March 2014









• Bully  (2)
• Business-like
• Chairman of the world’s unofficial Autocrat’s Club 


























• Pre-1917 imperial nationalist
• Prickly
• Pugnacious 




• Ruthless  (2)
• Steely  (2)







• Tyrant  (2)
• Uncompromising  (2)
• Unpleasant





• Vlad the Invader
• Wooden
(The survey of newspapers for the stated period was based on a search of the 
Nexis newspaper database using the search terms ‘Putin’ and ‘Crimea’. The 
resulting sample of 541 news and editorial items included London editions of 
the Daily Telegraph, Times, Daily Mail, Daily Express, Guardian, Independent, 
Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Star, Sunday Times, Sunday Telegraph, Independent on 
Sunday, Observer, Mail on Sunday and Sunday Express. To avoid unwarranted 




British Newspaper Descriptions  
of President Putin’s Policies and  
Actions During the Crimea Crisis,  
21 February–20 March 2014
(Frequency of more than one occurrence in brackets)
• Acting defensively
• Aggression  (4)
• Aggrieved party
• Anger











• Covert network of influence
• Cynicism
• De facto dictatorship
• Determination
• Exerting power in the shadows
• Flights of apparent fancy
• Irredentist adventure





• Muscle flexing  (2)
• Nazi tactics





• Politics of grievance
• Power games
• Propaganda
• Putsch  (2)




• Ruthless clarity of purpose
• Ruthless determination
• Sabre rattling  (4)
• Strong-arm threats
• Threat






(The survey of newspapers for the stated period was based on a search of the Nexis 
newspaper database using the search terms ‘Putin’ and ‘Crimea’ The resulting 
sample of 541 news and editorial items included London editions of the Daily 
Telegraph, Times, Daily Mail, Daily Express, Guardian, Independent, Sun, Daily 
Mirror, Daily Star, Sunday Times, Sunday Telegraph, Independent on Sunday, 
Observer, Mail on Sunday and Sunday Express. To avoid unwarranted duplication 
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chapter 2: the war correspondent:  
risk, motivation and tradition
 1. For the purposes of clarity and simplicity, I have taken the IPI and CPJ as my 
principal sources for information on the risks and dangers of war reporting. 
However, this is not to ignore the work of similar organisations such as 
Reporters Without Borders and the Freedom Foundation. 
 2. See IPI website: www.freemedia.at
 3. See CPJ website: www.cpj.org
 4. ‘‘Who killed my dad?’ – The death of Terry Lloyd’, ITV, ITN Productions, 21 
March 2013.
 5. Jim Boumelha (2010) ‘US must deliver justice on friendly fire’, Comment is 
Free in Guardian, 10 April (www.theguardian.com, consulted July 2014). 
 6. See: ‘War Spin: Saving Private Lynch’, Correspondent, BBC2, 18 May 2003.
 7. Source: ‘Collateral Murder’, online article (https://collateralmurder.
wikileaks.org, consulted July 2014).
 8. The most cited sources in news reports appear to be the United Nations and 
the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR). The United 
Nations (UN) decided to stop monitoring the ongoing death toll at the end 
of 2013 because of the attendant dangers of doing so.
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